[Bug] Path traversal vulnerability in memory manager allows writing files outside memory directory

[Prodesire]

Bug Description

The MemoryManager and WriteMemoryTool do not validate memory names for path traversal characters. A memory name containing ../ allows writing files outside the designated memory directory. This can be exploited via prompt injection to write arbitrary files on the filesystem.

Steps to Reproduce

from iac_code.memory.memory_manager import MemoryManager

mgr = MemoryManager("/path/to/memory")
mgr.save('../escape', 'malicious content', 'user', 'description')
# File is written to /path/to/escape.md (OUTSIDE the memory directory)

Or via the WriteMemoryTool (callable by the LLM):

result = await write_memory_tool.execute(
    tool_input={'name': '../escape', 'content': 'escaped', 'memory_type': 'user', 'description': 'test'},
    context=ctx
)
# Result: is_error=False, file written outside memory directory

Expected Behavior

The memory manager should reject names containing path traversal sequences (../, /, \) and return an error.

Actual Behavior

The file is silently written outside the memory directory. The tool reports success:

Memory '../escape' saved.

And the file exists at the parent directory level:

$ ls /path/to/escape.md
/path/to/escape.md   # Written OUTSIDE /path/to/memory/

Root Cause

In src/iac_code/memory/memory_manager.py, the _memory_path method directly concatenates the name:

def _memory_path(self, name: str) -> str:
    return os.path.join(self._memory_dir, f"{name}.md")

No validation is performed on the name parameter. When name is ../escape, this resolves to a path outside the memory directory.

Suggested Fix

Add name validation in the save() method (and optionally in _memory_path):

def save(self, name: str, content: str, memory_type: str, description: str) -> None:
    if memory_type not in MEMORY_TYPES:
        raise ValueError(f"Invalid memory type: {memory_type}")
    if '/' in name or '\\' in name or '..' in name:
        raise ValueError(f"Invalid memory name: {name!r}. Must not contain path separators or '..'.")
    # ... rest of method

Security Impact

• Attack vector: Prompt injection → LLM calls WriteMemoryTool with malicious name
• Impact: Arbitrary file write within filesystem permissions of the running user
• Severity: Medium (requires prompt injection, limited to user's filesystem permissions)

Operating System

macOS

Python Version

3.14.0b1

iac-code Version

0.3.0 (dev)

Additional Context

A secondary issue: memory names containing / (without ..) cause a FileNotFoundError because intermediate directories are not created. This should also be caught by input validation.

[guima-why]

Fixed in PR #62. Memory names are now validated to reject path traversal attempts such as ../escape, preventing writes outside the configured memory directory.

PR: #62

Verified with make translate, make format, make lint, and make test (3777 passed, 244 warnings).

Closing as completed.