feat(v2.5.0): crypto_misuse category — PA022

Add CryptoMisuse weak point category detecting cryptographic primitive
misuse: MD5/SHA1 in security contexts (Rust/Python/JS/Go/Elixir), and
constant-time comparison violations (== on secret/password/token/key
variables). Context window heuristic (±200 chars) keeps FP rate low.
Key-reuse and nonce-reuse deferred — not reliably detectable statically.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Author: hyperpolymath

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,30 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## [2.3.0] - 2026-04-12
+
+### Added
+- **CryptoMisuse category (PA022)**: New weak point category detecting cryptographic primitive
+  misuse across five languages. Context-window heuristic (±200 chars) restricts MD5/SHA-1
+  findings to security-sensitive usage — MD5 for file checksums is not flagged.
+  - **Rust**: `md5::compute`/`Md5::new` and `sha1::Sha1`/`Sha1::new` in security context (High);
+    `==` comparison on `secret`/`password`/`token`/`key` variables (Critical — timing attack).
+  - **Python**: `hashlib.md5()`/`hashlib.sha1()` in security context (High);
+    `==` on secret-named variables — use `hmac.compare_digest()` instead (Critical).
+  - **JavaScript**: `crypto.createHash('md5')` and `crypto.createHash('sha1')` (High);
+    `crypto.createHash('sha256')` is fine and not flagged.
+  - **Go**: `md5.New()`/`md5.Sum()` and `sha1.New()`/`sha1.Sum()` in security context (High).
+  - **Elixir**: `:crypto.hash(:md5, ...)` and `:crypto.hash(:sha, ...)` (High);
+    `:crypto.mac(:hmac, :sha, ...)` is acceptable (HMAC-SHA1 is not broken) and not flagged.
+  - Key-reuse and nonce-reuse deferred — not reliably detectable statically.
+- **has_security_context() helper**: Module-level helper function checks ±200 char window
+  around a pattern match for security vocabulary (password, secret, token, auth, key,
+  credential, hash, sign, verify, encrypt) to reduce false positives on benign MD5/SHA-1 use.
+- **PA022 → panicbot**: CryptoMisuse mapped to fleet category `static-analysis/crypto-misuse`
+  with 0.75 confidence, Eliminate tier, Partial fixability. Confidence is honest — the context
+  window has a modest false-positive rate when security vocabulary appears for unrelated reasons.
+- **Idris2 ABI completeness**: `PatternCompleteness.idr` updated — CryptoMisuse added to
+  `WPCategory` with `detectorsFor` covering Rust, Python, JavaScript, Go, Elixir.
+
 ## [2.2.0] - 2026-04-12
 
 ### Added
@@ -13,8 +38,6 @@
   with 0.85 confidence, Eliminate tier, fixable (adding pins resolves the finding).
 - **Idris2 ABI completeness**: `PatternCompleteness.idr` updated — SupplyChain added to
   `WPCategory` with `detectorsFor` covering Rust, Julia, Nix, JavaScript.
-- **CryptoMisuse wiring completed**: CryptoMisuse (PA022) now fully wired into
-  `readiness.rs` expected categories and `translator.rs` category mapping.
 
 ### Changed
 - **Category count**: 22 → 23 (added SupplyChain)

Cargo.lock

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: PMPL-1.0-or-later
 [package]
 name = "panic-attack"
-version = "2.2.0"
+version = "2.3.0"
 edition = "2021"
 rust-version = "1.85.0"
 authors = ["Jonathan D.A. Jewell <j.d.a.jewell@open.ac.uk>"]

Cargo.toml

@@ -79,10 +79,10 @@ The estate uses SHA, Sodium, Ed25519, CBOR proofs, and hash-chain integrity
 throughout VerisimCore, Hypatia attestations, and the Patch Bridge.  Current
 coverage: none beyond `unsafe_blocks` (too blunt).
 
-* [ ] Detect weak-hash-for-security patterns (MD5/SHA1 in security contexts)
-* [ ] Detect constant-time comparison violations (using `==` on secret values)
-* [ ] Detect key-reuse patterns across contexts
-* [ ] Detect nonce reuse in symmetric encryption
+* [x] Detect weak-hash-for-security patterns (MD5/SHA1 in security contexts) — PA022, Rust/Python/JS/Go/Elixir
+* [x] Detect constant-time comparison violations (using `==` on secret values) — PA022, Rust/Python
+* [ ] Detect key-reuse patterns across contexts (not reliably detectable statically — deferred)
+* [ ] Detect nonce reuse in symmetric encryption (not reliably detectable statically — deferred)
 * [ ] Detect missing signature verification before use
 
 === `proof_drift` — Formal verification drift