x86/sev: Evict cache lines during SNP memory validation

Commit 7b306df upstream.

An SNP cache coherency vulnerability requires a cache line eviction
mitigation when validating memory after a page state change to private.
The specific mitigation is to touch the first and last byte of each 4K
page that is being validated. There is no need to perform the mitigation
when performing a page state change to shared and rescinding validation.

CPUID bit Fn8000001F_EBX[31] defines the COHERENCY_SFW_NO CPUID bit that,
when set, indicates that the software mitigation for this vulnerability is
not needed.

Implement the mitigation and invoke it when validating memory (making it
private) and the COHERENCY_SFW_NO bit is not set, indicating the SNP guest
is vulnerable.

Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Author: tlendacky

arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c

@@ -165,6 +165,13 @@ static void __page_state_change(unsigned long paddr, enum psc_op op)
 	 */
 	if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE && pvalidate(paddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 1))
 		sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
+
+	/*
+	 * If validating memory (making it private) and affected by the
+	 * cache-coherency vulnerability, perform the cache eviction mitigation.
+	 */
+	if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE && !has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO))
+		sev_evict_cache((void *)paddr, 1);
 }
 
 void snp_set_page_private(unsigned long paddr)

arch/x86/boot/cpuflags.c

@@ -115,5 +115,18 @@ void get_cpuflags(void)
 			cpuid(0x80000001, &ignored, &ignored, &cpu.flags[6],
 			      &cpu.flags[1]);
 		}
+
+		if (max_amd_level >= 0x8000001f) {
+			u32 ebx;
+
+			/*
+			 * The X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO feature bit is in
+			 * the virtualization flags entry (word 8) and set by
+			 * scattered.c, so the bit needs to be explicitly set.
+			 */
+			cpuid(0x8000001f, &ignored, &ebx, &ignored, &ignored);
+			if (ebx & BIT(31))
+				set_bit(X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO, cpu.flags);
+		}
 	}
 }

arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h

@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_FLEXPRIORITY	( 8*32+ 1) /* Intel FlexPriority */
 #define X86_FEATURE_EPT			( 8*32+ 2) /* Intel Extended Page Table */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VPID		( 8*32+ 3) /* Intel Virtual Processor ID */
+#define X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO	( 8*32+ 4) /* "" SNP cache coherency software work around not needed */
 
 #define X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL		( 8*32+15) /* Prefer VMMCALL to VMCALL */
 #define X86_FEATURE_XENPV		( 8*32+16) /* "" Xen paravirtual guest */

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CPB,		CPUID_EDX,  9, 0x80000007, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK,    CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_MBA,		CPUID_EBX,  6, 0x80000008, 0 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO,	CPUID_EBX, 31, 0x8000001f, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_SMBA,		CPUID_EBX,  2, 0x80000020, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_BMEC,		CPUID_EBX,  3, 0x80000020, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO,	CPUID_ECX,  1, 0x80000021, 0 },

arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c

@@ -1068,6 +1068,24 @@ static void __head setup_cpuid_table(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
 	}
 }
 
+static inline void sev_evict_cache(void *va, int npages)
+{
+	volatile u8 val __always_unused;
+	u8 *bytes = va;
+	int page_idx;
+
+	/*
+	 * For SEV guests, a read from the first/last cache-lines of a 4K page
+	 * using the guest key is sufficient to cause a flush of all cache-lines
+	 * associated with that 4K page without incurring all the overhead of a
+	 * full CLFLUSH sequence.
+	 */
+	for (page_idx = 0; page_idx < npages; page_idx++) {
+		val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE];
+		val = bytes[page_idx * PAGE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE - 1];
+	}
+}
+
 static void pvalidate_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
 {
 	struct psc_entry *e;
@@ -1100,6 +1118,24 @@ static void pvalidate_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
 			sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
 		}
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If not affected by the cache-coherency vulnerability there is no need
+	 * to perform the cache eviction mitigation.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO))
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i <= desc->hdr.end_entry; i++) {
+		e = &desc->entries[i];
+
+		/*
+		 * If validating memory (making it private) perform the cache
+		 * eviction mitigation.
+		 */
+		if (e->operation == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE)
+			sev_evict_cache(pfn_to_kaddr(e->gfn), e->pagesize ? 512 : 1);
+	}
 }
 
 static int vmgexit_psc(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct snp_psc_desc *desc)

arch/x86/kernel/sev.c

@@ -688,12 +688,14 @@ static void __head
 early_set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
 		      unsigned long npages, enum psc_op op)
 {
-	unsigned long paddr_end;
+	unsigned long vaddr_begin, paddr_end;
 	u64 val;
 	int ret;
 
 	vaddr = vaddr & PAGE_MASK;
 
+	vaddr_begin = vaddr;
+
 	paddr = paddr & PAGE_MASK;
 	paddr_end = paddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT);
 
@@ -736,6 +738,13 @@ early_set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
 		paddr += PAGE_SIZE;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * If validating memory (making it private) and affected by the
+	 * cache-coherency vulnerability, perform the cache eviction mitigation.
+	 */
+	if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE && !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO))
+		sev_evict_cache((void *)vaddr_begin, npages);
+
 	return;
 
 e_term: