diff --git a/.banlist.txt b/.banlist.txt
index dc9a27699..569362b13 100644
--- a/.banlist.txt
+++ b/.banlist.txt
@@ -35,6 +35,16 @@ pypi-AgE[A-Za-z0-9_-]{50,}
 (^|[^A-Za-z0-9])hf_[A-Za-z0-9]{34,}
 (^|[^A-Za-z0-9])shp(at|ca|pa|ss)_[a-f0-9]{32}
 (^|[^A-Za-z0-9])do[por]_v1_[a-f0-9]{64}
+(aws_secret_access_key|AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY)[ ]*[=:][ ]*["']?[A-Za-z0-9/+]{30}([A-DF-Za-z0-9/+][A-Za-z0-9/+]{9}|E[A-WY-Za-z0-9/+][A-Za-z0-9/+]{8}|EX[B-Za-z0-9/+][A-Za-z0-9/+]{7}|EXA[A-LN-Za-z0-9/+][A-Za-z0-9/+]{6}|EXAM[A-OQ-Za-z0-9/+][A-Za-z0-9/+]{5}|EXAMP[A-KM-Za-z0-9/+][A-Za-z0-9/+]{4}|EXAMPL[A-DF-Za-z0-9/+][A-Za-z0-9/+]{3}|EXAMPLE[A-JL-Za-z0-9/+][A-Za-z0-9/+]{2}|EXAMPLEK[A-DF-Za-z0-9/+][A-Za-z0-9/+]{1}|EXAMPLEKE[A-XZ-Za-z0-9/+])([^A-Za-z0-9/+]|$)
+(^|[^A-Za-z0-9])AC[0-9a-f]{32}([^A-Za-z0-9]|$)
+(auth_token|AUTH_TOKEN|authToken)["']?[ ]*[:=][ ]*["']?[0-9a-f]{32}([^0-9A-Za-z]|$)
+(^|[^A-Za-z0-9_-])eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}
+(AccountKey|SharedAccessKey)=[A-Za-z0-9+/]{40,}
+(^|[^A-Za-z0-9_-])[MNO][A-Za-z0-9_-]{23,27}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{27,38}([^A-Za-z0-9_-]|$)
+lin_(api|oauth)_[A-Za-z0-9]{40}
+(^|[^A-Za-z0-9-])key-[0-9a-f]{32}([^0-9A-Za-z]|$)
+dckr_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}
+(^|[^0-9])[0-9]{8,10}:AA[A-Za-z0-9_-]{33}([^A-Za-z0-9_-]|$)
 [A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.-]*://[A-Za-z0-9._-]+:[A-Za-z0-9%+_=-]{12,}@[A-Za-z0-9-]+\.[A-Za-z]
 -----BEGIN (RSA |EC |OPENSSH |DSA |ENCRYPTED )?PRIVATE KEY-----
 -----BEGIN (PGP )PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
diff --git a/.claude/skills/agentic-delivery/scripts/destructive_guard.py b/.claude/skills/agentic-delivery/scripts/destructive_guard.py
index 08787ead1..507831368 100644
--- a/.claude/skills/agentic-delivery/scripts/destructive_guard.py
+++ b/.claude/skills/agentic-delivery/scripts/destructive_guard.py
@@ -44,7 +44,10 @@
   `docker volume rm|prune`, `docker system prune --volumes|-a`, `docker rm|rmi|kill $(...)` (global options like `-H x` are skipped), `kill ... -1|0`, `shutdown|reboot|halt|poweroff`, `shred`, `truncate -s 0`,
   `rsync --delete` (not with `-n`/`--dry-run`), SQL DROP/TRUNCATE/DELETE-all via psql/mysql/sqlite3, fork bombs,
   `git push --force-with-lease` to main/master, `git worktree remove --force`, a secret variable in a curl/wget
-  URL query.
+  URL query, `aws s3 rm --recursive|s3 rb --force|ec2 terminate-instances|rds delete-db-*`, `gcloud projects delete`,
+  `az group delete`, `terraform|tofu destroy|apply -destroy`, `kubectl delete namespace|all --all`,
+  `redis-cli FLUSHALL|FLUSHDB`, mongo `dropDatabase`, `wipefs` (not `-n`), `diskutil eraseDisk|eraseVolume|...`,
+  and `eval`/`sh` of a `$(... base64 -d ...)` payload.
 Everything else is allowed.
 
 No in-repo grant or allow list: anything an agent can write, an agent can forge. When the owner really wants a
@@ -86,6 +89,9 @@
 DYNCMD = re.compile(r"(?:^|[;&|\n({]|\bthen\b|\bdo\b)\s*\"?(?:\$\([^()]{0,200}\)|`[^`]{0,200}`|\$\{?\w{1,64}\}?)\"?(?:\s+\S+){0,8}?\s+(?:-\w*(?:rf|fr)\w*|--hard)\b")
 FORKBOMB = re.compile(r"(\S{1,32})\(\)\s*\{\s*\1\s*\|\s*\1\s*&")
 SSH_VAL = "bcDEeFIiJLlmOopQRSWw"
+B64EXEC = re.compile(r"\b(?:eval|source|(?:ba|z|da|k|a)?sh)\b[^|;&\n]{0,300}(?:\$\(|`)[^)`]{0,300}\bbase64\b[^)`]{0,300}(?:\s-\w*[dD]|--decode)")
+KUBE_VAL = ("-n", "--namespace", "-l", "--selector", "-f", "--filename", "--context", "--cluster", "--kubeconfig", "--user", "-o", "--output", "--field-selector")
+DISKUTIL = ("erasedisk", "erasevolume", "secureerase", "zerodisk", "randomdisk", "partitiondisk")
 DOCKER_VAL = ("-H", "--host", "--context", "-c", "--config", "-l", "--log-level", "--tlscacert", "--tlscert", "--tlskey")
 HEREDOC = re.compile(r"<<-?[ \t]*(['\"]?)([A-Za-z_]\w*)\1[^\n]*\n(.*?)\n[ \t]*\2[ \t]*(?=\n|$)", re.S)
 MAXDEPTH = 6
@@ -95,6 +101,8 @@
     r"\bgit\b.*\b(?:reset\s+--ha|clean\s+-\w*f|checkout\s+(?:-f|--\s+\.|\.)|switch\s+-f|restore\s+\.|branch\s+-D|stash\s+(?:clear|drop))",
     r"\bgit\b.*\bpush\b.*(?:--for|\s-\w*f\w*\b|--del|--mir|\s[+:]\S)",
     r"\bfind\b.*(?:-delete|-exec\s+rm)", r"\bdd\b.*\bof=/dev/(?!null|zero|std)", r"\bmkfs",
+    r"\b(?:terraform|tofu)\b.*\bdestroy\b", r"\bkubectl\b.*\bdelete\s+(?:ns|namespaces?)\b",
+    r"\baws\b.*\b(?:terminate-instances|delete-db-|s3\s+rb)", r"\b(?:wipefs|redis-cli\s.*flush(?:all|db))\b",
     r"\b(?:chmod|chown)\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*-\w*R\w*\s+(?:\S+\s+)?[/~]", r"\b(?:pkill|killall)\b",
     r"\bkill\s+(?!(?:-0|-s\s+0)(?:\s+--)?\s+(?:\d+|\"?\$\{?\w+\}?\"?|\"\$\([^\"()]*\)\")\s*(?:[;&|\n]|$)).*[$`]", r"\b(?:curl|wget)\b.*\|\s*(?:sudo\s+)?(?:ba|z|da|k|fi)?sh\b",
 )]
@@ -242,6 +250,33 @@ def _cmd(name, a, ph):
         return "kill by pattern/substitution. `kill` the exact PID you started"
     if name in ("curl", "wget") and any(re.match(r"https?://\S*\?\S*\$\{?\w*(?:SECRET|TOKEN|PASSW|API_?KEY|PRIVATE)", t, re.I) for t in a):
         return "secret variable in a URL query string leaves the host. Send it in an Authorization header to a host you trust"
+    w = [t for t in a if not t.startswith("-")]  # positional words; option values may leak in, which only widens a match
+    pair = lambda *x: any(w[k:k + len(x)] == list(x) for k in range(len(w)))
+    if (name == "aws" and ((pair("s3", "rm") and "--recursive" in a) or (pair("s3", "rb") and "--force" in a)
+                           or pair("ec2", "terminate-instances") or any(t.startswith("delete-db-") for t in w) and "rds" in w)) \
+            or (name == "gcloud" and pair("projects", "delete")) or (name == "az" and pair("group", "delete")):
+        return f"{name} bulk or whole-resource delete. Name the exact resource and ask the owner"
+    if name in ("terraform", "tofu") and (w[:1] == ["destroy"] or (w[:1] == ["apply"] and any(t in ("-destroy", "--destroy") for t in a))):
+        return f"{name} destroy removes real infrastructure. Run `plan -destroy` and ask the owner"
+    if name == "kubectl" and "delete" in w:
+        r, k = [], a.index("delete") + 1 if "delete" in a else len(a)  # first positional after delete, skipping option values (`-n foo ns bar`)
+        while k < len(a) and not r:
+            if a[k] in KUBE_VAL:
+                k += 1
+            elif not a[k].startswith("-"):
+                r = [a[k]]
+            k += 1
+        r = r[0].split("/")[0].lower() if r else ""
+        if r in ("ns", "namespace", "namespaces") or (r == "all" and ("--all" in a or "-A" in a or "--all-namespaces" in a)):
+            return "kubectl delete namespace/all removes a whole workload. Delete exact named objects and ask the owner"
+    if name == "redis-cli" and any(t.upper() in ("FLUSHALL", "FLUSHDB") for t in a):
+        return "redis FLUSHALL/FLUSHDB wipes the keyspace. Ask the owner"
+    if name in ("mongo", "mongosh") and any(re.search(r"dropDatabase\s*\(", t) for t in a):
+        return "mongo dropDatabase. Ask the owner"
+    if name == "wipefs" and not any(t in ("-n", "--no-act") for t in a):
+        return "wipefs erases filesystem signatures on a device. Do it in a VM, never on the host"
+    if name == "diskutil" and w[:1] and w[0].lower() in DISKUTIL:
+        return "diskutil erase/partition wipes a disk. Do it in a VM, never on the host"
     if name == "ssh":  # the remote command is everything after the host
         k = 0
         while k < len(a) and a[k].startswith("-"):
@@ -353,12 +388,16 @@ def _feed(name, text):
 def _bodies(cmd):
     """Backtick and `$(...)` bodies of the raw text (balanced parens), scanned recursively by the caller."""
     out = re.findall(r"`([^`]*)`", cmd)
+    end = 0
     for m in re.finditer(r"\$\(", cmd):
+        if m.start() < end:
+            continue  # nested: the outer body already holds it and check() recurses into it (no fan-out blowup)
         depth, j = 1, m.end()
         while j < len(cmd) and depth:
             depth += (cmd[j] == "(") - (cmd[j] == ")")
             j += 1
         out.append(cmd[m.end():j - 1 if depth == 0 else j])
+        end = j
     return out
 
 
@@ -383,6 +422,8 @@ def check(cmd, _depth=0, _ph=None):
     cmd = re.sub(r"\$\{IFS\}|\$IFS\b", " ", cmd)  # rm${IFS}-rf is rm -rf
     if "()" in cmd and FORKBOMB.search(cmd):
         return "fork bomb. Never run it"
+    if "base64" in cmd and B64EXEC.search(cmd):
+        return "eval/shell of a decoded base64 payload cannot be vetted. Decode to a file, read it, then run it"
     if DYNCMD.search(cmd):
         return "command word built from a variable or substitution with -rf/--hard. Spell the command out"
     try:
@@ -461,7 +502,7 @@ def check(cmd, _depth=0, _ph=None):
         if r:
             return r
         src = src or hd[n] or name in ("echo", "printf", "cat", "tee") or (
-            name == "base64" and any(re.fullmatch(r"-[A-Za-z]*d[A-Za-z]*|--decode", t) for t in a))
+            name == "base64" and any(re.fullmatch(r"-[A-Za-z]*[dD][A-Za-z]*|--decode", t) for t in a))
         fetch = fetch or name in ("curl", "wget")
         feed = ([" ".join(a)] + a) if name in ("echo", "printf") else None  # joined, and each arg (printf FORMAT ARG)
         prev = name
diff --git a/changelog.d/security-gates-heldout-fixes.md b/changelog.d/security-gates-heldout-fixes.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bd8099957
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changelog.d/security-gates-heldout-fixes.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+### Added
+- `.banlist.txt` provider-format patterns for the AWS secret access key in a credentials file (the public AWS docs example secret stays allowed), Twilio account SID and auth token, JWT, Azure storage `AccountKey`/`SharedAccessKey`, Discord bot token, Linear `lin_api_`/`lin_oauth_`, Mailgun `key-`, Docker Hub `dckr_pat_` and Telegram bot token.
+- `destructive_guard.py` now blocks `aws s3 rm --recursive`, `aws s3 rb --force`, `ec2 terminate-instances`, `rds delete-db-*`, `gcloud projects delete`, `az group delete`, `terraform|tofu destroy` and `apply -destroy`, `kubectl delete namespace` and `delete all --all`, `redis-cli FLUSHALL|FLUSHDB`, mongo `dropDatabase`, `wipefs`, `diskutil eraseDisk` and siblings, and `eval`/`sh` of a decoded base64 payload. Routine `kubectl delete pod`, `terraform plan` and a single-key `aws s3 rm` stay allowed.
+- Held-out-1024 after the fixes: secret gate 21/30 to 30/30 (2/30 decoys flagged, unchanged), guard 26/40 to 40/40 (3/40 benign, unchanged); the first corpus stays 30/31 and 46/46 with FP 1/34 and 0/45. The held-out corpus is now in-sample; a fresh held-out-2 corpus is the real test. Tests: `scripts/test_security_gates_heldout_fixes.py`.
+- Out-of-sample score (`docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024`, preregistered corpus, rules frozen at this change): secret gate 23/40 leaks with 2/40 decoys flagged against ported gitleaks 26/40 (0 FP); guard 37/50 with 4/50 benign blocked against ported safety-net 18/50 (2 FP) and hooks-mastery 9/50 (5 FP). Perun still trails gitleaks on secrets out of sample. the privacy gate skips the frozen `security-gates-*/secret-leaks.txt` and `secret-decoys.txt` corpora (fictional values, immutable once landed); `score.py` accepts `id<TAB>cmd` rows and hashes from `SHA256-frozen.txt` (last line per path); `bench_check.py` resolves a bare frozen filename from the bench dir first. Pins: `scripts/test_security_gates_heldout2.py`.
diff --git a/changelog.d/security-gates-heldout.md b/changelog.d/security-gates-heldout.md
index 1e6ad4053..755f38354 100644
--- a/changelog.d/security-gates-heldout.md
+++ b/changelog.d/security-gates-heldout.md
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 ### Added
-- Held-out score for the secret gate and destructive guard (`docs/bench/security-gates-heldout-1024`): corpora written blind before the rules were read and hashed in a preregistration commit. Perun 21 of 30 leaks found with 2 of 30 decoys flagged, and 26 of 40 dangerous commands blocked with 3 of 40 benign blocked; ported gitleaks 23 of 30 (0 of 30 FP), hooks-mastery 9 of 40 (6 of 40 FP), safety-net ported subset 17 of 40 (2 of 40 FP). No rule was changed after scoring; misses are logged as leads. `score.py` gained `--corpus-dir`; pins run in CI via `scripts/test_security_gates_heldout.py`.
+- Held-out score for the secret gate and destructive guard (`docs/bench/security-gates-heldout-1024`): corpora written blind before the rules were read and hashed in a preregistration commit. Perun 21 of 30 leaks found with 2 of 30 decoys flagged, and 26 of 40 dangerous commands blocked with 3 of 40 benign blocked; ported gitleaks 23 of 30 (0 of 30 FP), hooks-mastery 9 of 40 (6 of 40 FP), safety-net ported subset 17 of 40 (2 of 40 FP). No rule was changed during scoring; misses were logged as leads and closed afterwards (see the gate-fix entry). `score.py` gained `--corpus-dir`; pins run in CI via `scripts/test_security_gates_heldout.py`.
diff --git a/docs/INDEX.md b/docs/INDEX.md
index da42ab12a..5f6e93a6d 100644
--- a/docs/INDEX.md
+++ b/docs/INDEX.md
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Generated by `python3 .claude/skills/agentic-delivery/scripts/focus_kit.py docs-
 | `docs/idea-critic-outcome-1019/README.md` | idea-critic outcome bench (2026-10-19), exploratory (not preregistered): on 36 historically resolved go/no-go decisions, the idea-critic sk… | 2085 |
 | `docs/peer-survey-2026-10-16.md` | Peer survey and field measurements, 2026-10-16: The roadmap in roadmap.md cites this page as the source for peer-reported pain points. | 335 |
 | `docs/perun-doctor.md` | Perun doctor and uninstall: Installed scripts and hooks can sit in a repo and never run: an operating layer that needed an extra flag, a st… | 1588 |
-| `docs/perun-vs-rivals.md` | Perun vs other skill bundles: Harness: run rival rows with scripts/rival_eval_keys.py run ..., a wrapper around the hash-pinned scripts/riv… | 31990 |
+| `docs/perun-vs-rivals.md` | Perun vs other skill bundles: Harness: run rival rows with scripts/rival_eval_keys.py run ..., a wrapper around the hash-pinned scripts/riv… | 32305 |
 | `docs/review-cost-per-recall.md` | Review cost per real bug caught, and false alarms per case: on the one set with per-case data (S1, n=22, patch-only), Perun's real skill ca… | 2915 |
 | `docs/roadmap.md` | Roadmap: Two parts. The product roadmap below is what to build or fix next for Perun, produced by the CEO improvement loop: ranked by a pri… | 15600 |
 | `docs/scoreboard.md` | Perun scoreboard: Generated by scripts/scoreboard.py from committed results | 4422 |
diff --git a/docs/bench/security-gates-1024/rivals/score_rivals.py b/docs/bench/security-gates-1024/rivals/score_rivals.py
index 985d6cf75..8551dceed 100644
--- a/docs/bench/security-gates-1024/rivals/score_rivals.py
+++ b/docs/bench/security-gates-1024/rivals/score_rivals.py
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ def scores():
     if GL[2]: raise SystemExit(f"{GL[2]} gitleaks regexes failed to compile")
     pick = lambda n: [(l.split("\t")[0], l.split("\t", 1)[1].replace("@@", "")) for l in sc.rows(n)]
     leaks, decoys = pick("secret-leaks.txt"), pick("secret-decoys.txt")
-    dang, ben = sc.rows("destructive-dangerous.txt"), sc.rows("destructive-benign.txt")
+    dang, ben = sc.cmds("destructive-dangerous.txt"), sc.cmds("destructive-benign.txt")
     s = {"gitleaks": dict(n_leaks=len(leaks), n_decoys=len(decoys), rules=len(GL[1]),
                           missed=[n for n, t in leaks if not gitleaks_rule(t)], fp=[n for n, t in decoys if gitleaks_rule(t)])}
     s["hooks-mastery"] = dict(n=len(dang), n_ben=len(ben), missed=[c for c in dang if not hooks_mastery(c)], fp=[c for c in ben if hooks_mastery(c)])
diff --git a/docs/bench/security-gates-1024/score.py b/docs/bench/security-gates-1024/score.py
index 20ef1e1cb..ee307d01b 100644
--- a/docs/bench/security-gates-1024/score.py
+++ b/docs/bench/security-gates-1024/score.py
@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
 """Score Perun's secret gate and destructive guard on the frozen synthetic corpora in this directory.
 
 Offline and deterministic: no network, no model calls, nothing is executed (commands are only classified).
-Usage: python3 docs/bench/security-gates-1024/score.py [--corpus-dir DIR]   (DIR holds the corpora and a README.md with SHA256 lines; run from the repo root; exit 1 on any hash drift)
-Corpus files: tab-separated `name<TAB>text` (secrets) or one command per line; `#` lines are comments; `@@`
+Usage: python3 docs/bench/security-gates-1024/score.py [--corpus-dir DIR]   (DIR holds the corpora and SHA256 lines in SHA256-frozen.txt, else README.md; run from the repo root; exit 1 on any hash drift)
+Corpus files: tab-separated `name<TAB>text` (secrets) or `id<TAB>cmd` / one command per line; `#` lines are comments; `@@`
 inside a secret line is a marker deleted before scoring so the files never trip the repo privacy gate.
 """
 import hashlib, importlib.util, pathlib, subprocess, sys, tempfile
@@ -18,13 +18,19 @@ def rows(name):
     return [l for l in (D / name).read_text().splitlines() if l and not l.startswith("#")]
 
 
+def cmds(name):
+    """Command rows: `id<TAB>cmd` (the id is dropped) or a bare command per line."""
+    return [l.split("\t", 1)[-1] for l in rows(name)]
+
+
 def sha_ok():
-    """Compare corpus hashes with SHA256 lines in README.md; returns the list of drifted files."""
+    """Compare corpus hashes with the SHA256 lines of SHA256-frozen.txt (last line per path pins the file, earlier ones are disclosed amendments) or, without it, README.md; returns the list of drifted files."""
     want = {}
-    for l in (D / "README.md").read_text().splitlines():
+    fz = D / "SHA256-frozen.txt"
+    for l in (fz if fz.exists() else D / "README.md").read_text().splitlines():
         p = l.split()
-        if len(p) == 2 and len(p[0]) == 64 and p[1].endswith(".txt"):
-            want[p[1]] = p[0]
+        if len(p) == 2 and len(p[0]) == 64 and p[1].endswith((".txt", ".md") if fz.exists() else ".txt"):
+            want[pathlib.PurePath(p[1]).name] = p[0]
     return [f for f, h in want.items() if hashlib.sha256((D / f).read_bytes()).hexdigest() != h] or (
         [] if want else ["README.md has no sha256 lines"])
 
@@ -51,7 +57,7 @@ def main():
         fp = [n for n, t in decoys if secret_flagged(tmp, t)]
     print(f"secret gate: recall {len(leaks) - len(miss)}/{len(leaks)}  FP {len(fp)}/{len(decoys)}")
     print("  missed:", miss); print("  false positives:", fp)
-    dang, ben = rows("destructive-dangerous.txt"), rows("destructive-benign.txt")
+    dang, ben = cmds("destructive-dangerous.txt"), cmds("destructive-benign.txt")
     dmiss = [c for c in dang if not dg.check(c)]
     dfp = [c for c in ben if dg.check(c)]
     print(f"destructive guard: blocked {len(dang) - len(dmiss)}/{len(dang)}  FP {len(dfp)}/{len(ben)}")
diff --git a/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout-1024/README.md b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout-1024/README.md
index b63662b8c..b737dc82b 100644
--- a/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout-1024/README.md
+++ b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout-1024/README.md
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Held-out security gates, 2026-10-24
 
-**BLUF.** On corpora written blind, Perun's secret gate found 21 of 30 synthetic leaks (2 of 30 decoys flagged) and its destructive guard blocked 26 of 40 dangerous commands (3 of 40 benign blocked). Ported gitleaks found 23 of 30 leaks (0 FP). Ported hooks-mastery blocked 9 of 40 (6 FP) and the ported claude-code-safety-net subset 17 of 40 (2 FP). Out of sample, Perun trails gitleaks on secret recall and leads on destructive blocking, but the in-sample 30/31 and 46/46 do not generalize: the guard has no cloud, orchestration or NoSQL-store coverage, which the first corpus never exercised.
+**BLUF.** On corpora written blind, Perun's secret gate found 21 of 30 synthetic leaks (2 of 30 decoys flagged) and its destructive guard blocked 26 of 40 dangerous commands (3 of 40 benign blocked); after rules written against those misses, 30 of 30 leaks (2 of 30 decoys) and 40 of 40 blocked (3 of 40 benign), now in-sample. Ported gitleaks found 23 of 30 leaks (0 FP). Ported hooks-mastery blocked 9 of 40 (6 FP) and the ported claude-code-safety-net subset 17 of 40 (2 FP). Out of sample, Perun trails gitleaks on secret recall and leads on destructive blocking, but the in-sample 30/31 and 46/46 did not generalize: the guard has no cloud, orchestration or NoSQL-store coverage, which the first corpus never exercised.
 
 **Method.** The four corpora below were authored before reading `.banlist.txt`, `destructive_guard.py`, the first corpus or the rival ports; only the `@@` marker convention was taken from `score.py`. Their preregistration hashes were committed locally before scoring (commit ad168d8c6, squashed into this commit); `SHA256-frozen.txt` pins them. The timestamp cannot be checked from public history; `score.py` and `rivals/score_rivals.py` then ran unchanged apart from a `--corpus-dir` argument. No rule was changed after seeing results. All values are invented; secret lines carry `@@` markers so they never trip the privacy gate.
 
@@ -10,12 +10,15 @@ Run: `python3 docs/bench/security-gates-1024/score.py --corpus-dir docs/bench/se
 
 | System | Secret leaks found (30) | Decoys flagged (30) | Dangerous blocked (40) | Benign blocked (40) |
 |---|---|---|---|---|
-| Perun | 21 | 2 | 26 | 3 |
+| Perun, before (as scored blind) | 21 | 2 | 26 | 3 |
+| Perun, after gatefix2 (in-sample now) | 30 | 2 | 40 | 3 |
 | gitleaks v8.30.1 (ported) | 23 | 0 | n/a | n/a |
 | hooks-mastery (ported) | n/a | n/a | 9 | 6 |
 | claude-code-safety-net (ported subset) | n/a | n/a | 17 | 2 |
 
-## Leads (misses logged, not fixed here)
+**This corpus is now in-sample.** The rows below were fixed by format-spec patterns and verb rules (`.banlist.txt`, `destructive_guard.py`; variants and decoys in `scripts/test_security_gates_heldout_fixes.py`), so 30/30 and 40/40 prove nothing about unseen data; the out-of-sample test is `docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024`. The first corpus stays at 30/31, FP 1/34 and 46/46, FP 0/45. The 2 decoy and 3 benign flags are unchanged.
+
+## Leads (misses at blind scoring; fixed afterwards, see above)
 
 - Secret gate missed 9: AWS secret key in a credentials file, Twilio auth token, Docker Hub PAT, JWT bearer header, Azure storage connection string, Discord bot token, Telegram bot URL, Linear API key, Mailgun key. Flagged decoys: `sk-xxxx...` placeholder, the AWS documentation example key.
 - Destructive guard missed 14: `eval` of a base64 payload, `wipefs`, `diskutil eraseDisk`, `redis-cli FLUSHALL`, mongo `dropDatabase`, and every cloud and orchestration row (`aws s3 rm/rb`, `ec2 terminate-instances`, `rds delete-db-instance`, `gcloud projects delete`, `az group delete`, `terraform destroy`, `kubectl delete namespace/all`). It flagged three benign rows (`git stash drop`, `find ... -delete`, `rm -rf /tmp/...`).
@@ -23,7 +26,7 @@ Run: `python3 docs/bench/security-gates-1024/score.py --corpus-dir docs/bench/se
 
 ## Frozen hashes
 
-The local preregistration commit (ad168d8c6, squashed away) pinned `secret-leaks.txt` at `d7aef600ac9ad7c9b511c7f467e066d12f5bf99d98197192b9ec6eadbcc9217c`. Before any scoring, the repo privacy gate flagged three rows (Slack webhook URL, two database URLs) that lacked `@@` markers, so markers were added to those rows only; with every `@@` removed the file is byte-identical to the preregistered one (sha256 `7c5309f21640db3a8a7eb77cb63f94e557d066ea8b7a8fb13d840d040f650cfd`, asserted by `scripts/test_security_gates_heldout.py`). After scoring, GitHub push protection blocked three more unmarked rows (Twilio account SID, Azure storage key, Mailgun key), so markers were added to those too; the `@@`-stripped content, and therefore every score, is unchanged. The other three corpora are unchanged. `SHA256-frozen.txt` keeps the four preregistered lines and appends both `secret-leaks.txt` amendments; `ledger.jsonl` records each with its time. Hashes now pinned:
+The local preregistration commit (ad168d8c6, squashed away) pinned `secret-leaks.txt` at `d7aef600ac9ad7c9b511c7f467e066d12f5bf99d98197192b9ec6eadbcc9217c`. Before any scoring, the repo privacy gate flagged three rows (Slack webhook URL, two database URLs) that lacked `@@` markers, so markers were added to those rows only; with every `@@` removed the file is byte-identical to the preregistered one once `@@` is stripped from both (sha256 `7c5309f21640db3a8a7eb77cb63f94e557d066ea8b7a8fb13d840d040f650cfd`, asserted by `scripts/test_security_gates_heldout.py`). After scoring, GitHub push protection blocked three more unmarked rows (Twilio account SID, Azure storage key, Mailgun key), so markers were added to those too; the `@@`-stripped content, and therefore every score, is unchanged. The other three corpora are unchanged. `SHA256-frozen.txt` keeps the four preregistered lines and appends both `secret-leaks.txt` amendments; `ledger.jsonl` records each with its time; it was reconstructed after the fact from commit and reflog times,, and the second amendment's time is the committer time of commit 587f293a6. Hashes now pinned:
 
 714861750f651ddde17f0ff3a49e0735b7e5480369f1c56b2545a6c078a02b5b  secret-leaks.txt
 c5f82cec87517931a0fed914c2fa8ece8a096868b535260856686a4560329c12  secret-decoys.txt
diff --git a/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/README.md b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2c3476f3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# Held-out security corpus 2 (2026-10-24)
+
+Second blind held-out corpus for the security gates, written blind on 2026-10-24 before any rule wave scored it. Four tab-separated files (`id<TAB>text`): `secret-leaks.txt` (40 live-format secrets), `secret-decoys.txt` (40 hashes, UUIDs, blobs, placeholders and public examples), `destructive-dangerous.txt` (50 host, data and infra destroying commands including obfuscated forms) and `destructive-benign.txt` (50 routine lookalikes). Every live-format secret carries an `@@` marker inside its prefix or body so push protection and the privacy gate never fire; strip it with `replace("@@", "")` before scoring. All values are fictional (acme-demo, example.com). Do not edit rows after this commit; `SHA256-frozen.txt` pins the files, so any change means a new corpus.
diff --git a/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/RESULTS.md b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/RESULTS.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cfceee36c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/RESULTS.md
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+# Held-out 2 results, 2026-10-24
+
+**BLUF.** On a second blind corpus that Perun's rules never saw, the secret gate found 23 of 40 leaks (2 of 40 decoys flagged) and the destructive guard blocked 37 of 50 dangerous commands (4 of 50 benign blocked). Ported gitleaks found 26 of 40 leaks (0 FP). Ported claude-code-safety-net blocked 18 of 50 (2 FP) and ported hooks-mastery 9 of 50 (5 FP). Out of sample, Perun still trails gitleaks on secrets and leads on destructive blocking. The in-sample numbers for the first corpus (30/31, 46/46) and for held-out-1024 after its fixes (30/30, 40/40) overstate what an unseen corpus gives.
+
+**Method.** The corpora were committed (8abdefc93) before any rule wave scored them; `SHA256-frozen.txt` pins them and `ledger.jsonl` records the preregistration. Perun's rules were frozen at the gatefix2 commit; nothing was tuned after seeing these rows. The corpus freeze (8abdefc93) predates the rule change that closed the held-out-1024 misses, so the published numbers are the frozen-rule scores. Later hardening of the guard (a bounded base64-exec pattern, `kubectl delete` option-value skipping, no nested-substitution fan-out) leaves them unchanged: re-scored 23/40 leaks (2/40 decoys flagged) and 37/50 blocked (4/50 benign blocked). Run: `python3 docs/bench/security-gates-1024/score.py --corpus-dir docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024` and `python3 -I docs/bench/security-gates-1024/rivals/score_rivals.py --corpus-dir docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024`. Pins: `scripts/test_security_gates_heldout2.py`.
+
+| System | Secret leaks found (40) | Decoys flagged (40) | Dangerous blocked (50) | Benign blocked (50) |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| Perun | 23 | 2 | 37 | 4 |
+| gitleaks v8.30.1 (ported) | 26 | 0 | n/a | n/a |
+| hooks-mastery (ported) | n/a | n/a | 9 | 5 |
+| claude-code-safety-net (ported subset, 1 row unported) | n/a | n/a | 18 | 2 |
+
+**Caveats.** Same-model-family author as Perun's rule writers, so shared blind spots can flatter Perun; rival systems are Python ports, not their binaries (ported-rule fidelity is the main threat); n is small, so a few rows are noise. Some fixtures may be off the provider's real format, which would penalize strict format rules; this was not audited row by row. Decoy flags: the public AWS documentation key (arguably a correct flag) and a 32-character `x` placeholder under `api_key`. Benign flags: `rm -rf /tmp/acme-demo-cache`, `find . -name '*.pyc' -delete`, `mkfs.ext4 ./test.img` and `git push --dry-run --force origin main`, all scoped or dry-run forms a strict guard may reasonably refuse.
+
+## Leads (misses, not fixed here)
+
+Known gaps, not in this corpus and not fixed: `redis-cli` fed `FLUSHALL` on stdin, and `aws s3 sync --delete`.
+
+- Secret gate missed 17: AWS secret key, GitHub and npm tokens, a CircleCI PAT, a Telegram bot token, Stripe webhook secret, PayPal, Square, Replicate, Groq, credentialed Postgres, MongoDB, Redis and JDBC URLs, a New Relic key and a Sentry DSN. Gitleaks missed 14 (it catches 10 of Perun's 17 misses; Perun catches 7 of its 14; 7 are missed by both).
+- Destructive guard missed 13: `eval` of an echoed command, `> /etc/passwd`, `git filter-branch --force`, bare SQL statements (`DROP DATABASE`, `DROP TABLE`, `TRUNCATE`, `DELETE FROM` typed without a client), `gcloud sql instances delete`, `kubectl delete pods --all --all-namespaces`, `kubectl delete pv --all`, `helm uninstall`, `terragrunt run-all destroy` and a printf-built `rm -rf /`.
diff --git a/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/SHA256-frozen.txt b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/SHA256-frozen.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..133219be5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/SHA256-frozen.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+546187bbc7c08f50225d8b9e92e2c913c51c285f3f5aa2ddbd6d721282a9cd80  secret-decoys.txt
+0f774ed6fb7afb5c685e5262bd8408d063eb54d62d1e5ca820e82e36c9014e53  secret-leaks.txt
+a2cca1e165278e5af4ddb6f7d32429fc464a012d7afbffb41c3dbf965d894415  destructive-benign.txt
+9cae82cf81df447c5b9e35ee7d54b829547d795115f8772d75928ba375450fe3  destructive-dangerous.txt
+356c706ffb1db1d5a71a38d8ba286c82bc33cb0e3fbf7eeb0e6fa5a170ebecb1  README.md
+c9279da73393c0534e737c4faa046d7b82c6eec6bf3a5948ccabec4111b8dd97  secret-decoys.txt
diff --git a/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/destructive-benign.txt b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/destructive-benign.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..99e657946
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/destructive-benign.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+B2-01	rm -rf node_modules
+B2-02	rm -rf ./dist ./build
+B2-03	rm -rf /tmp/acme-demo-cache
+B2-04	rm -f debug.log
+B2-05	rm -rf .next
+B2-06	rm -ri old-notes/
+B2-07	find . -name '*.pyc' -delete
+B2-08	find /tmp -name 'acme-*' -mtime +7 -print
+B2-09	dd if=/dev/zero of=./test.img bs=1M count=10
+B2-10	dd if=disk.iso of=/dev/null bs=1M
+B2-11	mkfs.ext4 ./test.img
+B2-12	lsblk && df -h
+B2-13	diskutil list
+B2-14	chmod -R 755 ./scripts
+B2-15	chown -R $USER ./build
+B2-16	echo 'hello' > out.txt
+B2-17	mv old.txt new.txt
+B2-18	git push origin feature/login
+B2-19	git push --force-with-lease origin feature/login
+B2-20	git push --dry-run --force origin main
+B2-21	git reset --soft HEAD~1
+B2-22	git clean -n
+B2-23	git stash && git pull --rebase
+B2-24	git branch -d merged-branch
+B2-25	git status && git diff
+B2-26	SELECT * FROM users LIMIT 10;
+B2-27	DROP TABLE IF EXISTS tmp_scratch_import;
+B2-28	DELETE FROM sessions WHERE expires_at < now();
+B2-29	psql -c 'select count(*) from orders'
+B2-30	pg_dump acme_demo > backup.sql
+B2-31	mysql -e 'SHOW DATABASES'
+B2-32	mongo acme --eval 'db.users.find().limit(5)'
+B2-33	redis-cli GET session:1
+B2-34	redis-cli --scan --pattern 'cache:*'
+B2-35	aws s3 ls s3://acme-demo-prod
+B2-36	aws s3 cp ./report.csv s3://acme-demo-prod/reports/
+B2-37	aws ec2 describe-instances
+B2-38	aws rds describe-db-instances
+B2-39	gcloud projects list
+B2-40	az group list
+B2-41	kubectl get pods -n production
+B2-42	kubectl delete pod web-1 -n staging
+B2-43	kubectl apply -f deploy.yaml --dry-run=client
+B2-44	helm list -A
+B2-45	helm upgrade --install acme-demo ./chart
+B2-46	terraform plan
+B2-47	terraform fmt -check
+B2-48	docker ps -a
+B2-49	docker rm acme-demo-test-container
+B2-50	docker image prune -f --filter 'until=24h'
diff --git a/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/destructive-dangerous.txt b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/destructive-dangerous.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bae24932e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/destructive-dangerous.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+X2-01	rm -rf /
+X2-02	rm -rf --no-preserve-root /
+X2-03	rm -rf ~
+X2-04	rm -rf $HOME/*
+X2-05	rm -rf /var/lib/postgresql
+X2-06	sudo rm -rf /usr /lib /etc
+X2-07	find / -type f -delete
+X2-08	find . -name '*' -exec rm -f {} +
+X2-09	dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda bs=1M
+X2-10	dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/nvme0n1
+X2-11	mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda1
+X2-12	shred -n 3 -z /dev/sdb
+X2-13	wipefs -a /dev/sda
+X2-14	diskutil eraseDisk JHFS+ Blank /dev/disk0
+X2-15	chmod -R 000 /
+X2-16	eval $(echo 'rm -rf $HOME')
+X2-17	:(){ :|:& };:
+X2-18	> /etc/passwd
+X2-19	git push --force origin main
+X2-20	git push origin +main
+X2-21	git push origin --delete main
+X2-22	git reset --hard HEAD~50 && git clean -fdx
+X2-23	r""m -rf ~
+X2-24	git filter-branch --force --index-filter 'git rm -rf --cached .' HEAD
+X2-25	DROP DATABASE acme_demo;
+X2-26	DROP TABLE users CASCADE;
+X2-27	TRUNCATE TABLE orders;
+X2-28	DELETE FROM customers;
+X2-29	psql -c 'drop schema public cascade'
+X2-30	mysql -e 'DROP DATABASE production'
+X2-31	mongo acme --eval 'db.dropDatabase()'
+X2-32	redis-cli FLUSHALL
+X2-33	redis-cli -h cache.example.com flushdb
+X2-34	aws s3 rb s3://acme-demo-prod --force
+X2-35	aws s3 rm s3://acme-demo-prod --recursive
+X2-36	aws ec2 terminate-instances --instance-ids i-0abc123def456
+X2-37	aws rds delete-db-instance --db-instance-identifier acme-demo --skip-final-snapshot
+X2-38	gcloud projects delete acme-demo
+X2-39	gcloud sql instances delete acme-demo-db
+X2-40	az group delete --name acme-demo-rg --yes --no-wait
+X2-41	kubectl delete namespace production
+X2-42	kubectl delete pods --all --all-namespaces
+X2-43	kubectl delete pv --all
+X2-44	helm uninstall acme-demo --namespace production
+X2-45	terraform destroy -auto-approve
+X2-46	terragrunt run-all destroy --terragrunt-non-interactive
+X2-47	docker system prune -af --volumes
+X2-48	docker rm -f $(docker ps -aq)
+X2-49	bash -c "$(printf '\x72\x6d -rf /')"
+X2-50	echo cm0gLXJmIC8= | base64 -d | sh
diff --git a/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/ledger.jsonl b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/ledger.jsonl
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bbd8c8ee0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/ledger.jsonl
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+{"iso": "2026-10-24T20:09:40Z", "event": "preregistered", "sha256_of": "SHA256-frozen.txt", "sha256": "bfe946c27191a7100010e878cad37fd4a1a6605170eaa77435c8d35b658c02eb", "text": "Corpora authored blind and committed as 8abdefc93 (prereg/heldout2) before any scoring. Rules were frozen at the gatefix2 commit; no rule changed after seeing these rows."}
+{"iso": "2026-10-24T20:59:14Z", "event": "scored", "text": "score.py and rivals/score_rivals.py run unchanged except for id<TAB>cmd rows and README-less hash checks. Perun secrets 23/40 FP 2/40, guard 37/50 FP 4/50; see RESULTS.md."}
+{"iso": "2026-10-25T00:25:00Z", "event": "amendment", "file": "secret-decoys.txt", "sha256": "c9279da73393c0534e737c4faa046d7b82c6eec6bf3a5948ccabec4111b8dd97", "text": "After scoring: an @@ marker was added to row D2-08 because GitHub push protection blocked the placeholder key. The @@-stripped content and every score are unchanged."}
diff --git a/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/secret-decoys.txt b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/secret-decoys.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ec0ec0ad1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/secret-decoys.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+D2-01	commit 9fceb02d0ae598e95dc970b74767f19372d61af8
+D2-02	sha256: e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855
+D2-03	md5sum d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e  empty.txt
+D2-04	id: 123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000
+D2-05	request_id=550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000
+D2-06	AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=<your-access-key-id>
+D2-07	OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-your-key-here
+D2-08	STRIPE_SECRET_KEY=sk_@@test_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+D2-09	password: changeme
+D2-10	DATABASE_URL=postgres://user:password@localhost:5432/dev
+D2-11	token = os.environ["GITHUB_TOKEN"]
+D2-12	export SLACK_BOT_TOKEN=${SLACK_BOT_TOKEN}
+D2-13	aws_secret_access_key = REDACTED
+D2-14	image: sha256:4f53cda18c2baa0c0354bb5f9a3ecbe5ed12ab4d8e11ba873c2f11161202b945
+D2-15	iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAYAAAAfFcSJAAAADUlEQVR42mNkYPhfDwAChwGA60e6kgAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==
+D2-16	
+D2-17	integrity=sha512-Zm9vYmFyYmF6cXV4Zm9vYmFyYmF6cXV4Zm9vYmFyYmF6cXV4Zm9vYmFyYmF6cXV4Zm9vYmFyYmF6cXV4Zg==
+D2-18	checksum: 2c26b46b68ffc68ff99b453c1d30413413422d706483bfa0f98a5e886266e7ae
+D2-19	git rev-parse HEAD -> a94a8fe5ccb19ba61c4c0873d391e987982fbbd3
+D2-20	const apiKey = process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY ?? ''
+D2-21	example from the docs: AKIA@@IOSFODNN7EXAMPLE
+D2-22	wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY is the public AWS docs sample secret
+D2-23	curl -H 'Authorization: Bearer YOUR_TOKEN_HERE' https://api.example.com/v1/me
+D2-24	fixture: {"token": "test-token-123", "user": "jane@example.com"}
+D2-25	api_key: "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
+D2-26	SECRET_KEY=django-insecure-dev-only-not-for-prod
+D2-27	-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+D2-28	-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
+D2-29	ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIOMqqnkVzrm0SdG6UOoqKLsabgH5C9okWi0dh2l9GKJl jane@example.com
+D2-30	eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.eyJzdWIiOiIxIn0. is an unsigned alg:none sample
+D2-31	uuid=6ba7b810-9dad-11d1-80b4-00c04fd430c8 namespace DNS
+D2-32	password = input('Password: ')
+D2-33	mongodb://localhost:27017/test
+D2-34	redis://localhost:6379
+D2-35	npm_config_registry=https://registry.npmjs.org/
+D2-36	ENV NODE_ENV=production PORT=8080
+D2-37	git push https://github.com/acme-demo/app.git main
+D2-38	slack webhook format: https://hooks.slack.com/services/T000/B000/XXXX
+D2-39	TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN=your_auth_token
+D2-40	password_hash: $2b$12$KIXQJm1VQ0Zf8kQ0y3q8QOe5Z8Zt6y1c0m9Qy0h5Qz7y2x3w4v5u6
diff --git a/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/secret-leaks.txt b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/secret-leaks.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1940dc3b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/secret-leaks.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+L2-01	AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AK@@IAJ7QWXZ3MNPLR4TGHB
+L2-02	aws_secret_access_key = w9Xq@@Lm2VbN7rT4kZpC8sYdF3hJ6gAe1UoI0xRz
+L2-03	ASIA@@Y3KQ7WLM2PXR9TNB5 session credential in ~/.aws/credentials
+L2-04	GOOGLE_API_KEY=AI@@zaSyD4k8Qm2LpXw7RtN3vBc9YfH6JgA1EoUs0
+L2-05	{"type":"service_account","project_id":"acme-demo","private_key":"-----BEGIN @@PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASC\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n"}
+L2-06	AZURE_STORAGE_CONNECTION_STRING=DefaultEndpointsProtocol=https;AccountName=acmedemo;AccountKey=q7Lm2@@Xw9RtN3vBc8YfH6JgA1EoUs0Kd4PzQ5VbMn7LrT2xWy9Rt==;EndpointSuffix=core.windows.net
+L2-07	DO_TOKEN=dop_v1_@@3f9a1c7e5b2d8046a1f3c9e7b5d20486a1f3c9e7b5d2048a6c1f3e9d7b5a2c40
+L2-08	export GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_@@R7mQ2xLw9VbN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz0Iq
+L2-09	git clone https://octocat:github_pat_@@11ABCDEFG0aBcDeFgHiJkL_mNoPqRsTuVwXyZ0123456789aBcDeFgHiJkLmNoPqRsTuVwXy@github.com/acme-demo/app.git
+L2-10	GITLAB_TOKEN: glpat-@@x7Lm2Rw9VbN3tKpC8sYd
+L2-11	npm_config__authToken=npm_@@R7mQ2xLw9VbN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz0Iq
+L2-12	//registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=npm_@@Zq3Lm9RwXv7bN2tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoU5Iq
+L2-13	CIRCLE_TOKEN=CCIPAT_@@4kQ7Lm2RwXv9bN3tKpC8sY_d1f3a5c7e9b2d4f6a8c0e1b3d5f7a9c2e4b6d8f0
+L2-14	echo 'pypi-@@AgEIcHlwaS5vcmcCJDQ3YzFhOWE0LTdiMmUtNGM1ZC1hOTNmLTBkMWU4Zjc2YjlhMwACKlszLCJ4Il0AAAYgq7Lm2RwXv9bN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz0Iq' > .pypirc-token
+L2-15	SLACK_BOT_TOKEN=xoxb-@@1234567890123-1234567890123-R7mQ2xLw9VbN3tKpC8sYdF6h
+L2-16	curl -X POST -d 'token=xoxp-@@9876543210987-9876543210987-9876543210987-3f9a1c7e5b2d8046a1f3c9e7b5d20486' https://slack.com/api/auth.test
+L2-17	webhook: https://hooks.slack.com/services/T@@0123ABCDE/B@@0123ABCDE/R7mQ2xLw9VbN3tKpC8sYdF6h
+L2-18	DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN=MTA@@xMjM0NTY3ODkwMTIzNDU2Nw.GqLm2R.w9VbN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz0Iq4Xr7M2Lw
+L2-19	TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN=123456789:AA@@Hq7Lm2RwXv9bN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz0I
+L2-20	STRIPE_SECRET_KEY=sk_live_@@51Hq7Lm2RwXv9bN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz0Iq4Xr
+L2-21	stripe_restricted: rk_live_@@51Hq7Lm2RwXv9bN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz0Iq4Xr
+L2-22	whsec_@@Hq7Lm2RwXv9bN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz0Iq4XrM2LwR7 # stripe webhook signing secret
+L2-23	PAYPAL_SECRET=E@@Hq7Lm2RwXv9bN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz0Iq4XrM2LwR7mQ2xLw9VbN3tKpC8sYdF6hJ
+L2-24	SQUARE_ACCESS_TOKEN=EAAA@@Hq7Lm2RwXv9bN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz0Iq4XrM2LwR7mQ2xLw9VbN3tK
+L2-25	OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-proj-@@Hq7Lm2RwXv9bN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz0Iq4XrM2LwR7mQ2xLw9VbN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz0Iq
+L2-26	ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-api03-@@Hq7Lm2RwXv9bN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz0Iq4XrM2LwR7mQ2xLw9VbN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz-AAAA
+L2-27	HF_TOKEN=hf_@@Hq7Lm2RwXv9bN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz0
+L2-28	REPLICATE_API_TOKEN=r8_@@Hq7Lm2RwXv9bN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz0Iq
+L2-29	curl https://api.groq.com/openai/v1/models -H 'Authorization: Bearer gsk_@@Hq7Lm2RwXv9bN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz0Iq4XrM2LwR7mQ2xLw9VbN3'
+L2-30	DATABASE_URL=postgres://acme_admin:R7mQ2xLw9VbN3tKp@@db.example.com:5432/acme-demo
+L2-31	MONGO_URI=mongodb+srv://acme_root:Hq7Lm2RwXv9bN3tK@@cluster0.example.com/acme-demo?retryWrites=true
+L2-32	REDIS_URL=rediss://default:R7mQ2xLw9VbN3tKpC8sYdF6h@@cache.example.com:6380
+L2-33	spring.datasource.url=jdbc:mysql://db.example.com:3306/acme?user=root&password=Hq7Lm2RwXv9bN3tK@@
+L2-34	-----BEGIN @@OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+L2-35	-----BEGIN @@RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+L2-36	Authorization: Bearer eyJ@@hbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJhY21lLWRlbW8iLCJyb2xlIjoiYWRtaW4ifQ.R7mQ2xLw9VbN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz0Iq4XrM2LwR
+L2-37	ERROR 2026-10-01 auth failed for token SG.@@Hq7Lm2RwXv9bN3tKpC8sYd.F6hJgA1EoUz0Iq4XrM2LwR7mQ2xLw9VbN3tKpC8sYdF
+L2-38	ENV TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN=SK@@3f9a1c7e5b2d8046a1f3c9e7b5d20486
+L2-39	RUN echo 'NEWRELIC_LICENSE_KEY=NRAK-@@Hq7Lm2RwXv9bN3tKpC8sYdF6hJg' >> /etc/env
+L2-40	SENTRY_DSN=https://R7mQ2xLw9VbN3tKpC8sYdF6hJgA1EoUz@@0@o123456.ingest.sentry.io/4501
diff --git a/docs/perun-vs-rivals.md b/docs/perun-vs-rivals.md
index ca3acfce5..c329de9ce 100644
--- a/docs/perun-vs-rivals.md
+++ b/docs/perun-vs-rivals.md
@@ -162,7 +162,8 @@ Only the three caller-trap tickets separate the arms, and only no pack failed th
 | False positives on 34 decoys (frozen corpus) | 1 (the public AWS documentation example key; an ERE cannot exclude the `EXAMPLE` suffix) | gitleaks ported rules: 0 of 34 (its rule allowlist excludes `EXAMPLE`) | Perun loses on precision against gitleaks (1 against 0 of 34 here, 0 of 20 on the older corpus); same port caveat |
 | Planted leaks found (before the fix) | 9/20, 3 false positives | 15/20, 0 | Same corpus; the fix is what moved 9 to 17 |
 | Token totals against ccusage 20.0.34 | Within 0.11% on 5 of 5 sessions (3 exact); cost within 0.35% | n/a | n=5 sessions, one machine, mostly one project. Earlier the gap was 2.8% to 3.0% on 2 Opus sessions because advisor spend was dropped |
-| Held-out leaks found (`docs/bench/security-gates-heldout-1024`, blind-authored and hash-preregistered before the rules were read; no rule changed after scoring) | 21/30 with 2/30 decoys flagged (1 of the 2 is the public AWS docs example key, arguably a correct flag) | gitleaks v8.30.1 ported: 23/30, 0/30 FP | n=30 leaks, 30 decoys; same-model-family author may share blind spots with Perun's rules; Perun trails gitleaks out of sample; misses logged as leads in the README |
+| Held-out leaks found, as scored blind (`docs/bench/security-gates-heldout-1024`, blind-authored and hash-preregistered before the rules were read; the rules were changed after this scoring, so the 30/30 below is in-sample) | 21/30 with 2/30 decoys flagged as scored blind (now 30/30, in-sample after the fixes; 1 of the 2 is the public AWS docs example key, arguably a correct flag) | gitleaks v8.30.1 ported: 23/30, 0/30 FP | n=30 leaks, 30 decoys; same-model-family author may share blind spots with Perun's rules; Perun trails gitleaks out of sample; misses logged as leads in the README |
+| Out-of-sample leaks found (`docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024`, committed before any rule wave scored it; rules frozen at the gatefix2 commit) | 23/40 with 2/40 decoys flagged (the public AWS docs example key and a 32-character `x` placeholder) | gitleaks v8.30.1 ported: 26/40, 0/40 FP | n=40 leaks, 40 decoys; same-model-family author; out of sample Perun still trails gitleaks on secrets (the 30/30 on held-out-1024 is in-sample after the fixes); 17 misses listed in `RESULTS.md` |
 
 Perun's older lead on secrets was the PII patterns only; on tokens and keys it tied gitleaks (older corpus); on the new corpus the ported gitleaks rules catch 22 of 31 against Perun's 30, a gap driven mostly by our fixtures not following the providers' exact formats. Use gitleaks as a required gate and Perun's banlist for the repo-specific names. Perun is the only one with a main, subagent and lane split plus a budget gate; ccusage prices everything and has live monitoring.
 
@@ -249,8 +250,9 @@ V2 minus toolkit: F1 +.063 [-.099, +.249], recall +.190 [0, +.429], precision -.
 
 On the frozen 2026-10-24 corpus (`docs/bench/security-gates-1024/score.py`, 46 dangerous including interpreter, IFS, brace, quote-split, variable-command and `ssh` wrapper tricks, 45 benign) the guard blocked 29 of 46 before the rule additions and 46 of 46 after, with 0 of 45 false positives; that is in-sample and written by us. Rival rules were ported to Python and scored on it (`rivals/score_rivals.py`; rules ported to Python, not the rival binary; ported-rule fidelity is the main threat). hooks-mastery (exact port of its `rm` and `.env` regexes at a pinned commit) blocked 13 of 46 with 5 of 45 benign blocked (`rm -rf ./node_modules/.cache`, `rm -rf /tmp/claude-1/scratch` and three commands that only mention `rm -rf` in text). claude-code-safety-net is a shell-AST analyzer, so only a documented subset was ported and scored three-state: 27 of 46 blocked, 15 allowed, 4 unported (variable, brace and IFS command words, which its strict mode covers); read 27 as a ported-subset result, not the tool's score, with 0 of 45 benign blocked. Unported families: heredocs, PowerShell and cmd, awk, parallel, policy files, strict and paranoid modes, worktree and temp-root relaxations, shell variable assignment tracking, filesystem-dependent path resolution, the raw-text fallback, the interpreter exec-sink check, `git rm`, `git rebase --abort`, `git reflog delete`, disk-erase tools and nested `$(...)` analysis; details in `rivals/SOURCES.md`. hooks-mastery implements only `rm -rf` and `.env` checks by design, so its 13 of 46 says nothing about its quality outside those two. The guard is a best-effort string check, not a security boundary. Three adversarial reviews found residual bypasses (interpreter APIs such as `subprocess` and `exec`, IFS and brace-expansion tricks, exotic wrappers), rated medium. The OS sandbox is the boundary; keep it on. A 32-string corpus is small, so the lead over the rivals is indicative.
 
-Held-out (`docs/bench/security-gates-heldout-1024`, 40 dangerous and 40 benign written blind and hash-preregistered before the guard or rival ports were read; no rule changed after scoring): the guard blocked 26 of 40 with 3 of 40 benign blocked, against 17 of 40 (2 of 40 benign) for the ported claude-code-safety-net subset and 9 of 40 (6 of 40 benign) for the ported hooks-mastery rules. All 14 Perun misses are cloud, orchestration, NoSQL, disk-tool or base64-`eval` rows the first corpus did not exercise; the author shares a model family with Perun's rule writers, so shared blind spots are possible, and ports are not the rival binaries.
+Held-out (`docs/bench/security-gates-heldout-1024`, 40 dangerous and 40 benign written blind and hash-preregistered before the guard or rival ports were read; scores are as scored blind, and the guard was changed afterwards): the guard blocked 26 of 40 with 3 of 40 benign blocked as scored blind (now 40 of 40, in-sample after the fixes), against 17 of 40 (2 of 40 benign) for the ported claude-code-safety-net subset and 9 of 40 (6 of 40 benign) for the ported hooks-mastery rules. All 14 Perun misses are cloud, orchestration, NoSQL, disk-tool or base64-`eval` rows the first corpus did not exercise; the author shares a model family with Perun's rule writers, so shared blind spots are possible, and ports are not the rival binaries.
 
+Out of sample (`docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024`, 50 dangerous and 50 benign committed before any rule wave scored them, rules frozen): the guard blocked 37 of 50 with 4 of 50 benign blocked, against 18 of 50 (2 of 50 benign) for the ported claude-code-safety-net subset and 9 of 50 (5 of 50 benign) for the ported hooks-mastery rules. The 13 misses are in `RESULTS.md`; bare SQL statements, whole-resource Kubernetes and Helm deletes, `terragrunt` and `git filter-branch` lead the list. The 40 of 40 on held-out-1024 is in-sample after its fixes.
 ### H9. Test quality, vacuous-test detection
 
 A 40-test corpus with 20 vacuous tests (the other 20 are not vacuous). Counts are vacuous tests caught; intervals are Wilson 95%, computed here.
diff --git a/scripts/bench_check.py b/scripts/bench_check.py
index 30282cc10..168b50e85 100644
--- a/scripts/bench_check.py
+++ b/scripts/bench_check.py
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ def hit(e):  # k = number of frozen lines the event's hash covers; 0 = no match
 def frozen_errs(d):
     """Rule e: every "<sha256>  <path>" line of SHA256-frozen.txt names a file that exists and still hashes to it.
 
-    The path resolves from REPO first, then from d (sha256sum -c run from the repo root or the bench dir;
+    The path resolves from REPO first (a bare filename, which could also name a repo-root file such as README.md, from d first), then from the other (sha256sum -c run from the repo root or the bench dir;
     a "../" path resolves from d only, so it never reaches outside the repo by way of REPO/..);
     the first base that holds the file is the one hashed. Reads only. No SHA256-frozen.txt gives no errors
     here (ledger_errs reports it). A line that is not "<64 hex>  <path>" is an error (fails closed).
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ def frozen_errs(d):
         p = m.group(2)
         if last[p] != n:  # an amendment re-lists the path below; ledger_errs makes it name a later ledger event
             continue
-        hit = None if p.startswith("/") else next((c for c in in_repo(REPO / p, d / p) if c.is_file()), None)
+        hit = None if p.startswith("/") else next((c for c in in_repo(*((d / p, REPO / p) if "/" not in p else (REPO / p, d / p))) if c.is_file()), None)
         if hit is None:
             out.append(f"{f}: {p} is missing (tried the repo root and the bench dir)")
         elif hashlib.sha256(hit.read_bytes()).hexdigest() != m.group(1).lower():
diff --git a/scripts/ci-gates.sh b/scripts/ci-gates.sh
index 7747c39a5..e1a36822c 100644
--- a/scripts/ci-gates.sh
+++ b/scripts/ci-gates.sh
@@ -166,6 +166,11 @@ cmd_privacy() {
     while IFS= read -r -d '' f; do
       skip=0
       for b in "${skip_bases[@]}"; do [ "${f##*/}" = "$b" ] && skip=1; done
+      # frozen synthetic leak/decoy corpora of the two held-out security-gates benches (exact paths, no glob): fictional values by design, immutable once landed
+      case "${f##*/}" in secret-leaks.txt|secret-decoys.txt)  # repo-relative path, so scanning a subdir still resolves it
+        local d top; d="$(cd "$(dirname "$f")" && pwd -P)"; top="$(git -C "$d" rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null)" || top=""
+        case "${d#"$top"/}/${f##*/}" in docs/bench/security-gates-heldout-1024/secret-leaks.txt|docs/bench/security-gates-heldout-1024/secret-decoys.txt|docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/secret-leaks.txt|docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024/secret-decoys.txt) [ -n "$top" ] && skip=1 ;; esac ;;
+      esac
       [ "$skip" -eq 1 ] || scan+=("$f")
     done < <(scan_files "$t")
   done
diff --git a/scripts/ci-tests.d/security-gates-heldout-fixes.sh b/scripts/ci-tests.d/security-gates-heldout-fixes.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..83c3bffcf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/ci-tests.d/security-gates-heldout-fixes.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# Registers the held-out security-gate fixes regression with CI. Offline.
+python3 scripts/test_security_gates_heldout_fixes.py
diff --git a/scripts/ci-tests.d/security-gates-heldout2.sh b/scripts/ci-tests.d/security-gates-heldout2.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fc8298b49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/ci-tests.d/security-gates-heldout2.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# Pins the out-of-sample held-out-2 security-gates scores and hashes. Offline.
+python3 scripts/test_security_gates_heldout2.py
diff --git a/scripts/test-ci-gates.sh b/scripts/test-ci-gates.sh
index bebc8b505..c6d9e7952 100644
--- a/scripts/test-ci-gates.sh
+++ b/scripts/test-ci-gates.sh
@@ -118,6 +118,16 @@ if [ "$GATE_RC" -ne 0 ]; then record 0 "privacy: reject all-comment banlist"; el
 gate "$GATES" privacy --banlist "$WORK/banlist.valid" "$WORK/scan"
 if [ "$GATE_RC" -ne 0 ]; then record 0 "privacy: detect planted banned secret"; else record 1 "privacy: detect planted banned secret"; fi
 
+# The frozen-corpus skip is an exact path list: a same-named file in any other bench dir must still fail.
+mkdir -p "$WORK/scan2/docs/bench/security-gates-new" "$WORK/scan3/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout-1024"
+printf 'aws_key = %s\n' "$planted" >"$WORK/scan2/docs/bench/security-gates-new/secret-leaks.txt"
+printf 'aws_key = %s\n' "$planted" >"$WORK/scan3/docs/bench/security-gates-heldout-1024/secret-leaks.txt"
+git -C "$WORK/scan3" init -q
+gate "$GATES" privacy --banlist "$WORK/banlist.valid" "$WORK/scan2"
+if [ "$GATE_RC" -ne 0 ]; then record 0 "privacy: security-gates-new/secret-leaks.txt is not skipped"; else record 1 "privacy: security-gates-new/secret-leaks.txt is not skipped"; fi
+gate "$GATES" privacy --banlist "$WORK/banlist.valid" "$WORK/scan3"
+if [ "$GATE_RC" -eq 0 ]; then record 0 "privacy: frozen heldout-1024 secret-leaks.txt is skipped"; else record 1 "privacy: frozen heldout-1024 secret-leaks.txt is skipped"; fi
+
 # A banlist carrying an invalid extended regular expression (a lone opening
 # bracket has no closing `]`). The gate must fail closed: an unusable pattern
 # cannot be silently skipped, because a skipped pattern scans nothing and lets a
diff --git a/scripts/test-destructive-guard.sh b/scripts/test-destructive-guard.sh
index 357073f4d..a50281b69 100644
--- a/scripts/test-destructive-guard.sh
+++ b/scripts/test-destructive-guard.sh
@@ -164,4 +164,13 @@ PY
 echo '{"tool_name":"Bash","tool_input":{"command":"git reset --hard"}}' | python3 "$G" 2>"$W/err"; [ $? -eq 2 ] && grep -q '`!` prefix' "$W/err"; ok $? "block message tells the owner to run it with the ! prefix"
 printf 'destructive-guard-allow: git reset --hard\n' >"$W/CLAUDE.md"
 echo '{"tool_name":"Bash","tool_input":{"command":"git reset --hard"}}' | CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR="$W" DCR_OWNER_EMAIL=owner@example.com python3 "$G" 2>/dev/null; [ $? -eq 2 ]; ok $? "no grant mechanism: a CLAUDE.md allow line does not unblock"
+python3 -I - "$G" <<'PY'; ok $? "B64EXEC is not a ReDoS; kubectl delete skips option values"
+import importlib.util, sys, time
+s = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("dg", sys.argv[1]); m = importlib.util.module_from_spec(s); s.loader.exec_module(m)
+for c in ("sh " * 1000 + "$(" * 1000,):
+    t = time.time(); m.check(c); assert time.time() - t < 0.5, time.time() - t
+assert m.check("kubectl delete -n foo ns bar") and m.check("kubectl delete --namespace=foo namespace bar")
+assert m.check("kubectl delete -l a=b -n x ns bar")
+assert not m.check("kubectl delete -n foo pod bar")
+PY
 echo "Tests: $p/$n passed"; exit "$fail"
diff --git a/scripts/test_security_gates_heldout.py b/scripts/test_security_gates_heldout.py
index a8472fe63..3571f8911 100644
--- a/scripts/test_security_gates_heldout.py
+++ b/scripts/test_security_gates_heldout.py
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 """Pins the held-out security-gates scores (docs/bench/security-gates-heldout-1024) and the preregistered corpus hashes.
 
-The corpora were written before the rules or the first corpus were read; no rule was changed after scoring. A moved
+The corpora were written before the rules or the first corpus were read. Scores pinned here are AFTER the gatefix2 rules were written against the misses, so this corpus is now in-sample (before: secret 21/30, guard 26/40; held-out-2 is the out-of-sample test). A moved
 number means a rule or port edit changed held-out behavior: re-score, record it in the README, and update the pins
 deliberately. Offline; commands are only classified.
 """
@@ -18,6 +18,11 @@
     assert hashlib.sha256((H / name).read_bytes()).hexdigest() == want, f"held-out corpus drifted: {name}"
     assert l in (H / "README.md").read_text(), f"README lacks frozen hash line: {name}"
 
+import json
+frozen_txt = (H / "SHA256-frozen.txt").read_text()
+for e in map(json.loads, (H / "ledger.jsonl").read_text().splitlines()):
+    assert e["event"] != "amendment" or e["sha256"] in frozen_txt, f"ledger amendment hash not in SHA256-frozen.txt: {e['sha256']}"
+
 # markers-stripped content equals the preregistered corpus (markers were added to 3 rows after the prereg commit)
 assert hashlib.sha256((H / "secret-leaks.txt").read_bytes().replace(b"@@", b"")).hexdigest() == "7c5309f21640db3a8a7eb77cb63f94e557d066ea8b7a8fb13d840d040f650cfd"
 
@@ -29,7 +34,7 @@ def run(*a):
 
 
 perun = run(str(B / "security-gates-1024/score.py"))
-for want in ("secret gate: recall 21/30  FP 2/30", "destructive guard: blocked 26/40  FP 3/40"):
+for want in ("secret gate: recall 30/30  FP 2/30", "destructive guard: blocked 40/40  FP 3/40"):
     assert want in perun, (want, perun)
 riv = run(str(B / "security-gates-1024/rivals/score_rivals.py"))
 for want in ("recall 23/30  FP 0/30", "hooks-mastery (ported): blocked 9/40  FP 6/40",
diff --git a/scripts/test_security_gates_heldout2.py b/scripts/test_security_gates_heldout2.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..07af9a904
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/test_security_gates_heldout2.py
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Pins the out-of-sample held-out-2 security-gates scores (docs/bench/security-gates-heldout2-1024) and its preregistered hashes.
+
+Perun's rules were frozen before these rows were scored. A moved number means a rule or port edit changed
+behavior on a corpus that is meant to stay out of sample: re-score, record it in RESULTS.md and update the pins deliberately.
+Offline; commands are only classified.
+"""
+import hashlib, pathlib, subprocess, sys
+
+ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+B = ROOT / "docs/bench"
+H = B / "security-gates-heldout2-1024"
+
+frozen = (H / "SHA256-frozen.txt").read_text().splitlines()
+assert hashlib.sha256("".join(l + "\n" for l in frozen[:5]).encode()).hexdigest() == "bfe946c27191a7100010e878cad37fd4a1a6605170eaa77435c8d35b658c02eb", "preregistered hash list drifted"
+# later lines for a path are disclosed amendments (see ledger.jsonl); the last one pins the file
+for name, want in {name: want for want, name in (l.split() for l in frozen)}.items():
+    assert hashlib.sha256((H / name).read_bytes()).hexdigest() == want, f"held-out-2 corpus drifted: {name}"
+
+
+def run(*a):
+    r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-I", *a, "--corpus-dir", str(H)], capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=ROOT)
+    assert r.returncode == 0, r.stdout + r.stderr
+    return r.stdout
+
+
+perun = run(str(B / "security-gates-1024/score.py"))
+for want in ("secret gate: recall 23/40  FP 2/40", "destructive guard: blocked 37/50  FP 4/50"):
+    assert want in perun, (want, perun)
+riv = run(str(B / "security-gates-1024/rivals/score_rivals.py"))
+for want in ("recall 26/40  FP 0/40", "hooks-mastery (ported): blocked 9/50  FP 5/50",
+             "safety-net (ported subset): blocked 18/50 (1 unported)  FP 2/50"):
+    assert want in riv, (want, riv)
+print("held-out-2 security gates pins: ok")
diff --git a/scripts/test_security_gates_heldout_fixes.py b/scripts/test_security_gates_heldout_fixes.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..42ae9cafc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/test_security_gates_heldout_fixes.py
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Regression for the gate rules added after docs/bench/security-gates-heldout-1024 (provider-format secret patterns, cloud/orchestration/store destructive rules).
+
+Each rule has variants whose values differ from the held-out corpus, plus decoys that must stay allowed. Secret
+values are fake and assembled from fragments so this file never trips the privacy gate. Commands are only classified.
+"""
+import importlib.util, pathlib, subprocess, sys, tempfile
+
+ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("dg", ROOT / ".claude/skills/agentic-delivery/scripts/destructive_guard.py")
+dg = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); spec.loader.exec_module(dg)
+H, M = "0f1e2d3c4b5a69788796a5b4c3d2e1f0", "Qw3Er5Ty7Ui9Op1As2Df4Gh6Jk8Lz0Xc"
+B64 = "Zm9vYmFyYmF6cXV4cXV1eHF1dXV4"
+LEAK = {
+    "aws_secret_env": 'AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="' + M + H[:8] + '"',
+    "aws_secret_colon": "aws_secret_access_key: " + M + H[:8],
+    "twilio_sid": "A" "C" + H,
+    "twilio_token_json": '{"authToken": "' + H + '"}',
+    "twilio_token_env": "AUTH_TOKEN=" + H,
+    "jwt": "eyJ" "hbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJ" + "zdWIiOiJ4eHh4eHh4In0." + M[:20],
+    "azure_account": "AccountKey=" + M * 2 + "==",
+    "azure_sas": "SharedAccessKey=" + M * 2 + "=",
+    "discord": "N" + M[:24] + "." + "Xy12Za." + M[:27],
+    "linear": "lin_" "api_" + M + H[:8],
+    "linear_oauth": "lin_" "oauth_" + M + H[:8],
+    "mailgun": "key" "-" + H,
+    "dockerhub": "dckr" "_pat_" + M[:27],
+    "telegram": "bot1234567890:" "AA" + M + "x",
+    "telegram_bare": "token 987654321:" "AA" + M + "x end",
+}
+OK = {
+    "aws_doc_secret": "aws_secret_access_key = wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiC" "YEXAMPLEKEY",
+    "aws_secret_ref": "aws_secret_access_key = ${AWS_SECRET}",
+    "aws_secret_short": "aws_secret_access_key = abc123",
+    "twilio_token_short": "auth_token = " + H[:20],
+    "sha1_commit": "commit " + H + H[:8],
+    "jwt_header_only": 'header {"alg":"HS256"} eyJ' "hbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9 decoded",
+    "monkey_key": "monkey" "-" + H,
+    "discord_dotted": "Module.Section.SubSectionNameThatIsLongEnoughToLookLike",
+    "linear_short": "lin_" "api_ prefix is documented",
+    "telegram_doc": "https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/sendMessage",
+    "ratio": "ts 20260301:AAB-12",
+}
+BAD = [
+    "aws s3 rm s3://b --recursive", "aws s3 rm --recursive s3://b/p/", "aws --profile p s3 rb s3://b --force", "sudo aws s3 rb --force s3://b",
+    "aws ec2 terminate-instances --instance-ids i-1", "aws rds delete-db-cluster --db-cluster-identifier c",
+    "aws rds delete-db-instance --db-instance-identifier d", "gcloud projects delete p", "gcloud --quiet projects delete p",
+    "az group delete -n g -y", "terraform destroy", "terraform -chdir=infra destroy -auto-approve", "tofu destroy",
+    "terraform apply -destroy", "terraform apply -auto-approve -destroy", "kubectl delete namespace prod", "kubectl delete ns prod",
+    "kubectl -n x delete namespace/prod", "kubectl delete all --all", "kubectl delete all --all -n x", "kubectl delete all -A --all",
+    "redis-cli FLUSHALL", "redis-cli -h h flushdb", 'mongo --eval "db.dropDatabase()"', "mongosh --eval 'db.dropDatabase()'",
+    "wipefs -a /dev/sdb", "wipefs --all /dev/sdb", "diskutil eraseDisk APFS X disk2", "diskutil eraseVolume HFS+ X /Volumes/x",
+    "eval $(echo " + B64 + " | base64 -d)", 'eval "$(base64 -d <<< ' + B64 + ')"', "bash -c \"$(echo " + B64 + " | base64 --decode)\"",
+    "echo " + B64 + " | base64 -d | sh", "sh `echo " + B64 + " | base64 -d`", "ssh h 'terraform destroy'",
+]
+GOOD = [
+    "aws s3 rm s3://b/key.txt", "aws s3 ls s3://b --recursive", "aws s3 rb s3://b", "aws ec2 describe-instances",
+    "aws rds describe-db-instances", "gcloud projects list", "az group list", "terraform plan", "terraform plan -destroy",
+    "terraform apply", "terraform init", "kubectl delete pod x", "kubectl delete pod x -n dev", "kubectl get namespaces",
+    "kubectl delete all -l app=x", "redis-cli GET k", "redis-cli -h h info", "mongosh --eval 'db.stats()'", "wipefs -n /dev/sdb",
+    "diskutil list", "diskutil info disk2", "echo " + B64 + " | base64 -d > out.bin", 'eval "$(ssh-agent -s)"', "base64 -d in.b64 > out",
+    "git commit -m 'explain terraform destroy'",
+]
+fail = [f"guard missed: {c}" for c in BAD if not dg.check(c)] + [f"guard false positive: {c}" for c in GOOD if dg.check(c)]
+with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as t:
+    t = pathlib.Path(t)
+    (t / ".banlist.txt").write_text((ROOT / ".banlist.txt").read_text())
+
+    def flagged(text):
+        (t / "x.txt").write_text(text + "\n")
+        return subprocess.run(["bash", str(ROOT / "scripts/ci-gates.sh"), "privacy", "--banlist", str(t / ".banlist.txt"),
+                               str(t / "x.txt")], capture_output=True).returncode != 0
+    fail += [f"gate missed: {k}" for k, v in LEAK.items() if not flagged("v=" + v)]
+    fail += [f"gate false positive: {k}" for k, v in OK.items() if flagged(v)]
+    # only the exact frozen held-out corpus paths are exempt from the privacy scan (no glob); same-named files elsewhere are not
+    leak = "aws_secret_access_key = " + M + H[:8]
+    subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(t), "init", "-q"], check=True)
+    for d, name in (("security-gates-heldout-1024", "secret-leaks.txt"), ("security-gates-x", "secret-leaks.txt")):
+        (t / "docs/bench" / d).mkdir(parents=True)
+        (t / "docs/bench" / d / name).write_text(leak + "\n")
+    r = subprocess.run(["bash", str(ROOT / "scripts/ci-gates.sh"), "privacy", "--banlist", str(t / ".banlist.txt"), str(t / "docs")], capture_output=True, text=True)
+    fail += [] if "security-gates-x/secret-leaks.txt" in r.stderr and "heldout-1024" not in r.stderr else ["corpus exemption: wrong files flagged: " + r.stderr]
+print("\n".join(fail) or f"PASS  security gates held-out fixes ({len(BAD)}+{len(LEAK)} caught, {len(GOOD)}+{len(OK)} allowed)")
+sys.exit(1 if fail else 0)