Merge tag 'v6.12.39' into 6.12-main

This is the 6.12.39 stable release

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Author: frank-w

Documentation/bpf/map_hash.rst

@@ -233,10 +233,16 @@ attempts in order to enforce the LRU property which have increasing impacts on
 other CPUs involved in the following operation attempts:
 
 - Attempt to use CPU-local state to batch operations
-- Attempt to fetch free nodes from global lists
+- Attempt to fetch ``target_free`` free nodes from global lists
 - Attempt to pull any node from a global list and remove it from the hashmap
 - Attempt to pull any node from any CPU's list and remove it from the hashmap
 
+The number of nodes to borrow from the global list in a batch, ``target_free``,
+depends on the size of the map. Larger batch size reduces lock contention, but
+may also exhaust the global structure. The value is computed at map init to
+avoid exhaustion, by limiting aggregate reservation by all CPUs to half the map
+size. With a minimum of a single element and maximum budget of 128 at a time.
+
 This algorithm is described visually in the following diagram. See the
 description in commit 3a08c2fd7634 ("bpf: LRU List") for a full explanation of
 the corresponding operations:

Documentation/bpf/map_lru_hash_update.dot

@@ -35,18 +35,18 @@ digraph {
   fn_bpf_lru_list_pop_free_to_local [shape=rectangle,fillcolor=2,
     label="Flush local pending,
     Rotate Global list, move
-    LOCAL_FREE_TARGET
+    target_free
     from global -> local"]
   // Also corresponds to:
   // fn__local_list_flush()
   // fn_bpf_lru_list_rotate()
   fn___bpf_lru_node_move_to_free[shape=diamond,fillcolor=2,
-    label="Able to free\nLOCAL_FREE_TARGET\nnodes?"]
+    label="Able to free\ntarget_free\nnodes?"]
 
   fn___bpf_lru_list_shrink_inactive [shape=rectangle,fillcolor=3,
     label="Shrink inactive list
       up to remaining
-      LOCAL_FREE_TARGET
+      target_free
       (global LRU -> local)"]
   fn___bpf_lru_list_shrink [shape=diamond,fillcolor=2,
     label="> 0 entries in\nlocal free list?"]

Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 6
 PATCHLEVEL = 12
-SUBLEVEL = 38
+SUBLEVEL = 39
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Baby Opossum Posse
 

arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c

@@ -2959,6 +2959,13 @@ static bool has_sve_feature(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SME
+static bool has_sme_feature(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope)
+{
+	return system_supports_sme() && has_user_cpuid_feature(cap, scope);
+}
+#endif
+
 static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_elf_hwcaps[] = {
 	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, AES, PMULL, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_PMULL),
 	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, AES, AES, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_AES),
@@ -3037,25 +3044,25 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_elf_hwcaps[] = {
 	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1, BC, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_HBC),
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SME
 	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, SME, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, FA64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_FA64),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, LUTv2, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_LUTV2),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMEver, SME2p1, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME2P1),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMEver, SME2, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME2),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I16I64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I16I64),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F64F64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F64F64),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I16I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I16I32),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, B16B16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_B16B16),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F16F16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F16F16),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F8F16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F8F16),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F8F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F8F32),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I8I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I8I32),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F16F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F16F32),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, B16F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_B16F32),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, BI32I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_BI32I32),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F32F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F32F32),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8FMA, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8FMA),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8DP4, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8DP4),
-	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8DP2, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8DP2),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, FA64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_FA64),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, LUTv2, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_LUTV2),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMEver, SME2p1, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME2P1),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SMEver, SME2, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME2),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I16I64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I16I64),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F64F64, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F64F64),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I16I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I16I32),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, B16B16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_B16B16),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F16F16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F16F16),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F8F16, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F8F16),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F8F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F8F32),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, I8I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_I8I32),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F16F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F16F32),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, B16F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_B16F32),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, BI32I32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_BI32I32),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, F32F32, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_F32F32),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8FMA, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8FMA),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8DP4, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8DP4),
+	HWCAP_CAP_MATCH_ID(has_sme_feature, ID_AA64SMFR0_EL1, SF8DP2, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_SME_SF8DP2),
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SME */
 	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64FPFR0_EL1, F8CVT, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_F8CVT),
 	HWCAP_CAP(ID_AA64FPFR0_EL1, F8FMA, IMP, CAP_HWCAP, KERNEL_HWCAP_F8FMA),

arch/arm64/kernel/process.c

@@ -544,6 +544,11 @@ static void permission_overlay_switch(struct task_struct *next)
 	current->thread.por_el0 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
 	if (current->thread.por_el0 != next->thread.por_el0) {
 		write_sysreg_s(next->thread.por_el0, SYS_POR_EL0);
+		/*
+		 * No ISB required as we can tolerate spurious Overlay faults -
+		 * the fault handler will check again based on the new value
+		 * of POR_EL0.
+		 */
 	}
 }
 

arch/arm64/mm/fault.c

@@ -487,17 +487,29 @@ static void do_bad_area(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
 	}
 }
 
-static bool fault_from_pkey(unsigned long esr, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
-			unsigned int mm_flags)
+static bool fault_from_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned int mm_flags)
 {
-	unsigned long iss2 = ESR_ELx_ISS2(esr);
-
 	if (!system_supports_poe())
 		return false;
 
-	if (esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr) && (iss2 & ESR_ELx_Overlay))
-		return true;
-
+	/*
+	 * We do not check whether an Overlay fault has occurred because we
+	 * cannot make a decision based solely on its value:
+	 *
+	 * - If Overlay is set, a fault did occur due to POE, but it may be
+	 *   spurious in those cases where we update POR_EL0 without ISB (e.g.
+	 *   on context-switch). We would then need to manually check POR_EL0
+	 *   against vma_pkey(vma), which is exactly what
+	 *   arch_vma_access_permitted() does.
+	 *
+	 * - If Overlay is not set, we may still need to report a pkey fault.
+	 *   This is the case if an access was made within a mapping but with no
+	 *   page mapped, and POR_EL0 forbids the access (according to
+	 *   vma_pkey()). Such access will result in a SIGSEGV regardless
+	 *   because core code checks arch_vma_access_permitted(), but in order
+	 *   to report the correct error code - SEGV_PKUERR - we must handle
+	 *   that case here.
+	 */
 	return !arch_vma_access_permitted(vma,
 			mm_flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE,
 			mm_flags & FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION,
@@ -595,7 +607,7 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
 		goto bad_area;
 	}
 
-	if (fault_from_pkey(esr, vma, mm_flags)) {
+	if (fault_from_pkey(vma, mm_flags)) {
 		pkey = vma_pkey(vma);
 		vma_end_read(vma);
 		fault = 0;
@@ -639,7 +651,7 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
 		goto bad_area;
 	}
 
-	if (fault_from_pkey(esr, vma, mm_flags)) {
+	if (fault_from_pkey(vma, mm_flags)) {
 		pkey = vma_pkey(vma);
 		mmap_read_unlock(mm);
 		fault = 0;

arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/vdso.lds.S

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ SECTIONS
 		*(.data .data.* .gnu.linkonce.d.*)
 		*(.dynbss)
 		*(.bss .bss.* .gnu.linkonce.b.*)
-	}
+	}						:text
 
 	.note		: { *(.note.*) }		:text	:note
 

arch/s390/crypto/sha1_s390.c

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ static int s390_sha1_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
 	sctx->state[4] = SHA1_H4;
 	sctx->count = 0;
 	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_1;
+	sctx->first_message_part = 0;
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ static int s390_sha1_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
 	memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->state, sizeof(ictx->state));
 	memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buffer, sizeof(ictx->buffer));
 	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_1;
+	sctx->first_message_part = 0;
 	return 0;
 }
 

arch/s390/crypto/sha256_s390.c

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ static int s390_sha256_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
 	sctx->state[7] = SHA256_H7;
 	sctx->count = 0;
 	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256;
+	sctx->first_message_part = 0;
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ static int sha256_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
 	memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->state, sizeof(ictx->state));
 	memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf));
 	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256;
+	sctx->first_message_part = 0;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -90,6 +92,7 @@ static int s390_sha224_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
 	sctx->state[7] = SHA224_H7;
 	sctx->count = 0;
 	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_256;
+	sctx->first_message_part = 0;
 
 	return 0;
 }

arch/s390/crypto/sha512_s390.c

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ static int sha512_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
 	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[14] = SHA512_H7;
 	ctx->count = 0;
 	ctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512;
+	ctx->first_message_part = 0;
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -60,6 +61,7 @@ static int sha512_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
 	memcpy(sctx->state, ictx->state, sizeof(ictx->state));
 	memcpy(sctx->buf, ictx->buf, sizeof(ictx->buf));
 	sctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512;
+	sctx->first_message_part = 0;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -97,6 +99,7 @@ static int sha384_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
 	*(__u64 *)&ctx->state[14] = SHA384_H7;
 	ctx->count = 0;
 	ctx->func = CPACF_KIMD_SHA_512;
+	ctx->first_message_part = 0;
 
 	return 0;
 }