diff --git a/.env.example b/.env.example
index 9586b7f..b4217a1 100644
--- a/.env.example
+++ b/.env.example
@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ CONTEXT7_API_KEY=your_context7_api_key_here
 # Get your API key from https://www.perplexity.ai/settings/api
 PERPLEXITY_API_KEY=your_perplexity_api_key_here
 
+# Permission bypass (optional, OFF by default). Default is auto mode (autonomous +
+# background classifier). Set to 1 to add --dangerously-skip-permissions instead
+# (full bypass, no in-app safety checks) — for isolated/throwaway containers only.
+# CLAUDE_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS=1
+
 # Remote Control (optional, OFF by default). Set to 1 to add --remote-control to
 # the entrypoint. NOTE: it needs a full-scope login token (`claude auth login`);
 # the inference-only CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN above cannot drive Remote Control.
diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md
index aedcef9..65a4562 100644
--- a/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@@ -45,7 +45,8 @@ The container implements defense-in-depth:
 
 Claude Code configuration is pre-configured in the container:
 - `claude-config.json` - Main Claude configuration with all permissions enabled
-- `settings.local.json` - Local settings copied to `~/.claude/` and `/workspace/.claude/`
+- `settings.local.json` - Local settings copied to `~/.claude/settings.local.json` (statusLine + permissions)
+- `settings.json` - User settings copied to `~/.claude/settings.json`: `permissions.defaultMode: "auto"` + `advisorModel: "opus"` (auto mode must be in user-home, not project scope)
 - All permissions are auto-accepted for jailfree operation mode
 
 ## Common Commands
@@ -216,6 +217,9 @@ pnpm 11 vs Node 20 mismatch was caught before the base was bumped to Node 22).
 
 **Runtime variables** (set when running container):
 - `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` - OAuth token for Claude Code authentication (required)
+- `CLAUDE_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS` - set to `1` to add `--dangerously-skip-permissions` to the entrypoint
+  (off by default; default is auto mode). Full bypass, no in-app safety checks — for isolated/throwaway
+  containers only.
 - `CLAUDE_REMOTE_CONTROL` - set to `1` to add `--remote-control` to the entrypoint (off by default).
   Requires a full-scope login token (`claude auth login`); the inference-only `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`
   cannot drive Remote Control, so this is a no-op with it.
@@ -228,21 +232,32 @@ pnpm 11 vs Node 20 mismatch was caught before the base was bumped to Node 22).
 - `CODEGRAPH_NO_DOWNLOAD=1` (forbids CodeGraph's runtime binary download from GitHub Releases; binary must come from the npm registry)
 - `NODE_ENV=production`, plus security limits (`RLIMIT_CORE=0`, `RLIMIT_NOFILE=1024`, `YAMA_PTRACE_SCOPE=1`)
 
-**Pre-configured behavior** (`claude-config.json`, copied to `~/.claude.json`):
-- Full permission bypass for `/workspace`: `dangerouslySkipPermissions`, `autoAcceptPermissions`,
-  `defaultMode: acceptEdits`, all tools + `mcp__*` allowed
+**Pre-configured behavior:**
+- **Permission mode = `auto`** (set in `~/.claude/settings.json`, NOT `claude-config.json`). `auto`
+  must live in user-home `settings.json` — Claude Code (v2.1.142+) ignores `defaultMode: "auto"` from
+  project-scope settings. `claude-config.json` (`~/.claude.json`) is deliberately stripped of all
+  mode/auto-accept-forcing keys (`dangerouslySkipPermissions`, `autoAcceptPermissions`,
+  `defaultPermissionMode`, project `permissions.defaultMode`, `autoAccept*`) so settings.json is the
+  single source of mode. Trust/onboarding keys (`hasTrustDialogAccepted`, `hasCompletedOnboarding`,
+  `autoTrustNewProjects`, `suppressTrustPrompts`, `bypassPermissionsModeAccepted`) are kept to avoid
+  first-run dialogs in headless.
+- **`advisorModel: "opus"`** (in `settings.json`) — Claude consults Opus at decision points (Anthropic
+  API only). No-op if the main model outranks Opus (e.g. Fable).
+- `claude-config.json` still pre-approves tools for `/workspace` (`allow` rules + `mcp__*`); note auto
+  mode drops blanket `Bash(*)`/`Agent` rules at runtime (the classifier takes over).
 - `alwaysThinkingEnabled: true`, `autoUpdates: false`
 - The `typescript-lsp@claude-plugins-official` plugin is enabled (works with `ENABLE_LSP_TOOL=1`)
-- The OAuth account is hard-coded in this file — replace it if using a different account
+- The OAuth account is hard-coded in `claude-config.json` — replace it if using a different account
 
 ## Development Workflow (single read-write mode)
 
 1. **Run from your project**: `cd /path/to/repo && ./run_claude.sh`. The current directory is mounted
    **read-write** at `/workspace`; the container runs as your host user (`--user $(id -u):$(id -g)`).
-2. **Entrypoint**: `claude --dangerously-skip-permissions`; the entrypoint first
-   copies the baked agent state from `/home/claude` into the writable tmpfs HOME. Remote Control is
-   opt-in: `--remote-control` is added only when `CLAUDE_REMOTE_CONTROL=1` (it needs a full-scope
-   login token; the inference-only `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` cannot drive it).
+2. **Entrypoint**: `claude` (auto mode via settings.json); the entrypoint first copies the baked
+   agent state from `/home/claude` into the writable tmpfs HOME. Two opt-in flags, each added only
+   when its env var is set: `CLAUDE_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS=1` → `--dangerously-skip-permissions` (full
+   bypass for isolated containers); `CLAUDE_REMOTE_CONTROL=1` → `--remote-control` (needs a
+   full-scope `claude auth login` token; the inference-only `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` cannot drive it).
 3. **Autonomous agent**: Claude edits/commits the project directly in `/workspace`. For `git push`,
    set `DEPLOY_KEY=/path/to/repo_deploy_key` (scoped, read-only mounted). Commit identity comes from
    your host `git config` (passed as env).
@@ -385,6 +400,7 @@ Inside the debug shell, you can run diagnostics manually:
 - `tools/package-lock.json` - Lockfile (sha512 integrity) for the toolchain; installed via `npm ci`. Regenerate inside node:22 after editing package.json
 - `claude-config.json` - Claude Code configuration with all permissions
 - `settings.local.json` - Local Claude settings; also wires the `statusLine` to `/usr/local/bin/claude-statusline.sh`
+- `settings.json` - User Claude settings baked to `~/.claude/settings.json`: `permissions.defaultMode: "auto"` + `advisorModel: "opus"`
 - `statusline-command.sh` - Claude Code statusLine script (compact line: dir, git branch/dirty, model, duration, context %, 5h/7d rate limits); baked to `/usr/local/bin/claude-statusline.sh` (fixed, HOME-independent path). Deps (jq, git, awk, date, grep) are all present in the image
 - `mcp-servers.json` - Base MCP server configurations (always installed)
 - `mcp-servers-optional.json` - Optional MCP servers (require API keys)
diff --git a/Dockerfile b/Dockerfile
index e5b0e81..ab1b738 100644
--- a/Dockerfile
+++ b/Dockerfile
@@ -172,6 +172,10 @@ COPY --chown=${USER_NAME}:${USER_NAME} claude-config.json /home/${USER_NAME}/.cl
 # COPY --chown creates the .claude dir owned by the user (a root `mkdir` here would
 # leave it root-owned and break the later openspec/rtk init under USER claude).
 COPY --chown=${USER_NAME}:${USER_NAME} settings.local.json /home/${USER_NAME}/.claude/settings.local.json
+# User-level settings.json: permission defaultMode "auto" + advisorModel. MUST be
+# user-home (~/.claude/settings.json) — Claude Code (v2.1.142+) ignores defaultMode
+# "auto" from project-scope settings, so this never goes to /workspace/.claude.
+COPY --chown=${USER_NAME}:${USER_NAME} settings.json /home/${USER_NAME}/.claude/settings.json
 # Statusline command for Claude Code (compact line: dir, git, model, context, rate
 # limits). Installed at a fixed, HOME-independent path so settings.local.json's
 # statusLine.command works regardless of the runtime HOME relocation. Deps (jq, git,
@@ -247,14 +251,18 @@ RUN rtk init -g --auto-patch
 RUN npx -y github:JuliusBrussee/caveman#v1.9.0 --non-interactive --only claude --no-mcp-shrink
 
 # Create simple startup script for runtime.
+# Permission mode: default is `auto` (set in ~/.claude/settings.json) — autonomous
+#   with a background classifier, NOT the old `--dangerously-skip-permissions`
+#   bypass. Auto mode engages only on the Anthropic API with a supported model; if
+#   unavailable it silently falls back to `default` (prompts). See SECURITY.md.
+# --dangerously-skip-permissions: OPT-IN via CLAUDE_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS=1 (off by
+#   default). Re-adds the full bypass for isolated/throwaway containers where you
+#   accept no in-app safety checks. The flag is added only when the env var is set,
+#   so it is never a dead default.
 # --remote-control: OPT-IN via CLAUDE_REMOTE_CONTROL=1 (off by default). Remote
 #   Control requires a full-scope login token (`claude auth login`); the
 #   long-lived CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN / `claude setup-token` this image uses is
-#   inference-only, so RC stays disabled with it. The flag is added only when the
-#   env var is set, so it is never a dead default. See SECURITY.md.
-# --dangerously-skip-permissions: the container boundary is the perimeter (see
-#   SECURITY.md). NOTE: when enabled, Remote Control opens an outbound control
-#   channel — covered in the threat model.
+#   inference-only, so RC stays disabled with it.
 RUN echo '#!/bin/bash\n\
 set -e\n\
 # Runtime starts with --user $(id -u):$(id -g) to match host ownership of the rw\n\
@@ -266,14 +274,18 @@ if [ "$HOME" != "/home/claude" ] && [ ! -e "$HOME/.claude.json" ]; then\n\
   cp -a /home/claude/. "$HOME/" 2>/dev/null || true\n\
 fi\n\
 cd /workspace 2>/dev/null || cd "$HOME"\n\
-RC_ARGS=""\n\
+EXTRA_ARGS=""\n\
+mode_msg="permission mode: auto (default; falls back to default mode if auto is unavailable)"\n\
+if [ "${CLAUDE_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS:-0}" = "1" ]; then\n\
+  EXTRA_ARGS="$EXTRA_ARGS --dangerously-skip-permissions"\n\
+  mode_msg="permission mode: bypass (CLAUDE_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS=1 — no in-app safety checks)"\n\
+fi\n\
 if [ "${CLAUDE_REMOTE_CONTROL:-0}" = "1" ]; then\n\
-  RC_ARGS="--remote-control"\n\
-  echo "Starting Claude Code (Remote Control requested — needs a full-scope login token; see SECURITY.md) in $(pwd)..."\n\
-else\n\
-  echo "Starting Claude Code in $(pwd)..."\n\
+  EXTRA_ARGS="$EXTRA_ARGS --remote-control"\n\
+  mode_msg="$mode_msg; Remote Control requested (needs a full-scope login token; see SECURITY.md)"\n\
 fi\n\
-exec claude --dangerously-skip-permissions $RC_ARGS "$@"\n\
+echo "Starting Claude Code in $(pwd) — $mode_msg..."\n\
+exec claude $EXTRA_ARGS "$@"\n\
 ' > /home/${USER_NAME}/start-claude.sh \
     && chmod +x /home/${USER_NAME}/start-claude.sh
 
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 4f2a456..58caf0b 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -117,11 +117,22 @@ A single mode. The wrapper scripts (`run_claude.sh`, `debug-shell.sh`) apply har
 - Footgun guards: the scripts refuse `--privileged`, `docker.sock`, `--pid=host`, `--network=host`,
   `--cap-add`, or running as host root
 
-The entrypoint runs `claude --dangerously-skip-permissions` — the container boundary is the
-perimeter. Remote Control (driving the in-container agent remotely) is **opt-in**: set
-`CLAUDE_REMOTE_CONTROL=1` to add `--remote-control`. Note it needs a full-scope login token
-(`claude auth login`); the `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` this image uses is inference-only, so Remote
-Control stays disabled with it.
+The entrypoint runs `claude` in **auto mode** (`permissions.defaultMode: "auto"` in
+`~/.claude/settings.json`) — autonomous, but with a background classifier that blocks dangerous
+actions (prompt-injection-driven commands, `curl | bash`, force-push, pushing to `main`, prod
+deploys). The OS-level container boundary is still the perimeter. Auto mode engages on the Anthropic
+API with a supported model; if it's unavailable for your account it **silently falls back to
+`default`** (prompts on each action) — confirm the status bar shows `auto` on first run.
+
+Two opt-in env vars (off by default, each added to the launch only when set):
+- `CLAUDE_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS=1` — re-adds `--dangerously-skip-permissions` (full bypass, no in-app
+  safety checks) for isolated/throwaway containers.
+- `CLAUDE_REMOTE_CONTROL=1` — adds `--remote-control` (needs a full-scope `claude auth login` token;
+  the inference-only `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` cannot drive it).
+
+A stronger **advisor** model (`advisorModel: "opus"`) is configured by default: Claude consults Opus
+at decision points (requires the Anthropic API). It's a no-op if you run a main model that outranks
+Opus (e.g. `--model fable`, where an Opus advisor is rejected).
 
 > ⚠️ **On a host where the Docker daemon runs as root, `docker run` is equivalent to host root.**
 > The wrapper scripts and their guards protect against *accidental* misconfiguration, **not** a
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
index 6414ae0..fd58e36 100644
--- a/SECURITY.md
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -54,9 +54,19 @@ may be root. Consequently:
 
 ## Known limitations (by design)
 
-- **The image ENTRYPOINT is permissive** (`--dangerously-skip-permissions`). The
-  container boundary is the perimeter; in-app permission prompts are disabled. A bare `docker run`
-  without a wrapper still has no host-level hardening. Always use the wrapper scripts.
+- **The image ENTRYPOINT runs in auto mode by default, not full bypass.** `permissions.defaultMode`
+  is `"auto"` (`~/.claude/settings.json`): the agent runs autonomously, but a background classifier
+  vets actions and blocks dangerous ones. Full bypass (`--dangerously-skip-permissions`) is now
+  **opt-in** via `CLAUDE_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS=1`, for isolated/throwaway containers that accept no
+  in-app checks. The OS-level container boundary is still the perimeter; a bare `docker run` without
+  a wrapper has no host-level hardening — always use the wrapper scripts. Two by-design auto-mode
+  behaviors: (a) on entering auto, blanket `Bash(*)` / `Agent` allow rules are dropped (the
+  classifier takes over; narrow rules carry over); (b) in non-interactive `-p` runs, repeated
+  classifier blocks abort the session (no user to prompt).
+- **Auto mode can silently fall back to `default`.** If the account/model doesn't support auto
+  (e.g. Team/Enterprise without admin-enabled auto, or a non-API provider), Claude Code starts in
+  `default` mode with no error — meaning it prompts on most actions. Verify the status bar shows
+  `auto` on first run; set `CLAUDE_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS=1` if you need unattended operation regardless.
 - **Remote Control is opt-in and off by default.** Set `CLAUDE_REMOTE_CONTROL=1` to add
   `--remote-control`, which opens an outbound connection to the Remote Control service. It also
   requires a **full-scope login token** (`claude auth login`): the long-lived `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`
@@ -67,8 +77,11 @@ may be root. Consequently:
   On a root host this is an exfiltration channel under prompt injection — restrict egress at the
   Docker-network/daemon level (cap-drop=ALL prevents in-container iptables) or remove those MCP
   servers from `mcp-servers.json`.
-- **Prompt injection (the main runtime risk).** With `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, any file in
-  the project is executable instructions for the autonomous agent. The project is mounted
+- **Prompt injection (the main runtime risk).** Any file in the project is potential instructions for
+  the autonomous agent. In the default **auto mode** the classifier blocks the worst injected actions
+  (exfiltration to external endpoints, `curl | bash`, force-push, prod deploys) — but it is a research
+  preview, not a guarantee, and boundaries you state in chat can be lost to context compaction. With
+  `CLAUDE_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS=1` there are **no** in-app checks at all. The project is mounted
   **read-write**, so an injected agent can modify project files, push (if a deploy key is set), and
   exfiltrate code via egress. Residual risk is **Medium** with a scoped deploy key (below). **Use on
   trusted projects only** and review what the agent commits.
@@ -100,9 +113,9 @@ Two additional entrypoints exist for IDE use; both change the posture relative t
 - **ACP adapter (`run_acp.sh` → `claude-agent-acp`).** The editor (e.g. Zed) launches the container
   over stdio and drives it via the Agent Client Protocol. Crucially, this path does **not** pass
   `--dangerously-skip-permissions`; tool calls (edits, shell commands) are sent back to the editor as
-  **permission requests a human approves**. So the ACP path is *less* permissive than the skip-all
-  agent entrypoint — a human gates actions, which is a genuine deviation from "the container boundary
-  is the only perimeter." It keeps the same hardening (`cap-drop=ALL`, `no-new-privileges`, bridge
+  **permission requests a human approves**. So the ACP path is *less* permissive than the autonomous
+  agent entrypoint — a human gates each action, versus auto mode's background classifier (or full
+  bypass under `CLAUDE_BYPASS_PERMISSIONS=1`). It keeps the same hardening (`cap-drop=ALL`, `no-new-privileges`, bridge
   network, non-root `--user`, tmpfs HOME) with a raised `--pids-limit` (interactive tooling forks
   more). The project is bind-mounted **read-write at its host-absolute path** (path coherence for the
   editor); the same `DEPLOY_KEY` model gates `git push`. Outbound network and prompt-injection risks
diff --git a/claude-config.json b/claude-config.json
index c856a33..fc6b39b 100644
--- a/claude-config.json
+++ b/claude-config.json
@@ -6,12 +6,8 @@
   "autoConnectIde": false,
   "claudeInChromeDefaultEnabled": false,
   "showExpandedTodos": true,
-  "dangerouslySkipPermissions": true,
-  "autoAcceptPermissions": true,
   "autoTrustNewProjects": true,
   "suppressTrustPrompts": true,
-  "suppressPermissionPrompts": true,
-  "defaultPermissionMode": "accept",
   "customApiKeyResponses": {
     "approved": [],
     "rejected": []
@@ -29,7 +25,7 @@
         "allow": [
           "Bash(*)",
           "Edit(*)",
-          "Read(*)", 
+          "Read(*)",
           "Write(*)",
           "List(*)",
           "Glob(*)",
@@ -41,14 +37,11 @@
           "NotebookWrite(*)",
           "mcp__*"
         ],
-        "defaultMode": "acceptEdits",
         "additionalDirectories": ["/workspace/input", "/workspace/output", "/workspace/data", "/workspace/temp"]
       },
       "hasCompletedProjectOnboarding": true,
       "hasClaudeMdExternalIncludesApproved": false,
       "hasClaudeMdExternalIncludesWarningShown": false,
-      "autoAcceptAllTools": true,
-      "autoAcceptMcpTools": true,
       "history": [],
       "mcpContextUris": [],
       "mcpServers": {
@@ -56,9 +49,6 @@
       "enabledMcpjsonServers": [],
       "disabledMcpjsonServers": [],
       "hasTrustDialogAccepted": true,
-      "hasAllToolsApproved": true,
-      "autoAcceptEdits": true,
-      "skipConfirmationDialogs": true,
       "projectOnboardingSeenCount": 1,
       "thinkingMigrationComplete": true,
       "allowWebSearch": true,
diff --git a/settings.json b/settings.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7191017
--- /dev/null
+++ b/settings.json
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+{
+  "permissions": {
+    "defaultMode": "auto"
+  },
+  "advisorModel": "opus"
+}