build(deps): bump @adastracomputing/ink from 0.2.0 to 0.4.0 in /examples/foreign-sender-receiver

[dependabot]

Bumps @adastracomputing/ink from 0.2.0 to 0.4.0.

Release notes

Sourced from @​adastracomputing/ink's releases.

v0.4.0

This release tightens signature verification and input validation and adds several verification helpers. It is published on the next dist-tag.

Potentially breaking validation tightenings

These reject inputs that 0.3.0 accepted. Legitimate signer and receiver traffic is unaffected; the rejected inputs are malformed, malicious, or outside the documented profile.

• Ed25519 signatures are now verified in strict RFC 8032 mode at every verification site. Small-order public keys and non-canonical point encodings are rejected.
• Signed JSON numbers are constrained to the forms every canonicalizer serializes identically: non-finite values, negative zero, and values whose shortest form uses exponential notation are rejected at signing and verification.
• The agent card, audit, handshake, and discovery schemas now enforce maximum field lengths and array sizes.
• The Authorization: INK-Ed25519 header is matched against single literal spaces; a tab, carriage return, or line feed in the separator is rejected.

Additions

• verifyCheckpoint(signed, witnessPublicKey, expectedOrigin) verifies a signed C2SP checkpoint: the witness Ed25519 signature over the checkpoint body and the log origin. A checkpoint used for the inclusion-receipt cross-check must be verified this way first.
• verifyReceipt({ receipt, senderPublicKey, expected }) binds a delivery receipt to the exact message it acknowledges: issuer key, from/to/ messageId, the recomputed message hash, and an optional disposition.
• verifyInclusionReceipt accepts an event option that recomputes the leaf hash and binds it to receipt.eventId. The legacy eventHash is retained but does not provide that binding.
• verifyInkAuth returns a prefix-independent principal alongside the raw sender id; per-sender security state (blocks, rate limits) should key on principal. canonicalAgentPrincipal(agentId) is exported for the same use.

Per the pre-1.0 policy this release publishes under the next dist-tag; latest is unchanged.

v0.3.0

extractPublicKeyFromAgentId now accepts either the canonical tulpa: prefix or the ink: alias introduced in ink/0.4. Both carry the identical multibase Ed25519 key, so the bootstrap verification key is byte-identical and a signature made with that key verifies regardless of which accepted prefix carried it. The prefix is identity syntax, not signing authority.

Emission is unchanged: deriveAgentId still returns tulpa: (accept both, emit one). The new AGENT_ID_KEY_PREFIXES export is frozen so a consumer cannot widen the accepted set at runtime. The change is additive and backward compatible. Existing tulpa: inputs behave exactly as before, and every previously rejected prefix other than ink: is still rejected. The wire protocol version is unchanged.

A receiver that keys per-sender security state (blocks, rate limits, duplicate-payload checks, cached verification keys, connection identity) MUST collapse the two spellings to one prefix-independent principal so a sender cannot switch prefix to dodge a block or split a rate-limit window. See Identity.

... (truncated)

Changelog

Sourced from @​adastracomputing/ink's changelog.

0.4.0, stricter verification, message-size bounds, checkpoint and receipt verification

This release tightens signature verification and input validation and adds several verification helpers. It is published on the next dist-tag.

Potentially breaking validation tightenings

These reject inputs that 0.3.0 accepted. Legitimate signer and receiver traffic is unaffected; the rejected inputs are malformed, malicious, or outside the documented profile.

• Ed25519 signatures are now verified in strict RFC 8032 mode at every verification site. Small-order public keys and non-canonical point encodings are rejected.
• Signed JSON numbers are constrained to the forms every canonicalizer serializes identically: non-finite values, negative zero, and values whose shortest form uses exponential notation are rejected at signing and verification.
• The agent card, audit, handshake, and discovery schemas now enforce maximum field lengths and array sizes.
• The Authorization: INK-Ed25519 header is matched against single literal spaces; a tab, carriage return, or line feed in the separator is rejected.

Additions

• verifyCheckpoint(signed, witnessPublicKey, expectedOrigin) verifies a signed C2SP checkpoint: the witness Ed25519 signature over the checkpoint body and the log origin. A checkpoint used for the inclusion-receipt cross-check must be verified this way first.
• verifyReceipt({ receipt, senderPublicKey, expected }) binds a delivery receipt to the exact message it acknowledges: issuer key, from/to/ messageId, the recomputed message hash, and an optional disposition.
• verifyInclusionReceipt accepts an event option that recomputes the leaf hash and binds it to receipt.eventId. The legacy eventHash is retained but does not provide that binding.
• verifyInkAuth returns a prefix-independent principal alongside the raw sender id; per-sender security state (blocks, rate limits) should key on principal. canonicalAgentPrincipal(agentId) is exported for the same use.

Per the pre-1.0 policy this release publishes under the next dist-tag; latest is unchanged.

0.3.0, accept the ink: agentId alias for key extraction

extractPublicKeyFromAgentId now accepts either the canonical tulpa: prefix or the ink: alias introduced in ink/0.4. Both carry the identical multibase Ed25519 key, so the bootstrap verification key is byte-identical and a signature made with that key verifies regardless of which accepted prefix carried it. The prefix is identity syntax, not signing authority.

Emission is unchanged: deriveAgentId still returns tulpa: (accept both, emit one). The new AGENT_ID_KEY_PREFIXES export is frozen so a consumer cannot widen the accepted set at runtime. The change is additive and backward compatible. Existing tulpa: inputs behave exactly as before, and every previously rejected prefix other than ink: is still rejected. The wire protocol version is unchanged.

A receiver that keys per-sender security state (blocks, rate limits, duplicate-payload checks, cached verification keys, connection identity) MUST collapse the two spellings to one prefix-independent principal so a sender cannot switch prefix to dodge a block or split a rate-limit window. See Identity.

... (truncated)

Commits

• 63d78e1 release: 0.4.0 (#61)
• d15f6eb feat(receipts): add verifyReceipt to bind a receipt to its acknowledged messa...
• e315a0a harden: reject non-space separators in the Authorization header and correct t...
• f66df6a fix(audit): bind inclusion-proof verification to the receipt's event (#58)
• 6ad4ea0 feat(audit): verify transparency-log checkpoint signatures (#57)
• c98af10 fix(schemas): bound the sizes of agent-card, audit, handshake and discovery m...
• ac55388 feat(auth): return a canonical principal from verifyInkAuth (#55)
• ee915a2 fix: bound validateMessage complexity and reject non-canonical numbers (#54)
• a17f1e4 fix(crypto): verify Ed25519 signatures in RFC 8032 strict mode (#53)
• 4184286 build: batch root dev-dependency bumps and fix the nix package hash (#52)
• Additional commits viewable in compare view

Dependabot will resolve any conflicts with this PR as long as you don't alter it yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting @dependabot rebase.

---

Dependabot commands and options

You can trigger Dependabot actions by commenting on this PR:

• @dependabot rebase will rebase this PR
• @dependabot recreate will recreate this PR, overwriting any edits that have been made to it
• @dependabot show <dependency name> ignore conditions will show all of the ignore conditions of the specified dependency
• @dependabot ignore this major version will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this major version (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself)
• @dependabot ignore this minor version will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this minor version (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself)
• @dependabot ignore this dependency will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this dependency (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself)