diff --git a/agents/langchain-deepagents-code/dcode-wrapper.sh b/agents/langchain-deepagents-code/dcode-wrapper.sh
index 70c99dbb2a..06812fdfe7 100755
--- a/agents/langchain-deepagents-code/dcode-wrapper.sh
+++ b/agents/langchain-deepagents-code/dcode-wrapper.sh
@@ -119,6 +119,10 @@ run_dcode() {
 #       TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN, DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN) are allowed only when the value
 #       matches the platform-specific token shape AND does not embed a
 #       non-platform canonical secret prefix.
+#     * Local OTLP collector endpoints are allowed only for OTLP endpoint names,
+#       only as canonical HTTP URLs to loopback/OpenShell host aliases on
+#       standard OTLP ports, and never for OTLP headers or other credential
+#       names.
 #     * The env-file parser strips a leading `export ` keyword (mirroring
 #       python-dotenv) and rejects values containing dotenv expansion ($VAR,
 #       ${VAR}), command substitution ($(...) or backticks), because upstream
@@ -351,6 +355,59 @@ is_allowed_openshell_runtime_value() {
   [ "$name" = "OPENSHELL_TLS_KEY" ] && [ "$value" = "$OPENSHELL_TLS_KEY_PATH" ]
 }
 
+is_local_otlp_endpoint_name() {
+  case "$1" in
+    OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT | OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_TRACES_ENDPOINT)
+      return 0
+      ;;
+  esac
+  return 1
+}
+
+is_allowed_local_otlp_endpoint_value() {
+  local value="$1"
+  local rest authority host port path
+  case "$value" in
+    http://*) rest="${value#http://}" ;;
+    *) return 1 ;;
+  esac
+  case "$rest" in
+    "" | *[[:space:]]* | *\'* | *\"* | *\\* | *\?* | *\#* | *%* | *@*)
+      return 1
+      ;;
+  esac
+  authority="${rest%%/*}"
+  [ -n "$authority" ] || return 1
+  path="${rest#"$authority"}"
+  if [[ "$authority" == \[::1\]:* ]]; then
+    host="::1"
+    port="${authority##*:}"
+  else
+    case "$authority" in
+      *:*)
+        host="${authority%%:*}"
+        port="${authority#*:}"
+        ;;
+      *)
+        return 1
+        ;;
+    esac
+  fi
+  [ "$port" = "4317" ] || [ "$port" = "4318" ] || return 1
+  case "$host" in
+    localhost | 127.0.0.1 | ::1 | host.openshell.internal | host.docker.internal | host.containers.internal) ;;
+    *)
+      return 1
+      ;;
+  esac
+  case "$path" in
+    "" | / | /v1/traces)
+      return 0
+      ;;
+  esac
+  return 1
+}
+
 is_dynamic_dotenv_value() {
   local value="$1"
   case "$value" in
@@ -445,6 +502,9 @@ assert_no_secret_runtime_env() {
     if is_secret_shaped_value "$value"; then
       refuse_secret_env "runtime environment variable" "$name"
     fi
+    if is_local_otlp_endpoint_name "$name" && is_allowed_local_otlp_endpoint_value "$value"; then
+      continue
+    fi
     if has_credential_name_context "$name" && [ ${#value} -ge 10 ] && ! is_allowed_openshell_runtime_value "$name" "$value"; then
       refuse_secret_env "runtime environment variable" "$name"
     fi
diff --git a/agents/langchain-deepagents-code/managed-dcode-runtime.py b/agents/langchain-deepagents-code/managed-dcode-runtime.py
index c6760db1fe..c3919553fd 100644
--- a/agents/langchain-deepagents-code/managed-dcode-runtime.py
+++ b/agents/langchain-deepagents-code/managed-dcode-runtime.py
@@ -51,6 +51,20 @@
     "OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_HEADERS",
     "OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_TRACES_HEADERS",
 }
+_LOCAL_OTLP_ENDPOINT_ENV_NAMES = {
+    "OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT",
+    "OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_TRACES_ENDPOINT",
+}
+_LOCAL_OTLP_ENDPOINT_HOSTS = {
+    "localhost",
+    "127.0.0.1",
+    "::1",
+    "host.openshell.internal",
+    "host.docker.internal",
+    "host.containers.internal",
+}
+_LOCAL_OTLP_ENDPOINT_PORTS = {4317, 4318}
+_LOCAL_OTLP_ENDPOINT_PATHS = {"", "/", "/v1/traces"}
 # Python's \s also includes control separators that ECMAScript excludes, so
 # spell out the canonical whitespace set for cross-runtime parity.
 _ECMASCRIPT_NON_WHITESPACE_SECRET_CHAR = (
@@ -213,6 +227,44 @@ def _is_managed_value(name: str, value: str) -> bool:
     return False
 
 
+def _is_allowed_local_otlp_endpoint(name: str, value: str) -> bool:
+    if name.upper() not in _LOCAL_OTLP_ENDPOINT_ENV_NAMES:
+        return False
+    if not value.isascii() or any(
+        character.isspace()
+        or ord(character) < 32
+        or ord(character) == 127
+        for character in value
+    ):
+        return False
+    if any(character in value for character in ("%", "\\", "'", '"')):
+        return False
+    parsed = urlsplit(value)
+    if (
+        parsed.scheme != "http"
+        or not value.startswith("http://")
+        or not parsed.netloc
+        or parsed.hostname is None
+        or parsed.username is not None
+        or parsed.password is not None
+        or parsed.query
+        or parsed.fragment
+        or parsed.path not in _LOCAL_OTLP_ENDPOINT_PATHS
+    ):
+        return False
+    try:
+        port = parsed.port
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+    if (
+        port not in _LOCAL_OTLP_ENDPOINT_PORTS
+        or parsed.hostname not in _LOCAL_OTLP_ENDPOINT_HOSTS
+    ):
+        return False
+    host = f"[{parsed.hostname}]" if ":" in parsed.hostname else parsed.hostname
+    return value == f"http://{host}:{port}{parsed.path}"
+
+
 def _assert_safe_environment() -> None:
     for name, value in os.environ.items():
         if _OPENSHELL_ENV_PLACEHOLDER_PREFIX in value:
@@ -224,14 +276,22 @@ def _assert_safe_environment() -> None:
             )
         if _is_managed_value(name, value):
             continue
-        if _contains_secret_shape(value) or (
-            len(value) >= 10
-            and (
-                _CREDENTIAL_NAME.search(name)
-                or _CREDENTIAL_CAMEL_NAME.search(name)
+        if _contains_secret_shape(value):
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                f"runtime environment variable {name} contains a credential; "
+                "use NemoClaw credential handling"
+            )
+        if _is_allowed_local_otlp_endpoint(name, value):
+            continue
+        if (
+            (
+                len(value) >= 10
+                and (
+                    _CREDENTIAL_NAME.search(name)
+                    or _CREDENTIAL_CAMEL_NAME.search(name)
+                )
             )
-        ) or (
-            bool(value) and name.upper() in _CREDENTIAL_ENV_NAMES
+            or (bool(value) and name.upper() in _CREDENTIAL_ENV_NAMES)
         ):
             raise RuntimeError(
                 f"runtime environment variable {name} contains a credential; "
diff --git a/test/langchain-deepagents-code-direct-module-patch.test.ts b/test/langchain-deepagents-code-direct-module-patch.test.ts
index 2a4af1afa8..9f9f328db6 100644
--- a/test/langchain-deepagents-code-direct-module-patch.test.ts
+++ b/test/langchain-deepagents-code-direct-module-patch.test.ts
@@ -350,6 +350,35 @@ check("disabled", False)
     }
   });
 
+  it("allows direct-module local OTLP endpoint env vars only for endpoint names", () => {
+    const tempDir = createPackageFixture();
+    patchFixture(tempDir);
+    const allowed = spawnSync("python3", ["-m", "deepagents_code"], {
+      env: {
+        PATH: process.env.PATH,
+        PYTHONPATH: tempDir,
+        OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT: "http://host.openshell.internal:4318",
+        OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_TRACES_ENDPOINT: "http://127.0.0.1:4318/v1/traces",
+      },
+      encoding: "utf8",
+    });
+
+    expect(allowed.status, allowed.stderr).toBe(0);
+    expect(allowed.stdout).toContain("managed-posture-ok");
+
+    const rejected = spawnSync("python3", ["-m", "deepagents_code"], {
+      env: {
+        PATH: process.env.PATH,
+        PYTHONPATH: tempDir,
+        CUSTOM_API_KEY: "http://host.openshell.internal:4318",
+      },
+      encoding: "utf8",
+    });
+
+    expect(rejected.status).not.toBe(0);
+    expect(rejected.stderr).toContain("runtime environment variable CUSTOM_API_KEY");
+  });
+
   it("allows only scoped managed credential-shaped runtime values", () => {
     const tempDir = createPackageFixture();
     patchFixture(tempDir);
diff --git a/test/langchain-deepagents-code-image-credentials.test.ts b/test/langchain-deepagents-code-image-credentials.test.ts
index 5754d0bde7..d98a6c55f3 100644
--- a/test/langchain-deepagents-code-image-credentials.test.ts
+++ b/test/langchain-deepagents-code-image-credentials.test.ts
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ describe("LangChain Deep Agents Code image credential boundary", () => {
     const fakeSecret = "sk-TEST-FAKE-DO-NOT-USE-0000000000000000000000";
     const result = runWrapper(wrapperPath, ["-n", "hi"], { OPENAI_API_KEY: fakeSecret });
 
-    expect(result.status).not.toBe(0);
+    expect(result.status).toBe(2);
     expect(result.stderr).toContain("OPENAI_API_KEY");
     expect(result.stderr).not.toContain(fakeSecret);
     expect(result.stderr).toContain("nemoclaw credentials");
@@ -35,6 +35,52 @@ describe("LangChain Deep Agents Code image credential boundary", () => {
     expect(fs.existsSync(ranMarker)).toBe(false);
   });
 
+  it.each([
+    { name: "OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT", value: "http://host.openshell.internal:4318" },
+    { name: "OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT", value: "http://localhost:4317/" },
+    {
+      name: "OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_TRACES_ENDPOINT",
+      value: "http://127.0.0.1:4318/v1/traces",
+    },
+    {
+      name: "OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_TRACES_ENDPOINT",
+      value: "http://[::1]:4318/v1/traces",
+    },
+  ])("allows local OTLP endpoint env var $name=$value", ({ name, value }) => {
+    const tempDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "nemoclaw-dcode-local-otel-"));
+    const { wrapperPath, ranMarker } = makeWrapperFixture(tempDir);
+    const result = runWrapper(wrapperPath, ["-n", "hi"], { [name]: value });
+
+    expect(result.status, `${name}=${value}`).toBe(0);
+    expect(result.stdout).toContain("dcode-stub-ran");
+    expect(result.stderr).not.toContain("refusing to start");
+    expect(fs.existsSync(ranMarker)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    { name: "OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT", value: "https://collector.example/v1/traces" },
+    { name: "OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT", value: "http://host.openshell.internal:9999" },
+    {
+      name: "OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT",
+      value: "http://host.openshell.internal:4318/v1/traces?api_key=opaque",
+    },
+    {
+      name: "OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT",
+      value: "http://token@host.openshell.internal:4318",
+    },
+    { name: "OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_HEADERS", value: "authorization=opaque-value" },
+    { name: "CUSTOM_API_KEY", value: "http://host.openshell.internal:4318" },
+  ])("rejects non-local or non-endpoint OTLP env var $name=$value", ({ name, value }) => {
+    const tempDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "nemoclaw-dcode-otel-reject-"));
+    const { wrapperPath, ranMarker } = makeWrapperFixture(tempDir);
+    const result = runWrapper(wrapperPath, ["-n", "hi"], { [name]: value });
+
+    expect(result.status, `${name}=${value}`).toBe(2);
+    expect(result.stderr).toContain(name);
+    expect(result.stderr).not.toContain(value);
+    expect(fs.existsSync(ranMarker)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
   it("rejects secret-shaped values written to the deepagents env file", () => {
     const tempDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "nemoclaw-dcode-wrapper-"));
     const { wrapperPath, ranMarker, envFile } = makeWrapperFixture(tempDir);