diff --git a/contracts/escrow/src/lib.rs b/contracts/escrow/src/lib.rs
index 82ccfaf..6231be9 100644
--- a/contracts/escrow/src/lib.rs
+++ b/contracts/escrow/src/lib.rs
@@ -232,12 +232,14 @@ impl Escrow {
         }
         let key = DataKey::Usage(agent.clone(), service_id.clone());
         let prev: u32 = env.storage().persistent().get(&key).unwrap_or(0);
+        // saturate: settlement drains long before u32::MAX; never panic the hot path.
         let total = prev.saturating_add(requests);
         env.storage().persistent().set(&key, &total);
 
         // Cross-service lifetime counter for the agent. Saturates at u32::MAX.
         let total_key = DataKey::TotalUsageByAgent(agent.clone());
         let prev_total: u32 = env.storage().persistent().get(&total_key).unwrap_or(0);
+        // saturate: settlement drains long before u32::MAX; never panic the hot path.
         env.storage()
             .persistent()
             .set(&total_key, &prev_total.saturating_add(requests));
@@ -248,6 +250,7 @@ impl Escrow {
             .persistent()
             .get(&DataKey::TotalRequestsAllTime)
             .unwrap_or(0);
+        // u64 horizon; saturate not panic.
         env.storage().persistent().set(
             &DataKey::TotalRequestsAllTime,
             &proto_prev.saturating_add(requests as u64),
@@ -350,6 +353,8 @@ impl Escrow {
             .persistent()
             .get(&DataKey::ServicePrice(service_id))
             .unwrap_or(0);
+        // saturate: read/settle path returns a sentinel-large value rather than
+        // panicking; off-chain loop treats saturation as an error signal.
         (requests as i128).saturating_mul(price)
     }
 
@@ -377,6 +382,8 @@ impl Escrow {
             .persistent()
             .get(&DataKey::ServicePrice(service_id.clone()))
             .unwrap_or(0);
+        // saturate: read/settle path returns a sentinel-large value rather than
+        // panicking; off-chain loop treats saturation as an error signal.
         let billed = (requests as i128).saturating_mul(price);
         env.storage().persistent().set(&usage_key, &0u32);
         env.storage().persistent().set(
diff --git a/contracts/escrow/src/test.rs b/contracts/escrow/src/test.rs
index 2d924db..c0c30f6 100644
--- a/contracts/escrow/src/test.rs
+++ b/contracts/escrow/src/test.rs
@@ -697,3 +697,82 @@ fn test_pause_pause_unpause_ends_unpaused() {
 
     assert!(!client.is_paused());
 }
+
+// --- Arithmetic overflow/saturation policy (see docs/escrow/arithmetic.md) ---
+
+#[test]
+fn test_per_pair_usage_saturates_at_u32_max() {
+    let env = Env::default();
+    let (client, _admin) = setup_initialized(&env);
+
+    let agent = Address::generate(&env);
+    let service_id = Symbol::new(&env, "weather_api");
+
+    // record_usage takes a u32 delta, so reach the boundary across two calls:
+    // (u32::MAX - 1) then 5 more would overflow -> must clamp at u32::MAX.
+    client.record_usage(&agent, &service_id, &(u32::MAX - 1));
+    let record = client.record_usage(&agent, &service_id, &5u32);
+
+    assert_eq!(record.requests, u32::MAX);
+    assert_eq!(client.get_usage(&agent, &service_id), u32::MAX);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_total_usage_by_agent_saturates_at_u32_max() {
+    let env = Env::default();
+    let (client, _admin) = setup_initialized(&env);
+
+    let agent = Address::generate(&env);
+    // Two distinct services so the per-pair counters do not themselves clamp
+    // before the per-agent lifetime counter does.
+    let svc_a = Symbol::new(&env, "svc_a");
+    let svc_b = Symbol::new(&env, "svc_b");
+
+    client.record_usage(&agent, &svc_a, &(u32::MAX - 1));
+    client.record_usage(&agent, &svc_b, &10u32);
+
+    assert_eq!(client.get_total_usage_by_agent(&agent), u32::MAX);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_compute_billing_saturates_at_i128_max() {
+    let env = Env::default();
+    let (client, admin) = setup_initialized(&env);
+    let _ = &admin;
+
+    let agent = Address::generate(&env);
+    let service_id = Symbol::new(&env, "expensive");
+
+    // Huge price; any positive usage makes requests*price overflow i128.
+    client.set_service_price(&service_id, &i128::MAX);
+    client.record_usage(&agent, &service_id, &2u32);
+
+    assert_eq!(client.compute_billing(&agent, &service_id), i128::MAX);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_compute_billing_zero_price_is_zero() {
+    let env = Env::default();
+    let (client, _admin) = setup_initialized(&env);
+
+    let agent = Address::generate(&env);
+    let service_id = Symbol::new(&env, "free_api");
+
+    // Zero price (free service): any usage bills to zero.
+    client.set_service_price(&service_id, &0i128);
+    client.record_usage(&agent, &service_id, &1000u32);
+
+    assert_eq!(client.compute_billing(&agent, &service_id), 0);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_settle_unused_pair_returns_zero() {
+    let env = Env::default();
+    let (client, _admin) = setup_initialized(&env);
+
+    let agent = Address::generate(&env);
+    let service_id = Symbol::new(&env, "never_used");
+
+    // No usage recorded and no price set: settle bills zero.
+    assert_eq!(client.settle(&agent, &service_id), 0);
+}
diff --git a/docs/escrow/arithmetic.md b/docs/escrow/arithmetic.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eee8e63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/escrow/arithmetic.md
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+# Escrow arithmetic: overflow & saturation policy
+
+This document records the deliberate integer-arithmetic strategy used by the
+escrow contract (`contracts/escrow/src/lib.rs`). The policy is twofold:
+
+1. **All accumulator and billing math saturates** — it never wraps and never
+   panics the host on overflow.
+2. **`overflow-checks = true` on the release profile** is a defense-in-depth
+   backstop: any *non-saturating* `+`/`*` that gets added later will panic
+   (trap) on overflow instead of silently wrapping. This is intentional —
+   wrapping is the one outcome we never want on-chain.
+
+## Why saturate instead of checked/panic?
+
+Two distinct call contexts share the same answer:
+
+- **Hot write path (`record_usage`).** This is the most frequently called
+  entrypoint. Panicking here would block an agent from recording legitimate
+  usage and could wedge the off-chain metering loop. The counters are designed
+  to be drained by `settle` long before any realistic overflow horizon, so the
+  safe failure mode is to clamp rather than to abort a state transition.
+- **Read / settle path (`compute_billing`, `settle`).** These are read-mostly
+  and are consumed by an off-chain settlement loop. Returning a clamped
+  sentinel value lets that loop *detect* an anomaly and react, rather than
+  having the host trap and the loop receive no signal at all.
+
+## Saturating sites
+
+| Site | Expression | Type | Rationale |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| `record_usage` — per-pair counter | `prev.saturating_add(requests)` | `u32` | saturate: settlement drains long before `u32::MAX`; never panic the hot path |
+| `record_usage` — `TotalUsageByAgent` | `prev_total.saturating_add(requests)` | `u32` | same: lifetime per-agent counter, clamp not panic |
+| `record_usage` — `TotalRequestsAllTime` | `proto_prev.saturating_add(requests as u64)` | `u64` | `u64` horizon; saturate not panic |
+| `compute_billing` | `(requests as i128).saturating_mul(price)` | `i128` | saturate: read path returns a sentinel-large value rather than panicking; off-chain loop treats saturation as an error signal |
+| `settle` | `(requests as i128).saturating_mul(price)` | `i128` | same math as `compute_billing`; settle path returns sentinel rather than panicking |
+
+`price` is validated `>= 0` at `set_service_price`, and `requests` is a `u32`,
+so the multiplicands are always non-negative and the only reachable boundary is
+`i128::MAX`.
+
+## What a saturated value MEANS to downstream consumers
+
+A saturated value is **never** a silent wrap-around and **never** an ordinary
+result. It is an out-of-band signal:
+
+- A per-pair / per-agent counter pinned at `u32::MAX` means usage has been
+  accumulating without ever being drained — i.e. the settlement loop is **stuck
+  or not running** for that pair. Settlement resets the per-pair counter to
+  zero, so a pinned counter is an accounting anomaly to investigate, not a bill
+  to charge.
+- A billing value equal to `i128::MAX` means `requests * price` overflowed
+  `i128`. The off-chain settlement loop must treat this as an **error signal**
+  (stuck settlement / mis-configured price), not as a real amount to transfer.
+
+In all cases the contract has preserved a defined, monotonic, non-wrapping
+value; correctness of the *response* to that value is the off-chain consumer's
+responsibility.
+
+## Defense-in-depth backstop
+
+The release profile sets:
+
+```toml
+[profile.release]
+overflow-checks = true
+```
+
+This does not affect the saturating operations above (they cannot overflow by
+construction). Its purpose is forward-looking: if a future change introduces a
+plain `+` or `*` on a path that *can* overflow, the release build will trap
+rather than wrap. Wrapping arithmetic on accounting state is the single outcome
+this policy rules out; saturation is the chosen graceful behaviour and the
+overflow check is the safety net for everything else.