This document outlines the cryptographic workflow and the Negative-Trust philosophy behind Lockless-Core.
Unlike traditional vault-based systems, Lockless-Core never stores a secret. It utilizes a multi-layered Key Derivation Function (KDF) chain to compute identities on-the-fly.
The process begins with user-provided entropy. This input is never stored and exists only in volatile memory during the derivation process.
To prevent offline brute-force attacks, the user entropy is bound to the local machine:
- A unique Hardware Root Key is generated inside the TPM 2.0 chip.
- The TPM performs a keyed-hash operation that cannot be exported from the silicon.
- This ensures that the identity can only be derived on the specific authorized device.
The resulting hardware-bound seed is processed through the Argon2id algorithm:
- Memory-Hardness: Designed to resist ASIC and GPU-accelerated cracking attempts.
- Side-Channel Resistance: Configured to mitigate timing attacks.
The final key resides in Memory-Only. Once the session is closed or the duress-protocol is triggered, the key is wiped from RAM. No trace of the secret remains on the disk.
- Negative-Trust: We assume the environment is compromised. Security is moved to the hardware-silicon and mathematical derivation.
- Anti-Forensics: Since there is no Vault File, there is nothing for an attacker to steal for offline analysis.
- Duress Protocol: Integration for automated emergency signals if the wrong derivation path is forced.
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