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Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: src/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-proces-abuse/macos-ipc-inter-process-communication/macos-xpc/macos-xpc-authorization.md
-**CVE-2025-65842 – Acustica Audio Aquarius HelperTool**: The privileged Mach service `com.acustica.HelperTool` accepts every connection and its `checkAuthorization:` routine calls `AuthorizationCopyRights(NULL, …)`, so any 32‑byte blob passes. `executeCommand:authorization:withReply:` then feeds attacker-controlled comma‑separated strings into `NSTask` as root, making payloads such as:
trivially create a SUID root shell. Details in [this write-up](https://almightysec.com/helpertool-xpc-service-local-privilege-escalation/).
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-**CVE-2025-55076 – Plugin Alliance InstallationHelper**: The listener always returns YES and the same NULL `AuthorizationCopyRights` pattern appears in `checkAuthorization:`. Method `exchangeAppWithReply:` concatenates attacker input into a `system()` string twice, so injecting shell metacharacters in `appPath` (e.g. `"/Applications/Test.app";chmod 4755 /tmp/rootbash;`) yields root code execution via the Mach service `com.plugin-alliance.pa-installationhelper`. More info [here](https://almightysec.com/Plugin-Alliance-HelperTool-XPC-Service-Local-Privilege-Escalation/).
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-**CVE-2024-4395 – Jamf Compliance Editor helper**: Running an audit drops `/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.jamf.complianceeditor.helper.plist`, exposes the Mach service `com.jamf.complianceeditor.helper`, and exports `-executeScriptAt:arguments:then:` without verifying the caller’s `AuthorizationExternalForm` or code signature. A trivial exploit `AuthorizationCreate`s an empty reference, connects with `[[NSXPCConnection alloc] initWithMachServiceName:options:NSXPCConnectionPrivileged]`, and invokes the method to execute arbitrary binaries as root. Full reversing notes (plus PoC) in [Mykola Grymalyuk’s write-up](https://khronokernel.com/macos/2024/05/01/CVE-2024-4395.html).
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-**CVE-2025-25251 – FortiClient Mac helper**: FortiClient Mac 7.0.0–7.0.14, 7.2.0–7.2.8 and 7.4.0–7.4.2 accepted crafted XPC messages that reached a privileged helper lacking authorization gates. Because the helper trusted its own privileged `AuthorizationRef`, any local user able to message the service could coerce it into executing arbitrary configuration changes or commands as root. Details in [SentinelOne’s advisory summary](https://www.sentinelone.com/vulnerability-database/cve-2025-25251/).
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