diff --git a/contracts/common/src/lib.rs b/contracts/common/src/lib.rs
index c95a0dd..c17b6b3 100644
--- a/contracts/common/src/lib.rs
+++ b/contracts/common/src/lib.rs
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 extern crate alloc;
 
 pub mod namespace;
+pub mod scaling;
 pub mod weighted_rate;
 
 #[cfg(test)]
diff --git a/contracts/common/src/scaling.rs b/contracts/common/src/scaling.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..945712d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contracts/common/src/scaling.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+//! Overflow-safe deposit → token reconciliation scaling.
+//!
+//! Issue #5 — reconciling on-chain token supply with off-chain resource deposit
+//! attestations computes
+//!
+//! ```text
+//!     tokens_to_mint = deposit_amount × TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR / ASSET_PRECISION
+//! ```
+//!
+//! with `TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR = 10¹⁸` (Soroban token decimals) and a configurable
+//! `ASSET_PRECISION` (commodity micro-unit precision). A naive `u128`
+//! implementation overflows the intermediate product `deposit × 10¹⁸` and wraps
+//! **silently** — minting wildly wrong amounts (the issue's `u128::MAX` craft).
+//!
+//! This module computes the scaling with the exact 256-bit `mul_div` from
+//! [`crate::weighted_rate`]: the intermediate product is held in full 256-bit
+//! precision and divided exactly, so there is **no silent overflow** — an input
+//! whose true token result would exceed `u128` is reported as
+//! [`ScaleError::Overflow`], never a wrapped value. `ASSET_PRECISION` is bounds-
+//! validated, and rejection is returned as `Result` rather than a panic so the
+//! caller can reconcile gracefully.
+
+use crate::weighted_rate::mul_div_floor;
+
+/// Soroban token scale factor: 10¹⁸ (18 decimals).
+pub const TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR: u128 = 1_000_000_000_000_000_000;
+
+/// Minimum valid `ASSET_PRECISION`.
+pub const MIN_ASSET_PRECISION: u128 = 1;
+
+/// Maximum valid `ASSET_PRECISION`: 10¹².
+pub const MAX_ASSET_PRECISION: u128 = 1_000_000_000_000;
+
+/// Largest deposit whose product with [`TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR`] still fits `u128`.
+/// Deposits up to this bound are guaranteed representable for any precision ≥ 1;
+/// larger deposits are still handled correctly (256-bit intermediate) and only
+/// rejected if the *final* token amount would exceed `u128`.
+pub const MAX_SAFE_DEPOSIT: u128 = u128::MAX / TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR;
+
+/// Errors from reconciliation scaling.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum ScaleError {
+    /// `ASSET_PRECISION` is outside `[MIN_ASSET_PRECISION, MAX_ASSET_PRECISION]`.
+    InvalidPrecision,
+    /// The resulting token amount would exceed `u128::MAX`.
+    Overflow,
+}
+
+/// Whether `precision` is within the configured `[1, 10¹²]` bounds.
+pub fn is_valid_precision(precision: u128) -> bool {
+    precision >= MIN_ASSET_PRECISION && precision <= MAX_ASSET_PRECISION
+}
+
+/// Whether `deposit_amount × TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR` fits in `u128` (i.e. the
+/// conservative "safe range" guard from the resolution blueprint). The main
+/// [`reconcile_tokens`] does not require this — it handles larger deposits via
+/// 256-bit arithmetic — but callers wanting an early reject can use it.
+pub fn is_safe_deposit(deposit_amount: u128) -> bool {
+    deposit_amount <= MAX_SAFE_DEPOSIT
+}
+
+/// Reconcile a resource deposit into the number of tokens to mint:
+///
+/// ```text
+///     floor(deposit_amount × TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR / asset_precision)
+/// ```
+///
+/// Computed with exact 256-bit intermediate precision (no silent overflow).
+/// Floor rounding is used deliberately: the contract must never mint **more**
+/// tokens than the deposit backs (rounding error is strictly < 1 base unit).
+///
+/// # Errors
+/// * [`ScaleError::InvalidPrecision`] if `asset_precision ∉ [1, 10¹²]`.
+/// * [`ScaleError::Overflow`] if the (mathematically valid) token amount exceeds
+///   `u128::MAX`.
+pub fn reconcile_tokens(deposit_amount: u128, asset_precision: u128) -> Result<u128, ScaleError> {
+    if !is_valid_precision(asset_precision) {
+        return Err(ScaleError::InvalidPrecision);
+    }
+    // mul_div_floor holds deposit × 10¹⁸ in 256 bits and divides exactly;
+    // `None` means the true quotient does not fit u128.
+    mul_div_floor(deposit_amount, TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR, asset_precision).ok_or(ScaleError::Overflow)
+}
+
+/// General overflow-safe scaling: `floor(amount × scale_factor / precision)`.
+/// Same guarantees as [`reconcile_tokens`] but with a caller-supplied scale.
+///
+/// # Errors
+/// * [`ScaleError::InvalidPrecision`] if `precision == 0`.
+/// * [`ScaleError::Overflow`] if the result exceeds `u128::MAX`.
+pub fn scale(amount: u128, scale_factor: u128, precision: u128) -> Result<u128, ScaleError> {
+    if precision == 0 {
+        return Err(ScaleError::InvalidPrecision);
+    }
+    mul_div_floor(amount, scale_factor, precision).ok_or(ScaleError::Overflow)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn reconciles_simple_amounts() {
+        // 1 micro-unit at precision 1 -> 10^18 tokens.
+        assert_eq!(reconcile_tokens(1, 1), Ok(TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR));
+        // 1 commodity unit (10^6 micro-units) at precision 10^6 -> 1 token (10^18).
+        assert_eq!(reconcile_tokens(1_000_000, 1_000_000), Ok(TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR));
+        // zero deposit -> zero tokens.
+        assert_eq!(reconcile_tokens(0, 1_000), Ok(0));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_invalid_precision() {
+        assert_eq!(reconcile_tokens(100, 0), Err(ScaleError::InvalidPrecision));
+        assert_eq!(
+            reconcile_tokens(100, MAX_ASSET_PRECISION + 1),
+            Err(ScaleError::InvalidPrecision)
+        );
+        assert!(reconcile_tokens(100, MAX_ASSET_PRECISION).is_ok());
+        assert!(reconcile_tokens(100, MIN_ASSET_PRECISION).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn crafted_overflow_input_is_rejected_not_wrapped() {
+        // The issue's craft: deposit == u128::MAX, precision == 1.
+        // Naive u128 would wrap silently; we must report Overflow.
+        assert_eq!(reconcile_tokens(u128::MAX, 1), Err(ScaleError::Overflow));
+        // Even the max precision cannot bring u128::MAX * 10^18 back into range
+        // (10^18 / 10^12 = 10^6 > 1).
+        assert_eq!(
+            reconcile_tokens(u128::MAX, MAX_ASSET_PRECISION),
+            Err(ScaleError::Overflow)
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn boundary_of_safe_deposit() {
+        // deposit == MAX_SAFE_DEPOSIT, precision 1: product is ~u128::MAX and
+        // must NOT be a false overflow (256-bit intermediate handles it).
+        let expected = MAX_SAFE_DEPOSIT * TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR; // fits u128 by definition
+        assert_eq!(reconcile_tokens(MAX_SAFE_DEPOSIT, 1), Ok(expected));
+
+        // One past the safe deposit at precision 1 overflows the u128 result.
+        assert_eq!(
+            reconcile_tokens(MAX_SAFE_DEPOSIT + 1, 1),
+            Err(ScaleError::Overflow)
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn large_deposit_with_large_precision_fits() {
+        // deposit just above MAX_SAFE_DEPOSIT, but a precision that scales the
+        // result back under u128 — the 256-bit path returns the exact value
+        // where naive u128 would have overflowed the intermediate product.
+        let deposit = MAX_SAFE_DEPOSIT + 1_000;
+        // precision 10^6 -> result ~= deposit * 10^12, still < u128::MAX.
+        let result = reconcile_tokens(deposit, 1_000_000).unwrap();
+        // Cross-check against the same exact 256-bit primitive.
+        assert_eq!(
+            result,
+            crate::weighted_rate::mul_div_floor(deposit, TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR, 1_000_000).unwrap()
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn floor_rounding_never_over_mints() {
+        // deposit*scale not divisible by precision -> floor, error < 1 unit.
+        // 7 * 10^18 / 3 = 2.333...e18 -> floor.
+        let r = reconcile_tokens(7, 3).unwrap();
+        let exact_lower = (7u128 * TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR) / 3;
+        assert_eq!(r, exact_lower);
+        // tokens * precision <= deposit * scale (never over-mints).
+        assert!(r * 3 <= 7 * TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR);
+        // and within 1 base unit of exact.
+        assert!(7 * TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR - r * 3 < 3);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn scale_helper_matches_and_guards_zero() {
+        assert_eq!(scale(0, 1, 1), Ok(0));
+        assert_eq!(scale(10, 5, 2), Ok(25));
+        assert_eq!(scale(10, 5, 0), Err(ScaleError::InvalidPrecision));
+        assert_eq!(scale(u128::MAX, u128::MAX, 1), Err(ScaleError::Overflow));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn property_exact_within_safe_numerator_domain() {
+        // Deterministic sweep. Restrict deposit so deposit*SCALE fits u128, so a
+        // native u128 reference is valid; assert EXACT equality (error 0, far
+        // tighter than the "<= 1 base unit" target).
+        let mut seed: u64 = 0xDEAD_BEEF_CAFE_F00D;
+        let mut next = || {
+            seed ^= seed >> 12;
+            seed ^= seed << 25;
+            seed ^= seed >> 27;
+            seed.wrapping_mul(0x2545F4914F6CDD1D)
+        };
+        let mut next_u128 = || ((next() as u128) << 64) | (next() as u128);
+
+        for _ in 0..5000 {
+            let deposit = next_u128() % (MAX_SAFE_DEPOSIT + 1); // deposit*SCALE fits u128
+            let precision = (next_u128() % MAX_ASSET_PRECISION) + 1; // [1, 10^12]
+
+            let reference = (deposit * TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR) / precision; // exact in u128
+            assert_eq!(reconcile_tokens(deposit, precision), Ok(reference));
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/contracts/docs/specs/reconciliation-scaling.md b/contracts/docs/specs/reconciliation-scaling.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9eb11b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contracts/docs/specs/reconciliation-scaling.md
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+# Deposit → Token Reconciliation Scaling — Overflow Safety
+
+Issue #5 — "Integer Scaling Protection Failure in Resource Deposit/Burnback
+Reconciliation"
+
+## Goal
+
+Convert an off-chain resource deposit attestation into the number of on-chain
+tokens to mint:
+
+```
+tokens_to_mint = floor(deposit_amount × TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR / ASSET_PRECISION)
+```
+
+- `TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR = 10¹⁸` (Soroban 18-decimal token standard)
+- `ASSET_PRECISION ∈ [1, 10¹²]` (commodity micro-unit precision, configurable)
+
+**Invariant:** `tokens_minted × ASSET_PRECISION ≈ deposit_amount × TOKEN_SCALE_FACTOR`
+within < 1 base unit (floor rounding).
+
+## The defect
+
+A naive `u128` implementation computes `deposit_amount × 10¹⁸` first. For large
+deposits (and the crafted `deposit = u128::MAX`, `ASSET_PRECISION = 1`) that
+product exceeds `u128::MAX` and **wraps silently**, minting an amount wildly
+divorced from the deposit — either a tiny fraction of, or vastly more than, the
+backing resource.
+
+## The implementation
+
+`contracts/common/src/scaling.rs` (pure `#![no_std]`, no new dependencies):
+
+- `reconcile_tokens(deposit_amount, asset_precision) -> Result<u128, ScaleError>`
+  - validates `ASSET_PRECISION ∈ [1, 10¹²]` → `Err(InvalidPrecision)`;
+  - computes the scaling with the exact 256-bit `mul_div_floor` from
+    [`crate::weighted_rate`] — the `deposit × 10¹⁸` product is held in full
+    256-bit precision and divided exactly, so it **never wraps**;
+  - returns `Err(Overflow)` if the mathematically-correct token amount exceeds
+    `u128::MAX` (instead of a silently wrapped value).
+- `scale(amount, scale_factor, precision)` — the same, with a caller-supplied
+  scale factor.
+- `is_valid_precision`, `is_safe_deposit`, and `MAX_SAFE_DEPOSIT` helpers for
+  callers that want the blueprint's conservative early-reject guard.
+
+### Rounding
+
+Floor is used deliberately: the contract must never mint **more** tokens than the
+deposit backs. The error is strictly `< 1` base unit, satisfying the `|result −
+exact| ≤ 1` requirement (in fact `< 1`).
+
+### Why not a 512-bit `uint`-based `SafeScale`
+
+The blueprint proposes a `(numerator, denominator)` struct over the `uint` crate
+for 512-bit math. It is unnecessary: both operands are `u128`, so their product
+is at most 256 bits, which `mul_div_floor` already handles exactly with no new
+dependency and no allocation. The crate stays `no_std` and dependency-free.
+
+## Tests (`contracts/common/src/scaling.rs`)
+
+- simple conversions, zero deposit;
+- precision bounds rejection (`0`, `10¹² + 1`, and the inclusive endpoints);
+- the crafted `u128::MAX` overflow is **rejected, not wrapped**;
+- `MAX_SAFE_DEPOSIT` boundary (no false overflow at the limit; overflow one past);
+- large deposit with large precision still resolves;
+- floor never over-mints, error < 1 base unit;
+- 5000-iteration deterministic property sweep over
+  `deposit ∈ [0, MAX_SAFE_DEPOSIT]`, `precision ∈ [1, 10¹²]`, asserting **exact**
+  equality with a native `u128` reference.
+
+Run: `cargo test --package utility-contracts-common`
+
+## Wiring
+
+There is no `reconcile_deposit` contract in the repository today (the issue's
+`contracts/src/resource_tokenization/...` paths do not exist). The verified
+primitive lives in `common` so any reconciliation entry point — e.g. a future
+`reconcile_deposit` in `resource-token`, or the supply accounting in
+`utility_contracts` once that crate compiles — can call
+`utility_contracts_common::scaling::reconcile_tokens` instead of unchecked
+`u128` multiplication.