From d28aab82f2dd45158e6fda775e92b01d802a3d77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "google-labs-jules[bot]"
 <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2026 09:52:33 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F=20Sentinel:=20[CRITICAL]?=
 =?UTF-8?q?=20Fix=20Path=20Traversal=20in=20API=20Files=20Get?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Co-authored-by: thirdeyenation <133812267+thirdeyenation@users.noreply.github.com>
---
 .jules/sentinel.md   | 4 ++++
 api/api_files_get.py | 5 +++++
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 .jules/sentinel.md

diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ccec0563fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+## 2024-05-24 - [Path Traversal in API Files Get]
+ **Vulnerability:** Unrestricted file path loading in `/api/files/get` allowing users to read any file on the machine like `/etc/passwd`.
+ **Learning:** Paths weren't validated against the application's base directory before reading them to standard response outputs.
+ **Prevention:** Use explicit checks like `files.is_in_base_dir(external_path)` to ensure paths cannot traverse outside intended bounds.
diff --git a/api/api_files_get.py b/api/api_files_get.py
index b2533f4f4f..ec24d570b9 100644
--- a/api/api_files_get.py
+++ b/api/api_files_get.py
@@ -62,6 +62,11 @@ async def process(self, input: dict, request: Request) -> dict | Response:
                         external_path = path
                         filename = os.path.basename(path)
 
+                    # Security: Prevent path traversal
+                    if not files.is_in_base_dir(external_path):
+                        PrintStyle.warning(f"Access denied to file outside base dir: {path}")
+                        continue
+
                     # Check if file exists
                     if not os.path.exists(external_path):
                         PrintStyle.warning(f"File not found: {path}")