Status: draft for locally distributed pre-release desktop builds.
This notice explains what ShellKrypt stores, processes, shares, and avoids collecting. Delete the open questions and review the notice before public release.
ShellKrypt does not collect personal data through a ShellKrypt backend. It stores and processes user-provided vault data locally for encrypted-vault workflows and does not provide hosted accounts, telemetry, cloud sync, or remote recovery by default.
This notice applies to:
- ShellKrypt desktop builds and their local vault, settings, backup, export, clipboard, and activity workflows.
- Shared mobile foundations when they use the same local-only storage model.
- Local files created explicitly through ShellKrypt.
This notice does not apply to:
- Third-party operating systems, app stores, package sources, clipboard managers, backup tools, cloud-sync clients, or distribution channels.
- Files users independently upload, share, copy, or process outside ShellKrypt.
| Data Category | Purpose | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vault records and activity | Store credentials, notes, project records, and local history | Yes for vault use | Sensitive payloads and activity details are encrypted in .skvault files |
| App settings and vault registry | Remember preferences and known local vault paths | No | Stored in local app metadata; does not contain raw item secrets |
| Backups and exports | User-directed backup, restore, and reporting | No | .skbx is encrypted; plaintext exports are decrypted files |
| Clipboard contents | User-directed copy actions | No | Shared with the operating-system clipboard temporarily and cleared best-effort |
- Master passwords, backup passphrases, vault contents, or exports through a ShellKrypt server.
- Usage analytics, advertising identifiers, or telemetry by default.
- Crash reports, hosted account identifiers, or remote recovery material by default.
The project uses data to:
- Unlock, display, edit, search, audit, back up, restore, import, and export local vault records.
- Remember local settings, vault locations, safe operation history, and audit dismissals.
- Fulfill explicit copy, reveal, file-picker, scanner, backup, and export actions.
The project does not use data to:
- Build advertising profiles, sell user data, or operate analytics.
- Synchronize or recover vaults through a ShellKrypt-hosted service.
| External System Or Action | Data Shared | Reason | Optional |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operating-system clipboard | Value explicitly copied by the user | Paste into another application | Yes |
| User-selected filesystem location | Vault, backup, export, or report selected by the user | Local storage or transfer | Yes |
| User-selected project scan folder | Local filenames and text read by the scanner | Explicit Project Secrets analysis | Yes |
ShellKrypt does not automatically send this data to the project owner. Other software on the device may observe files, paths, clipboard contents, or process memory according to operating-system permissions.
- Choices or controls: users choose vault locations, clipboard behavior, backup settings, imports, exports, scans, and optional app preferences.
- Delete data: delete items or a confirmed vault through the app, and separately delete backups, exports, reports, and app metadata from their locations.
- Export data: create an encrypted
.skbxbackup or an explicitly warned plaintext report. - Close account or remove access: not applicable because ShellKrypt has no hosted account by default.
- There is no password recovery; a forgotten master password or backup passphrase may make data permanently inaccessible.
- Plaintext exports, clipboard values, unlocked process memory, local paths, and user-shared files are outside the encrypted-at-rest vault boundary.
- ShellKrypt is not externally audited, and local encryption does not protect a fully compromised device or malicious build.
This notice may change when ShellKrypt changes how it handles data. Meaningful privacy changes should be recorded in CHANGELOG.md or release notes before affected features are distributed.
- What privacy disclosures will be required by future app stores and distribution channels?
- Will optional crash reporting or update checking ever be proposed, and what consent model would it require?
- Which local metadata should receive additional encryption or retention controls before public 1.0?