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reorg_tests.rs
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881 lines (758 loc) · 42.1 KB
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// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
// history.
//
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
//! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::chain::Confirm;
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent};
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
use crate::sign::OutputSpender;
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::ln::{functional_test_utils::*, ChannelId};
fn do_test_onchain_htlc_reorg(local_commitment: bool, claim: bool) {
// Our on-chain HTLC-claim learning has a few properties worth testing:
// * If an upstream HTLC is claimed with a preimage (both against our own commitment
// transaction our counterparty's), we claim it backwards immediately.
// * If an upstream HTLC is claimed with a timeout, we delay ANTI_REORG_DELAY before failing
// it backwards to ensure our counterparty can't claim with a preimage in a reorg.
//
// Here we test both properties in any combination based on the two bools passed in as
// arguments.
//
// If local_commitment is set, we first broadcast a local commitment containing an offered HTLC
// and an HTLC-Timeout tx, otherwise we broadcast a remote commitment containing a received
// HTLC and a local HTLC-Timeout tx spending it.
//
// We then either allow these transactions to confirm (if !claim) or we wait until one block
// before they otherwise would and reorg them out, confirming an HTLC-Success tx instead.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
// Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
// Provide preimage to node 2 by claiming payment
nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let claim_txn = if local_commitment {
// Broadcast node 1 commitment txn to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
let node_1_commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
assert_eq!(node_1_commitment_txn.len(), 2); // 1 local commitment tx, 1 Outbound HTLC-Timeout
assert_eq!(node_1_commitment_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // to-self and Offered HTLC (to-remote/to-node-3 is dust)
check_spends!(node_1_commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
check_spends!(node_1_commitment_txn[1], node_1_commitment_txn[0]);
// Give node 2 node 1's transactions and get its response (claiming the HTLC instead).
connect_block(&nodes[2], &create_dummy_block(nodes[2].best_block_hash(), 42, node_1_commitment_txn.clone()));
check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true); // We should get a BroadcastChannelUpdate (and *only* a BroadcstChannelUpdate)
check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
let node_2_commitment_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
assert_eq!(node_2_commitment_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: 1 offered HTLC-Claim
check_spends!(node_2_commitment_txn[0], node_1_commitment_txn[0]);
// Make sure node 1's height is the same as the !local_commitment case
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
// Confirm node 1's commitment txn (and HTLC-Timeout) on node 1
connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, node_1_commitment_txn.clone()));
// ...but return node 1's commitment tx in case claim is set and we're preparing to reorg
vec![node_1_commitment_txn[0].clone(), node_2_commitment_txn[0].clone()]
} else {
// Broadcast node 2 commitment txn
let mut node_2_commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
assert_eq!(node_2_commitment_txn.len(), 2); // 1 local commitment tx, 1 Received HTLC-Claim
assert_eq!(node_2_commitment_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // to-remote and Received HTLC (to-self is dust)
check_spends!(node_2_commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
check_spends!(node_2_commitment_txn[1], node_2_commitment_txn[0]);
// Give node 1 node 2's commitment transaction and get its response (timing the HTLC out)
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_2_commitment_txn[0]);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
let node_1_commitment_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
assert_eq!(node_1_commitment_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: 1 offered HTLC-Timeout
check_spends!(node_1_commitment_txn[0], node_2_commitment_txn[0]);
// Confirm node 1's HTLC-Timeout on node 1
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_1_commitment_txn[0]);
// ...but return node 2's commitment tx (and claim) in case claim is set and we're preparing to reorg
vec![node_2_commitment_txn.pop().unwrap()]
};
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true); // We should get a BroadcastChannelUpdate (and *only* a BroadcstChannelUpdate)
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
// Connect ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2 blocks, giving us a confirmation count of ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1.
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
if claim {
// Disconnect Node 1's HTLC-Timeout which was connected above
disconnect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, claim_txn));
// ChannelManager only polls chain::Watch::release_pending_monitor_events when we
// probe it for events, so we probe non-message events here (which should just be the
// PaymentForwarded event).
expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(1000), true, true);
} else {
// Confirm the timeout tx and check that we fail the HTLC backwards
connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new()));
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
}
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Which should result in an immediate claim/fail of the HTLC:
let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
if claim {
assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
} else {
assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
}
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
if claim {
expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], our_payment_preimage);
} else {
expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
}
}
#[test]
fn test_onchain_htlc_claim_reorg_local_commitment() {
do_test_onchain_htlc_reorg(true, true);
}
#[test]
fn test_onchain_htlc_timeout_delay_local_commitment() {
do_test_onchain_htlc_reorg(true, false);
}
#[test]
fn test_onchain_htlc_claim_reorg_remote_commitment() {
do_test_onchain_htlc_reorg(false, true);
}
#[test]
fn test_onchain_htlc_timeout_delay_remote_commitment() {
do_test_onchain_htlc_reorg(false, false);
}
#[test]
fn test_counterparty_revoked_reorg() {
// Test what happens when a revoked counterparty transaction is broadcast but then reorg'd out
// of the main chain. Specifically, HTLCs in the latest commitment transaction which are not
// included in the revoked commitment transaction should not be considered failed, and should
// still be claim-from-able after the reorg.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
// Get the initial commitment transaction for broadcast, before any HTLCs are added at all.
let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
// Now add two HTLCs in each direction, one dust and one not.
route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 5_000_000);
route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 5_000);
let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000);
let payment_hash_4 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000).1;
nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_3);
let _ = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash_3, 4_000_000);
let mut unrevoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
assert_eq!(unrevoked_local_txn.len(), 3); // commitment + 2 HTLC txn
// Sort the unrevoked transactions in reverse order, ie commitment tx, then HTLC 1 then HTLC 3
unrevoked_local_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| 1_000_000 - tx.output.iter().map(|outp| outp.value).sum::<u64>());
// Now mine A's old commitment transaction, which should close the channel, but take no action
// on any of the HTLCs, at least until we get six confirmations (which we won't get).
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
// Connect up to one block before the revoked transaction would be considered final, then do a
// reorg that disconnects the full chain and goes up to the height at which the revoked
// transaction would be final.
let theoretical_conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
disconnect_all_blocks(&nodes[1]);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], theoretical_conf_height);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// Now connect A's latest commitment transaction instead and resolve the HTLCs
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &unrevoked_local_txn[0]);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// Connect the HTLC claim transaction for HTLC 3
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &unrevoked_local_txn[2]);
expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], payment_preimage_3, None, true, false);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
// Connect blocks to confirm the unrevoked commitment transaction
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_4, false);
}
fn do_test_unconf_chan(reload_node: bool, reorg_after_reload: bool, use_funding_unconfirmed: bool, connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
// After creating a chan between nodes, we disconnect all blocks previously seen to force a
// channel close on nodes[0] side. We also use this to provide very basic testing of logic
// around freeing background events which store monitor updates during block_[dis]connected.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let persister;
let new_chain_monitor;
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes_0_deserialized;
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
*nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
let chan_conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
{
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(peer_state.channel_by_id.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len(), 2);
}
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].confirmations, Some(10));
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].confirmations, Some(10));
if !reorg_after_reload {
if use_funding_unconfirmed {
let relevant_txids = nodes[0].node.get_relevant_txids();
assert_eq!(relevant_txids.len(), 1);
let block_hash_opt = relevant_txids[0].2;
let expected_hash = nodes[0].get_block_header(chan_conf_height).block_hash();
assert_eq!(relevant_txids[0].1, chan_conf_height);
assert_eq!(block_hash_opt, Some(expected_hash));
let txid = relevant_txids[0].0;
assert_eq!(txid, chan.3.txid());
nodes[0].node.transaction_unconfirmed(&txid);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 0);
} else if connect_style == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].confirmations, Some(1));
disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 0);
} else {
disconnect_all_blocks(&nodes[0]);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 0);
}
let relevant_txids = nodes[0].node.get_relevant_txids();
assert_eq!(relevant_txids.len(), 0);
{
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(peer_state.channel_by_id.len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
}
}
if reload_node {
// Since we currently have a background event pending, it's good to test that we survive a
// serialization roundtrip. Further, this tests the somewhat awkward edge-case of dropping
// the Channel object from the ChannelManager, but still having a monitor event pending for
// it when we go to deserialize, and then use the ChannelManager.
let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).encode();
reload_node!(nodes[0], *nodes[0].node.get_current_default_configuration(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized], persister, new_chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
}
if reorg_after_reload {
if use_funding_unconfirmed {
let relevant_txids = nodes[0].node.get_relevant_txids();
assert_eq!(relevant_txids.len(), 1);
let block_hash_opt = relevant_txids[0].2;
let expected_hash = nodes[0].get_block_header(chan_conf_height).block_hash();
assert_eq!(chan_conf_height, relevant_txids[0].1);
assert_eq!(block_hash_opt, Some(expected_hash));
let txid = relevant_txids[0].0;
assert_eq!(txid, chan.3.txid());
nodes[0].node.transaction_unconfirmed(&txid);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
} else if connect_style == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].confirmations, Some(1));
disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 0);
} else {
disconnect_all_blocks(&nodes[0]);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 0);
}
let relevant_txids = nodes[0].node.get_relevant_txids();
assert_eq!(relevant_txids.len(), 0);
{
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(peer_state.channel_by_id.len(), 0);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
}
}
// With expect_channel_force_closed set the TestChainMonitor will enforce that the next update
// is a ChannelForcClosed on the right channel with should_broadcast set.
*nodes[0].chain_monitor.expect_channel_force_closed.lock().unwrap() = Some((chan.2, true));
nodes[0].node.test_process_background_events(); // Required to free the pending background monitor update
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let expected_err = "Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs.";
if reorg_after_reload || !reload_node {
handle_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1, true, "Channel closed because of an exception: Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at 6 confs, now have 0 confs.");
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(format!("Channel closed because of an exception: {}", expected_err)) }
, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_owned() },
[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
// Now check that we can create a new channel
if reload_node && nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len() == 0 {
// If we dropped the channel before reloading the node, nodes[1] was also dropped from
// nodes[0] storage, and hence not connected again on startup. We therefore need to
// reconnect to the node before attempting to create a new channel.
nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
}, true).unwrap();
}
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
}
#[test]
fn test_unconf_chan() {
do_test_unconf_chan(true, true, false, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
do_test_unconf_chan(false, true, false, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
do_test_unconf_chan(true, false, false, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
do_test_unconf_chan(false, false, false, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
do_test_unconf_chan(true, true, false, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
do_test_unconf_chan(false, true, false, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
do_test_unconf_chan(true, false, false, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
do_test_unconf_chan(false, false, false, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
}
#[test]
fn test_unconf_chan_via_listen() {
do_test_unconf_chan(true, true, false, ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
do_test_unconf_chan(false, true, false, ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
do_test_unconf_chan(true, false, false, ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
do_test_unconf_chan(false, false, false, ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
}
#[test]
fn test_unconf_chan_via_funding_unconfirmed() {
do_test_unconf_chan(true, true, true, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
do_test_unconf_chan(false, true, true, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
do_test_unconf_chan(true, false, true, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
do_test_unconf_chan(false, false, true, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
do_test_unconf_chan(true, true, true, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
do_test_unconf_chan(false, true, true, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
do_test_unconf_chan(true, false, true, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
do_test_unconf_chan(false, false, true, ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
do_test_unconf_chan(true, true, true, ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
do_test_unconf_chan(false, true, true, ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
do_test_unconf_chan(true, false, true, ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
do_test_unconf_chan(false, false, true, ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
}
#[test]
fn test_set_outpoints_partial_claiming() {
// - remote party claim tx, new bump tx
// - disconnect remote claiming tx, new bump
// - disconnect tx, see no tx anymore
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
// Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs: to_local, to_remote, 2 outgoing HTLC
let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
assert_eq!(remote_txn.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
check_spends!(remote_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
check_spends!(remote_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
// Connect blocks on node A to advance height towards TEST_FINAL_CLTV
// Provide node A with both preimage
nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
// Connect blocks on node A commitment transaction
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
// Verify node A broadcast tx claiming both HTLCs
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
// ChannelMonitor: claim tx
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
node_txn.clear();
}
// Connect blocks on node B
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Verify node B broadcast 2 HTLC-timeout txn
let partial_claim_tx = {
let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[0]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
node_txn.remove(1)
};
// Broadcast partial claim on node A, should regenerate a claiming tx with HTLC dropped
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &partial_claim_tx);
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); //dropped HTLC
node_txn.clear();
}
nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
// Disconnect last block on node A, should regenerate a claiming tx with HTLC dropped
disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); //resurrected HTLC
node_txn.clear();
}
//// Disconnect one more block and then reconnect multiple no transaction should be generated
disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 15);
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
node_txn.clear();
}
}
fn do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(style: ConnectStyle) {
// In previous code, detection of to_remote outputs in a counterparty commitment transaction
// was dependent on whether a local commitment transaction had been seen on-chain previously.
// This resulted in some edge cases around not being able to generate a SpendableOutput event
// after a reorg.
//
// Here, we test this by first confirming one set of commitment transactions, then
// disconnecting them and reconnecting another. We then confirm them and check that the correct
// SpendableOutput event is generated.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
*nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = style;
*nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = style;
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
let remote_txn_a = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
let remote_txn_b = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn_a[0]);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn_a[0]);
assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
disconnect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn_b[0]);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn_b[0]);
assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
let mut node_a_spendable = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(node_a_spendable.len(), 1);
if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = node_a_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(channel_id, Some(chan_id));
let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn_b[0]);
}
// nodes[1] is waiting for the to_self_delay to expire, which is many more than
// ANTI_REORG_DELAY. Instead, walk it back and confirm the original remote_txn_a commitment
// again and check that nodes[1] generates a similar spendable output.
// Technically a reorg of ANTI_REORG_DELAY violates our assumptions, so this is undefined by
// our API spec, but we currently handle this correctly and there's little reason we shouldn't
// in the future.
assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
disconnect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn_a[0]);
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
let mut node_b_spendable = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(node_b_spendable.len(), 1);
if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = node_b_spendable.pop().unwrap() {
assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(channel_id, Some(chan_id));
let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
check_spends!(spend_tx, remote_txn_a[0]);
}
}
#[test]
fn test_to_remote_after_local_detection() {
do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstReorgsOnlyTip);
do_test_to_remote_after_local_detection(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
}
#[test]
fn test_htlc_preimage_claim_holder_commitment_after_counterparty_commitment_reorg() {
// We detect a counterparty commitment confirm onchain, followed by a reorg and a confirmation
// of a holder commitment. Then, if we learn of the preimage for an HTLC in both commitments,
// test that we only claim the currently confirmed commitment.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
// Route an HTLC which we will claim onchain with the preimage.
let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
// Force close with the latest counterparty commitment, confirm it, and reorg it with the latest
// holder commitment.
nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
let commitment_tx_a = txn.pop().unwrap();
check_spends!(commitment_tx_a, funding_tx);
let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
let commitment_tx_b = txn.pop().unwrap();
check_spends!(commitment_tx_b, funding_tx);
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx_a);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx_a);
disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
disconnect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx_b);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx_b);
if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
let _ = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
}
// Provide the preimage now, such that we only claim from the holder commitment (since it's
// currently confirmed) and not the counterparty's.
get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &nodes[1].tx_broadcaster,
&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
);
let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
let htlc_success_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
check_spends!(htlc_success_tx, commitment_tx_b);
}
#[test]
fn test_htlc_preimage_claim_prev_counterparty_commitment_after_current_counterparty_commitment_reorg() {
// We detect a counterparty commitment confirm onchain, followed by a reorg and a
// confirmation of the previous (still unrevoked) counterparty commitment. Then, if we learn
// of the preimage for an HTLC in both commitments, test that we only claim the currently
// confirmed commitment.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
// Route an HTLC which we will claim onchain with the preimage.
let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
// Obtain the current commitment, which will become the previous after a fee update.
let prev_commitment_a = &get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id)[0];
*nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 4;
nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
let mut msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
let (update_fee, commit_sig) = if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, mut updates } = msg_events.pop().unwrap() {
assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
(updates.update_fee.take().unwrap(), updates.commitment_signed)
} else {
panic!("Unexpected message send event");
};
// Handle the fee update on the other side, but don't send the last RAA such that the previous
// commitment is still valid (unrevoked).
nodes[1].node().handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
let _last_revoke_and_ack = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commit_sig, false, true, false, true);
// Force close with the latest commitment, confirm it, and reorg it with the previous commitment.
nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
let current_commitment_a = txn.pop().unwrap();
assert_ne!(current_commitment_a.txid(), prev_commitment_a.txid());
check_spends!(current_commitment_a, funding_tx);
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], ¤t_commitment_a);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], ¤t_commitment_a);
check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
disconnect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &prev_commitment_a);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &prev_commitment_a);
// Provide the preimage now, such that we only claim from the previous commitment (since it's
// currently confirmed) and not the latest.
get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &nodes[1].tx_broadcaster,
&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
);
let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, prev_commitment_a);
// Make sure it was indeed a preimage claim and not a revocation claim since the previous
// commitment (still unrevoked) is the currently confirmed closing transaction.
assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].witness.second_to_last().unwrap(), &payment_preimage.0[..]);
}
fn do_test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg(anchors: bool, revoked_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
// Tests that a node will retry broadcasting its own commitment after seeing a confirmed
// counterparty commitment be reorged out.
let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
if revoked_counterparty_commitment {
chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
}
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
if anchors {
config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
}
let persister;
let new_chain_monitor;
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
let nodes_1_deserialized;
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
// Route a payment so we have an HTLC to claim as well.
let _ = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
if revoked_counterparty_commitment {
// Trigger a fee update such that we advance the state. We will have B broadcast its state
// without the fee update.
let serialized_node = nodes[1].node.encode();
let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
*chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() += 1;
nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
reload_node!(
nodes[1], config, &serialized_node, &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, nodes_1_deserialized
);
}
// Connect blocks until the HTLC expiry is met, prompting a commitment broadcast by A.
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
{
let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
if anchors {
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
let commitment_tx_a = txn.pop().unwrap();
check_spends!(commitment_tx_a, funding_tx);
} else {
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
let htlc_tx_a = txn.pop().unwrap();
let commitment_tx_a = txn.pop().unwrap();
check_spends!(commitment_tx_a, funding_tx);
check_spends!(htlc_tx_a, commitment_tx_a);
}
};
// B will also broadcast its own commitment.
nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
let commitment_b = {
let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
let tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
check_spends!(tx, funding_tx);
tx
};
// Confirm B's commitment, A should now broadcast an HTLC timeout for commitment B.
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_b);
{
let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
// `commitment_a` and `htlc_timeout_a` are rebroadcast because the best block was
// updated prior to seeing `commitment_b`.
assert_eq!(txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 3 });
check_spends!(txn.last().unwrap(), commitment_b);
} else {
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_b);
}
}
// Disconnect the block, allowing A to retry its own commitment. Note that we connect two
// blocks, one to get us back to the original height, and another to retry our pending claims.
disconnect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
{
let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
if anchors {
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
} else {
assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
check_spends!(txn[0], txn[1]); // HTLC timeout A
check_spends!(txn[1], funding_tx); // Commitment A
assert_ne!(txn[1].txid(), commitment_b.txid());
}
}
}
#[test]
fn test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg() {
do_test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg(false, false);
do_test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg(false, true);
do_test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg(true, false);
do_test_retries_own_commitment_broadcast_after_reorg(true, true);
}