Seed without physical storage. Memory becomes the key.
SML-Seed is a memory-bound cryptographic seed generation model where the seed phrase is not stored anywhere physically or digitally, but reconstructed deterministically from user memory and system-bound cryptographic context.
Unlike the original version (simple SHA256 aggregation), SML-Seed now uses Phantom-Step V4/V5 key derivation as its entropy backbone.
The seed is no longer directly derived from raw Q/A pairs — instead, it is generated from:
- 🧩 Phantom-Step Master Key (V4/V5)
- 🔐 File-bound cryptographic context (
file_hash) - 🧠 Ordered user answers (memory sequence)
- ⚙️ Internal KDF cascade (Argon2id-based)
Memory is no longer just input — it is a structured entropy layer.
- Encrypted question set.
- Defines deterministic memory structure.
- Does NOT contain answers or secrets.
- Encrypted archive of user data.
- Protected via Memory-Derived Key (SML-Seed output).
- Can include:
- documents
- notes
- wallet backups
- media files
- User answers exist only in human memory.
- Can optionally be distributed among trusted parties (logical recovery model).
- No persistent storage required.
SML-Seed is now derived through a Phantom-Step Cascade dependency graph:
k0 = file_hash_seed
for each answer_i:
k_i = Argon2(answer_i, salt = k_{i-1})
Seed = SHA256(k_N)
k0 = HMAC(user_salt, "init")
for each answer_i:
input_i = HMAC(k_{i-1}, STEP || index || answer_i)
salt_i = SHA256(k_{i-1} || index || total_steps)
k_i = Argon2(input_i, salt_i)
Seed = SHA256(HMAC(k_N, file_hash))
Where:
file_hash_seed=SHA256(SML.zip)- Each step strengthens entropy via stateful chaining.
- Final output is deterministic and reproducible.
Seed = SHA256(SHA256(Q1 + A1 + file_hash) + SHA256(Q2 + A2 + file_hash) + ...)
- Stateful cascade instead of parallel hashing.
- Argon2-based memory hardness.
- Strong inter-step dependency.
- File-bound entropy initialization.
- Output Container:
V4/V5.psq(Phantom-Step Cascade container).
A nonce effectively becomes a source of time.
Traditional “digital time capsule” services rely on a trusted server that stores encrypted data and releases it after a specific date. This approach has critical weaknesses:
- The server stores sensitive data.
- Long-term availability of the service is uncertain.
- Users must trust the provider not to access the data.
The PSQC container model allows you to generate a seed phrase and securely lock it for yourself or a beneficiary for a predefined period. Once locked, it is theoretically impossible to recover the seed early, even for the creator.
This trustless architecture relies on a missing piece of entropy: the nonce.
- No stored secrets: The server does not store your encrypted data or keys — it only holds the full nonce until the target date.
- Guaranteed Lockout: Without the full nonce, decryption is mathematically impossible.
- Dual Recovery Paths: The delay before decryption is strictly enforced, but guarantees eventual access:
- Server Release (Time-Based): At the predefined time, the server reveals the complete nonce to unlock the container instantly.
- Computational Brute-Force (Fail-Safe): If the server disappears, the seed isn't lost. Users can use the
nonce_hintandnonce_hash_V1to mathematically guess the missing characters. The difficulty of this computation is the time-lock.
A PSQC file contains a small JSON structure prefixed with PSQC:.
PSQC:{
"nonce_hint": "LEdWTvvka9******",
"nonce_hash_V1": "48d49beb8cbb82c65d1009fbcbc22c70c1a3dad87a7558b932dfb97ec4f3b928",
"ciphertext": "..."
}
(In this structure, the nonce_hint masks the final characters, dictating the exact computational effort required to brute-force the lock if the server is unavailable).
No seed phrase storage anywhere — recovery exists only through structured memory.
Seed depends on:
- Answer order.
- Internal state transitions.
- File hash binding.
- Nonce-based computational delay allows locking the crypto seed by time without physical access to the seed itself or reliance on trusted third parties.
SML.psq(structure).SML.zip(data vault).
Both are useless without memory-based reconstruction.
- No network dependency.
- No external key servers.
- Fully deterministic local computation.
- Memory-hard derivation (Argon2id).
- Sequential dependency (no parallel shortcut attacks).
- File-bound entropy isolation.
- No stored seed or master key.
Assumes attacker has:
- Full access to
SML.zipandSML.psq(or PSQC container). - Full knowledge of the algorithm.
- No access to the correct memory answers.
Security depends on:
- Entropy of user memory.
- Strength of answer unpredictability.
- Computational cost of the Argon2 cascade.
- Weak or predictable answers reduce security significantly.
- SML-Seed is not a replacement for hardware wallets in high-risk custody scenarios.
Best used as:
- Recovery system.
- Backup entropy layer.
- Human-centric key reconstruction model.
- 🪙 Cryptocurrency wallet recovery without seed paper.
- ⏳ Trustless digital time capsules for crypto assets (via PSQC computational delay).
- 🧠 Human-memory-based authentication systems.
- 📦 Secure offline encrypted archives.
- 🎓 Educational cryptography systems.
“A seed is not written. A seed is reconstructed.”
SML-Seed transforms cryptographic ownership into a memory-bound deterministic system, eliminating dependency on physical seed storage entirely.