-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 30
Expand file tree
/
Copy pathpatch-1-redhat.patch
More file actions
4186 lines (4000 loc) · 126 KB
/
patch-1-redhat.patch
File metadata and controls
4186 lines (4000 loc) · 126 KB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000
Documentation/arch/x86/tdx.rst | 14 +-
MAINTAINERS | 10 +
Makefile | 38 +-
arch/arm/Kconfig | 4 +-
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 2 +-
.../boot/dts/qcom/x1e80100-lenovo-yoga-slim7x.dts | 143 ++++
arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 27 +
.../tools/gcc-check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh | 1 -
arch/powerpc/tools/gcc-check-mprofile-kernel.sh | 1 -
arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h | 1 +
arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c | 5 +
arch/s390/kernel/setup.c | 4 +
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 -
arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h | 12 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 31 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 17 +
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 44 +-
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 24 +-
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 36 +-
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 22 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 10 +
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 23 +-
crypto/sig.c | 3 +-
crypto/testmgr.c | 2 +-
drivers/acpi/apei/hest.c | 8 +
drivers/acpi/irq.c | 17 +-
drivers/acpi/scan.c | 11 +
drivers/ata/libahci.c | 18 +
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_dmi.c | 15 +
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c | 16 +-
drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 124 +++-
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c | 5 +
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 14 +-
drivers/firmware/efi/secureboot.c | 38 ++
drivers/gpio/Kconfig | 11 +
drivers/gpio/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/gpio/gpio-usbio.c | 248 +++++++
drivers/hid/hid-rmi.c | 66 --
drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c | 19 +
drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig | 11 +
drivers/i2c/busses/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-usbio.c | 321 +++++++++
drivers/input/rmi4/rmi_driver.c | 124 ++--
drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 22 +
drivers/media/i2c/ov08x40.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/core.c | 54 +-
drivers/pci/quirks.c | 24 +
drivers/platform/x86/intel/int3472/discrete.c | 58 +-
drivers/scsi/sd.c | 10 +
drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 7 +
drivers/usb/misc/Kconfig | 14 +
drivers/usb/misc/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/usb/misc/usbio.c | 749 +++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c | 6 +
include/linux/efi.h | 22 +-
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
include/linux/module.h | 1 +
include/linux/rmi.h | 1 +
include/linux/security.h | 9 +
include/linux/usb/usbio.h | 177 +++++
kernel/module/main.c | 2 +
kernel/module/signing.c | 9 +-
scripts/Makefile.lib | 3 +
scripts/mod/modpost.c | 8 +
scripts/tags.sh | 2 +
security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 6 +-
security/lockdown/Kconfig | 13 +
security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 11 +
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ksyms_btf.c | 31 -
72 files changed, 2499 insertions(+), 292 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/tdx.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/tdx.rst
index 719043cd8b46..61670e7df2f7 100644
--- a/Documentation/arch/x86/tdx.rst
+++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/tdx.rst
@@ -142,13 +142,6 @@ but depends on the BIOS to behave correctly.
Note TDX works with CPU logical online/offline, thus the kernel still
allows to offline logical CPU and online it again.
-Kexec()
-~~~~~~~
-
-TDX host support currently lacks the ability to handle kexec. For
-simplicity only one of them can be enabled in the Kconfig. This will be
-fixed in the future.
-
Erratum
~~~~~~~
@@ -171,6 +164,13 @@ If the platform has such erratum, the kernel prints additional message in
machine check handler to tell user the machine check may be caused by
kernel bug on TDX private memory.
+Kexec
+~~~~~~~
+
+Currently kexec doesn't work on the TDX platforms with the aforementioned
+erratum. It fails when loading the kexec kernel image. Otherwise it
+works normally.
+
Interaction vs S3 and deeper states
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 97d958c945e4..c7e27e2edfe4 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -12694,6 +12694,16 @@ S: Maintained
F: Documentation/admin-guide/pm/intel_uncore_frequency_scaling.rst
F: drivers/platform/x86/intel/uncore-frequency/
+INTEL USBIO USB I/O EXPANDER DRIVERS
+M: Israel Cepeda <israel.a.cepeda.lopez@intel.com>
+M: Hans de Goede <hansg@kernel.org>
+R: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
+S: Maintained
+F: drivers/gpio/gpio-usbio.c
+F: drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-usbio.c
+F: drivers/usb/misc/usbio.c
+F: include/linux/usb/usbio.h
+
INTEL VENDOR SPECIFIC EXTENDED CAPABILITIES DRIVER
M: David E. Box <david.e.box@linux.intel.com>
S: Supported
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 570042d208fd..7c4032f58786 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -355,6 +355,17 @@ ifneq ($(filter install,$(MAKECMDGOALS)),)
endif
endif
+# CKI/cross compilation hack
+# Do we need to rebuild scripts after cross compilation?
+# If kernel was cross-compiled, these scripts have arch of build host.
+REBUILD_SCRIPTS_FOR_CROSS:=0
+
+# Regenerating config with incomplete source tree will produce different
+# config options. Disable it.
+ifeq ($(REBUILD_SCRIPTS_FOR_CROSS),1)
+may-sync-config:=
+endif
+
ifdef mixed-build
# ===========================================================================
# We're called with mixed targets (*config and build targets).
@@ -1306,6 +1317,8 @@ uapi-asm-generic:
# Generate some files
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+include $(srctree)/Makefile.rhelver
+
# KERNELRELEASE can change from a few different places, meaning version.h
# needs to be updated, so this check is forced on all builds
@@ -1330,7 +1343,13 @@ define filechk_version.h
((c) > 255 ? 255 : (c)))'; \
echo \#define LINUX_VERSION_MAJOR $(VERSION); \
echo \#define LINUX_VERSION_PATCHLEVEL $(PATCHLEVEL); \
- echo \#define LINUX_VERSION_SUBLEVEL $(SUBLEVEL)
+ echo \#define LINUX_VERSION_SUBLEVEL $(SUBLEVEL); \
+ echo '#define RHEL_MAJOR $(RHEL_MAJOR)'; \
+ echo '#define RHEL_MINOR $(RHEL_MINOR)'; \
+ echo '#define RHEL_RELEASE_VERSION(a,b) (((a) << 8) + (b))'; \
+ echo '#define RHEL_RELEASE_CODE \
+ $(shell expr $(RHEL_MAJOR) \* 256 + $(RHEL_MINOR))'; \
+ echo '#define RHEL_RELEASE "$(RHEL_RELEASE)"'
endef
$(version_h): private PATCHLEVEL := $(or $(PATCHLEVEL), 0)
@@ -1932,6 +1951,23 @@ endif
ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
+scripts_build:
+ $(MAKE) $(build)=scripts/basic
+ $(MAKE) $(build)=scripts/mod
+ $(MAKE) $(build)=scripts scripts/module.lds
+ $(MAKE) $(build)=scripts scripts/unifdef
+ $(MAKE) $(build)=scripts
+
+prepare_after_cross:
+ # disable STACK_VALIDATION to avoid building objtool
+ sed -i '/^CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION/d' ./include/config/auto.conf || true
+ # build minimum set of scripts and resolve_btfids to allow building
+ # external modules
+ $(MAKE) KBUILD_EXTMOD="" M="" scripts_build V=1
+ $(MAKE) -C tools/bpf/resolve_btfids
+
+PHONY += prepare_after_cross scripts_build
+
modules.order: $(build-dir)
@:
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index b1f3df39ed40..5e1c1169e27e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -1230,9 +1230,9 @@ config HIGHMEM
If unsure, say n.
config HIGHPTE
- bool "Allocate 2nd-level pagetables from highmem" if EXPERT
+ bool "Allocate 2nd-level pagetables from highmem"
depends on HIGHMEM
- default y
+ default n
help
The VM uses one page of physical memory for each page table.
For systems with a lot of processes, this can use a lot of
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index 93f391e67af1..237f7f623b4a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -1430,7 +1430,7 @@ endchoice
config ARM64_FORCE_52BIT
bool "Force 52-bit virtual addresses for userspace"
- depends on ARM64_VA_BITS_52 && EXPERT
+ depends on ARM64_VA_BITS_52
help
For systems with 52-bit userspace VAs enabled, the kernel will attempt
to maintain compatibility with older software by providing 48-bit VAs
diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/x1e80100-lenovo-yoga-slim7x.dts b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/x1e80100-lenovo-yoga-slim7x.dts
index dad0f11e8e85..d02f8d4f7baf 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/x1e80100-lenovo-yoga-slim7x.dts
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/x1e80100-lenovo-yoga-slim7x.dts
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ / {
aliases {
serial0 = &uart21;
+ serial1 = &uart14;
};
chosen {
@@ -404,6 +405,107 @@ vph_pwr: regulator-vph-pwr {
regulator-always-on;
regulator-boot-on;
};
+
+ vreg_wcn_3p3: regulator-wcn-3p3 {
+ compatible = "regulator-fixed";
+
+ regulator-name = "VREG_WCN_3P3";
+ regulator-min-microvolt = <3300000>;
+ regulator-max-microvolt = <3300000>;
+
+ gpio = <&tlmm 214 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+ enable-active-high;
+
+ pinctrl-0 = <&wcn_sw_en>;
+ pinctrl-names = "default";
+
+ regulator-boot-on;
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: These two regulators are actually part of the removable M.2
+ * card and not the CRD mainboard. Need to describe this differently.
+ * Functionally it works correctly, because all we need to do is to
+ * turn on the actual 3.3V supply above.
+ */
+ vreg_wcn_0p95: regulator-wcn-0p95 {
+ compatible = "regulator-fixed";
+
+ regulator-name = "VREG_WCN_0P95";
+ regulator-min-microvolt = <950000>;
+ regulator-max-microvolt = <950000>;
+
+ vin-supply = <&vreg_wcn_3p3>;
+ };
+
+ vreg_wcn_1p9: regulator-wcn-1p9 {
+ compatible = "regulator-fixed";
+
+ regulator-name = "VREG_WCN_1P9";
+ regulator-min-microvolt = <1900000>;
+ regulator-max-microvolt = <1900000>;
+
+ vin-supply = <&vreg_wcn_3p3>;
+ };
+
+ wcn7850-pmu {
+ compatible = "qcom,wcn7850-pmu";
+
+ vdd-supply = <&vreg_wcn_0p95>;
+ vddio-supply = <&vreg_l15b_1p8>;
+ vddaon-supply = <&vreg_wcn_0p95>;
+ vdddig-supply = <&vreg_wcn_0p95>;
+ vddrfa1p2-supply = <&vreg_wcn_1p9>;
+ vddrfa1p8-supply = <&vreg_wcn_1p9>;
+
+ wlan-enable-gpios = <&tlmm 117 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+ bt-enable-gpios = <&tlmm 116 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+
+ pinctrl-0 = <&wcn_wlan_bt_en>;
+ pinctrl-names = "default";
+
+ regulators {
+ vreg_pmu_rfa_cmn: ldo0 {
+ regulator-name = "vreg_pmu_rfa_cmn";
+ };
+
+ vreg_pmu_aon_0p59: ldo1 {
+ regulator-name = "vreg_pmu_aon_0p59";
+ };
+
+ vreg_pmu_wlcx_0p8: ldo2 {
+ regulator-name = "vreg_pmu_wlcx_0p8";
+ };
+
+ vreg_pmu_wlmx_0p85: ldo3 {
+ regulator-name = "vreg_pmu_wlmx_0p85";
+ };
+
+ vreg_pmu_btcmx_0p85: ldo4 {
+ regulator-name = "vreg_pmu_btcmx_0p85";
+ };
+
+ vreg_pmu_rfa_0p8: ldo5 {
+ regulator-name = "vreg_pmu_rfa_0p8";
+ };
+
+ vreg_pmu_rfa_1p2: ldo6 {
+ regulator-name = "vreg_pmu_rfa_1p2";
+ };
+
+ vreg_pmu_rfa_1p8: ldo7 {
+ regulator-name = "vreg_pmu_rfa_1p8";
+ };
+
+ vreg_pmu_pcie_0p9: ldo8 {
+ regulator-name = "vreg_pmu_pcie_0p9";
+ };
+
+ vreg_pmu_pcie_1p8: ldo9 {
+ regulator-name = "vreg_pmu_pcie_1p8";
+ };
+ };
+ };
};
&apps_rsc {
@@ -1045,6 +1147,16 @@ &pcie4_port0 {
wifi@0 {
compatible = "pci17cb,1107";
reg = <0x10000 0x0 0x0 0x0 0x0>;
+
+ vddaon-supply = <&vreg_pmu_aon_0p59>;
+ vddwlcx-supply = <&vreg_pmu_wlcx_0p8>;
+ vddwlmx-supply = <&vreg_pmu_wlmx_0p85>;
+ vddrfacmn-supply = <&vreg_pmu_rfa_cmn>;
+ vddrfa0p8-supply = <&vreg_pmu_rfa_0p8>;
+ vddrfa1p2-supply = <&vreg_pmu_rfa_1p2>;
+ vddrfa1p8-supply = <&vreg_pmu_rfa_1p8>;
+ vddpcie0p9-supply = <&vreg_pmu_pcie_0p9>;
+ vddpcie1p8-supply = <&vreg_pmu_pcie_1p8>;
};
};
@@ -1403,6 +1515,37 @@ usb2_pwr_3p3_reg_en: usb2-pwr-3p3-reg-en-state {
drive-strength = <2>;
bias-disable;
};
+
+ wcn_sw_en: wcn-sw-en-state {
+ pins = "gpio214";
+ function = "gpio";
+ drive-strength = <2>;
+ bias-disable;
+ };
+
+ wcn_wlan_bt_en: wcn-wlan-bt-en-state {
+ pins = "gpio116", "gpio117";
+ function = "gpio";
+ drive-strength = <2>;
+ bias-disable;
+ };
+};
+
+&uart14 {
+ status = "okay";
+
+ bluetooth {
+ compatible = "qcom,wcn7850-bt";
+ max-speed = <3200000>;
+
+ vddaon-supply = <&vreg_pmu_aon_0p59>;
+ vddwlcx-supply = <&vreg_pmu_wlcx_0p8>;
+ vddwlmx-supply = <&vreg_pmu_wlmx_0p85>;
+ vddrfacmn-supply = <&vreg_pmu_rfa_cmn>;
+ vddrfa0p8-supply = <&vreg_pmu_rfa_0p8>;
+ vddrfa1p2-supply = <&vreg_pmu_rfa_1p2>;
+ vddrfa1p8-supply = <&vreg_pmu_rfa_1p8>;
+ };
};
&uart21 {
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c
index 23c05dc7a8f2..d7b7b2f39e16 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
#include <linux/scs.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/libfdt.h>
#include <asm/acpi.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
@@ -207,6 +209,24 @@ static void __init setup_machine_fdt(phys_addr_t dt_phys)
dump_stack_set_arch_desc("%s (DT)", name);
}
+static void __init init_secureboot_mode(void)
+{
+ void *fdt = initial_boot_params;
+ u64 chosen;
+ const __be32 *prop;
+ int len;
+
+ chosen = fdt_path_offset(fdt, "/chosen");
+ if (chosen < 0)
+ return;
+
+ prop = fdt_getprop(fdt, chosen, "secure-boot-mode", &len);
+ if (!prop || len != sizeof(u32))
+ return;
+
+ efi_set_secure_boot((enum efi_secureboot_mode)fdt32_to_cpu(*prop));
+}
+
static void __init request_standard_resources(void)
{
struct memblock_region *region;
@@ -327,6 +347,13 @@ void __init __no_sanitize_address setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
pr_warn(FW_BUG "Kernel image misaligned at boot, please fix your bootloader!");
WARN_TAINT(mmu_enabled_at_boot, TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND,
FW_BUG "Booted with MMU enabled!");
+ } else {
+ init_secureboot_mode();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+ security_lock_kernel_down("EFI Secure Boot mode", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX);
+#endif
}
arm64_memblock_init();
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/tools/gcc-check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh b/arch/powerpc/tools/gcc-check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh
index 06706903503b..baed467a016b 100755
--- a/arch/powerpc/tools/gcc-check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh
+++ b/arch/powerpc/tools/gcc-check-fpatchable-function-entry.sh
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
set -e
-set -o pipefail
# To debug, uncomment the following line
# set -x
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/tools/gcc-check-mprofile-kernel.sh b/arch/powerpc/tools/gcc-check-mprofile-kernel.sh
index 73e331e7660e..6193b0ed0c77 100755
--- a/arch/powerpc/tools/gcc-check-mprofile-kernel.sh
+++ b/arch/powerpc/tools/gcc-check-mprofile-kernel.sh
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
set -e
-set -o pipefail
# To debug, uncomment the following line
# set -x
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h
index b0d00032479d..afb9544fb007 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/ipl.h
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ int ipl_report_add_component(struct ipl_report *report, struct kexec_buf *kbuf,
unsigned char flags, unsigned short cert);
int ipl_report_add_certificate(struct ipl_report *report, void *key,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long len);
+bool ipl_get_secureboot(void);
/*
* DIAG 308 support
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c
index 961a3d60a4dd..927ba8a7b3ac 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c
@@ -2497,3 +2497,8 @@ int ipl_report_free(struct ipl_report *report)
}
#endif
+
+bool ipl_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+ return !!ipl_secure_flag;
+}
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c b/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c
index 7b529868789f..c054a407afa6 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/setup.c
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
#include <linux/memory.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/start_kernel.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
@@ -919,6 +920,9 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
log_component_list();
+ if (ipl_get_secureboot())
+ security_lock_kernel_down("Secure IPL mode", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX);
+
/* Have one command line that is parsed and saved in /proc/cmdline */
/* boot_command_line has been already set up in early.c */
*cmdline_p = boot_command_line;
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 05880301212e..5902dde9f447 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1896,7 +1896,6 @@ config INTEL_TDX_HOST
depends on X86_X2APIC
select ARCH_KEEP_MEMBLOCK
depends on CONTIG_ALLOC
- depends on !KEXEC_CORE
depends on X86_MCE
help
Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protects guest VMs from malicious
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
index f2ad77929d6e..5cfb27f26583 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
@@ -13,6 +13,15 @@
# define KEXEC_DEBUG_EXC_HANDLER_SIZE 6 /* PUSHI, PUSHI, 2-byte JMP */
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+
+#include <linux/bits.h>
+
+#define RELOC_KERNEL_PRESERVE_CONTEXT BIT(0)
+#define RELOC_KERNEL_CACHE_INCOHERENT BIT(1)
+
+#endif
+
# define KEXEC_CONTROL_PAGE_SIZE 4096
# define KEXEC_CONTROL_CODE_MAX_SIZE 2048
@@ -121,8 +130,7 @@ typedef unsigned long
relocate_kernel_fn(unsigned long indirection_page,
unsigned long pa_control_page,
unsigned long start_address,
- unsigned int preserve_context,
- unsigned int host_mem_enc_active);
+ unsigned int flags);
#endif
extern relocate_kernel_fn relocate_kernel;
#define ARCH_HAS_KIMAGE_ARCH
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index bde58f6510ac..a24c7805acdb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -731,6 +731,8 @@ void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy);
void microcode_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *prev_info);
void store_cpu_caps(struct cpuinfo_x86 *info);
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(bool, cache_state_incoherent);
+
enum l1tf_mitigations {
L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF,
L1TF_MITIGATION_AUTO,
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
index 7ddef3a69866..913199b1954b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
@@ -102,10 +102,31 @@ u64 __seamcall_ret(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args);
u64 __seamcall_saved_ret(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args);
void tdx_init(void);
+#include <linux/preempt.h>
#include <asm/archrandom.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
typedef u64 (*sc_func_t)(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args *args);
+static __always_inline u64 __seamcall_dirty_cache(sc_func_t func, u64 fn,
+ struct tdx_module_args *args)
+{
+ lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled();
+
+ /*
+ * SEAMCALLs are made to the TDX module and can generate dirty
+ * cachelines of TDX private memory. Mark cache state incoherent
+ * so that the cache can be flushed during kexec.
+ *
+ * This needs to be done before actually making the SEAMCALL,
+ * because kexec-ing CPU could send NMI to stop remote CPUs,
+ * in which case even disabling IRQ won't help here.
+ */
+ this_cpu_write(cache_state_incoherent, true);
+
+ return func(fn, args);
+}
+
static __always_inline u64 sc_retry(sc_func_t func, u64 fn,
struct tdx_module_args *args)
{
@@ -113,7 +134,9 @@ static __always_inline u64 sc_retry(sc_func_t func, u64 fn,
u64 ret;
do {
- ret = func(fn, args);
+ preempt_disable();
+ ret = __seamcall_dirty_cache(func, fn, args);
+ preempt_enable();
} while (ret == TDX_RND_NO_ENTROPY && --retry);
return ret;
@@ -203,5 +226,11 @@ static inline const char *tdx_dump_mce_info(struct mce *m) { return NULL; }
static inline const struct tdx_sys_info *tdx_get_sysinfo(void) { return NULL; }
#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
+void tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec(void);
+#else
+static inline void tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec(void) { }
+#endif
+
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLER__ */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_TDX_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index a11e17f3b4b1..ccaa51ce63f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -545,6 +545,23 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 msr;
+ /*
+ * Mark using WBINVD is needed during kexec on processors that
+ * support SME. This provides support for performing a successful
+ * kexec when going from SME inactive to SME active (or vice-versa).
+ *
+ * The cache must be cleared so that if there are entries with the
+ * same physical address, both with and without the encryption bit,
+ * they don't race each other when flushed and potentially end up
+ * with the wrong entry being committed to memory.
+ *
+ * Test the CPUID bit directly because with mem_encrypt=off the
+ * BSP will clear the X86_FEATURE_SME bit and the APs will not
+ * see it set after that.
+ */
+ if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f && (cpuid_eax(0x8000001f) & BIT(0)))
+ __this_cpu_write(cache_state_incoherent, true);
+
/*
* BIOS support is required for SME and SEV.
* For SME: If BIOS has enabled SME then adjust x86_phys_bits by
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
index 697fb99406e6..15088d14904f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
/*
@@ -346,6 +347,22 @@ int machine_kexec_prepare(struct kimage *image)
unsigned long reloc_end = (unsigned long)__relocate_kernel_end;
int result;
+ /*
+ * Some early TDX-capable platforms have an erratum. A kernel
+ * partial write (a write transaction of less than cacheline
+ * lands at memory controller) to TDX private memory poisons that
+ * memory, and a subsequent read triggers a machine check.
+ *
+ * On those platforms the old kernel must reset TDX private
+ * memory before jumping to the new kernel otherwise the new
+ * kernel may see unexpected machine check. For simplicity
+ * just fail kexec/kdump on those platforms.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCE)) {
+ pr_info_once("Not allowed on platform with tdx_pw_mce bug\n");
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
/* Setup the identity mapped 64bit page table */
result = init_pgtable(image, __pa(control_page));
if (result)
@@ -384,16 +401,10 @@ void __nocfi machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
{
unsigned long reloc_start = (unsigned long)__relocate_kernel_start;
relocate_kernel_fn *relocate_kernel_ptr;
- unsigned int host_mem_enc_active;
+ unsigned int relocate_kernel_flags;
int save_ftrace_enabled;
void *control_page;
- /*
- * This must be done before load_segments() since if call depth tracking
- * is used then GS must be valid to make any function calls.
- */
- host_mem_enc_active = cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT);
-
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP
if (image->preserve_context)
save_processor_state();
@@ -427,6 +438,17 @@ void __nocfi machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
*/
relocate_kernel_ptr = control_page + (unsigned long)relocate_kernel - reloc_start;
+ relocate_kernel_flags = 0;
+ if (image->preserve_context)
+ relocate_kernel_flags |= RELOC_KERNEL_PRESERVE_CONTEXT;
+
+ /*
+ * This must be done before load_segments() since it resets
+ * GS to 0 and percpu data needs the correct GS to work.
+ */
+ if (this_cpu_read(cache_state_incoherent))
+ relocate_kernel_flags |= RELOC_KERNEL_CACHE_INCOHERENT;
+
/*
* The segment registers are funny things, they have both a
* visible and an invisible part. Whenever the visible part is
@@ -436,6 +458,11 @@ void __nocfi machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
*
* Take advantage of this here by force loading the segments,
* before the GDT is zapped with an invalid value.
+ *
+ * load_segments() resets GS to 0. Don't make any function call
+ * after here since call depth tracking uses percpu variables to
+ * operate (relocate_kernel() is explicitly ignored by call depth
+ * tracking).
*/
load_segments();
@@ -443,8 +470,7 @@ void __nocfi machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
image->start = relocate_kernel_ptr((unsigned long)image->head,
virt_to_phys(control_page),
image->start,
- image->preserve_context,
- host_mem_enc_active);
+ relocate_kernel_flags);
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP
if (image->preserve_context)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index e3a3987b0c4f..4c718f8adc59 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -88,6 +88,16 @@ EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_tss_rw);
DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, __tss_limit_invalid);
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(__tss_limit_invalid);
+/*
+ * The cache may be in an incoherent state and needs flushing during kexec.
+ * E.g., on SME/TDX platforms, dirty cacheline aliases with and without
+ * encryption bit(s) can coexist and the cache needs to be flushed before
+ * booting to the new kernel to avoid the silent memory corruption due to
+ * dirty cachelines with different encryption property being written back
+ * to the memory.
+ */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, cache_state_incoherent);
+
/*
* this gets called so that we can store lazy state into memory and copy the
* current task into the new thread.
@@ -827,19 +837,7 @@ void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)
disable_local_APIC();
mcheck_cpu_clear(c);
- /*
- * Use wbinvd on processors that support SME. This provides support
- * for performing a successful kexec when going from SME inactive
- * to SME active (or vice-versa). The cache must be cleared so that
- * if there are entries with the same physical address, both with and
- * without the encryption bit, they don't race each other when flushed
- * and potentially end up with the wrong entry being committed to
- * memory.
- *
- * Test the CPUID bit directly because the machine might've cleared
- * X86_FEATURE_SME due to cmdline options.
- */
- if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f && (cpuid_eax(0x8000001f) & BIT(0)))
+ if (this_cpu_read(cache_state_incoherent))
wbinvd();
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
index ea604f4d0b52..11e20bb13aca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
@@ -66,8 +66,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(relocate_kernel)
* %rdi indirection_page
* %rsi pa_control_page
* %rdx start address
- * %rcx preserve_context
- * %r8 host_mem_enc_active
+ * %rcx flags: RELOC_KERNEL_*
*/
/* Save the CPU context, used for jumping back */
@@ -111,7 +110,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(relocate_kernel)
/* save indirection list for jumping back */
movq %rdi, pa_backup_pages_map(%rip)
- /* Save the preserve_context to %r11 as swap_pages clobbers %rcx. */
+ /* Save the flags to %r11 as swap_pages clobbers %rcx. */
movq %rcx, %r11
/* setup a new stack at the end of the physical control page */
@@ -129,9 +128,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped)
/*
* %rdi indirection page
* %rdx start address
- * %r8 host_mem_enc_active
* %r9 page table page
- * %r11 preserve_context
+ * %r11 flags: RELOC_KERNEL_*
* %r13 original CR4 when relocate_kernel() was invoked
*/
@@ -200,14 +198,21 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped)
movq %r9, %cr3
/*
+ * If the memory cache is in incoherent state, e.g., due to
+ * memory encryption, do WBINVD to flush cache.
+ *
* If SME is active, there could be old encrypted cache line
* entries that will conflict with the now unencrypted memory
* used by kexec. Flush the caches before copying the kernel.
+ *
+ * Note SME sets this flag to true when the platform supports
+ * SME, so the WBINVD is performed even SME is not activated
+ * by the kernel. But this has no harm.
*/
- testq %r8, %r8
- jz .Lsme_off
+ testb $RELOC_KERNEL_CACHE_INCOHERENT, %r11b
+ jz .Lnowbinvd
wbinvd
-.Lsme_off:
+.Lnowbinvd:
call swap_pages
@@ -220,7 +225,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped)
movq %cr3, %rax
movq %rax, %cr3
- testq %r11, %r11 /* preserve_context */
+ testb $RELOC_KERNEL_PRESERVE_CONTEXT, %r11b
jnz .Lrelocate
/*
@@ -273,7 +278,13 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped)
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
andq $PAGE_MASK, %r8
lea PAGE_SIZE(%r8), %rsp
- movl $1, %r11d /* Ensure preserve_context flag is set */
+ /*
+ * Ensure RELOC_KERNEL_PRESERVE_CONTEXT flag is set so that
+ * swap_pages() can swap pages correctly. Note all other
+ * RELOC_KERNEL_* flags passed to relocate_kernel() are not
+ * restored.
+ */
+ movl $RELOC_KERNEL_PRESERVE_CONTEXT, %r11d
call swap_pages
movq kexec_va_control_page(%rip), %rax
0: addq $virtual_mapped - 0b, %rax
@@ -321,7 +332,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(swap_pages)
UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK
/*
* %rdi indirection page
- * %r11 preserve_context
+ * %r11 flags: RELOC_KERNEL_*
*/
movq %rdi, %rcx /* Put the indirection_page in %rcx */
xorl %edi, %edi
@@ -357,7 +368,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(swap_pages)
movq %rdi, %rdx /* Save destination page to %rdx */
movq %rsi, %rax /* Save source page to %rax */
- testq %r11, %r11 /* Only actually swap for ::preserve_context */
+ /* Only actually swap for ::preserve_context */
+ testb $RELOC_KERNEL_PRESERVE_CONTEXT, %r11b
jz .Lnoswap
/* copy source page to swap page */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 1b2edd07a3e1..1c434c6900eb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <linux/pci.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/root_dev.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/static_call.h>
#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
#include <linux/tboot.h>
@@ -991,6 +992,13 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
efi_init();
+ efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_IN_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+ security_lock_kernel_down("EFI Secure Boot mode", LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX);
+#endif
+
reserve_ibft_region();
x86_init.resources.dmi_setup();
@@ -1154,19 +1162,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
/* Allocate bigger log buffer */
setup_log_buf(1);
- if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
- switch (boot_params.secure_boot) {
- case efi_secureboot_mode_disabled:
- pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
- break;
- case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
- pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
- break;
- default:
- pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
- break;
- }
- }
+ efi_set_secure_boot(boot_params.secure_boot);
reserve_initrd();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index d91d9d6bb26c..328443035027 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -442,6 +442,16 @@ void tdx_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)
tdx_flush_vp(&arg);
}
local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+ /*
+ * Flush cache now if kexec is possible: this is necessary to avoid
+ * having dirty private memory cachelines when the new kernel boots,
+ * but WBINVD is a relatively expensive operation and doing it during
+ * kexec can exacerbate races in native_stop_other_cpus(). Do it
+ * now, since this is a safe moment and there is going to be no more
+ * TDX activity on this CPU from this point on.
+ */
+ tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec();
}
#define TDX_SEAMCALL_RETRIES 10000
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
index c7a9a087ccaf..458cb109f61a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -1266,7 +1266,7 @@ static bool paddr_is_tdx_private(unsigned long phys)
return false;
/* Get page type from the TDX module */
- sret = __seamcall_ret(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RDMD, &args);
+ sret = __seamcall_dirty_cache(__seamcall_ret, TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RDMD, &args);
/*
* The SEAMCALL will not return success unless there is a
@@ -1522,7 +1522,7 @@ noinstr __flatten u64 tdh_vp_enter(struct tdx_vp *td, struct tdx_module_args *ar
{
args->rcx = tdx_tdvpr_pa(td);
- return __seamcall_saved_ret(TDH_VP_ENTER, args);
+ return __seamcall_dirty_cache(__seamcall_saved_ret, TDH_VP_ENTER, args);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_vp_enter);
@@ -1870,3 +1870,22 @@ u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, struct page *page)
return seamcall(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, &args);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
+void tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec(void)