fix(sdk-core): enforce recipient verification in ECDSA TSS signing#8924
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mrdanish26 wants to merge 2 commits into
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fix(sdk-core): enforce recipient verification in ECDSA TSS signing#8924mrdanish26 wants to merge 2 commits into
mrdanish26 wants to merge 2 commits into
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mohammadalfaiyazbitgo
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Jun 9, 2026
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| /** | ||
| * Transaction types that legitimately carry no explicit recipients. | ||
| * These are the intentType strings as stored in TxRequest.intent.intentType by WP. | ||
| * verifyTransaction handles no-recipient validation for these internally. | ||
| * Mirrors the bypass list in abstractEthLikeNewCoins.ts verifyTssTransaction. | ||
| * | ||
| * ECDSA types: acceleration, fillNonce, transferToken, tokenApproval, consolidate, | ||
| * bridgeFunds, enableToken, customTx, contractCall | ||
| * BSC/BNB delegation-based staking: delegate, undelegate, switchValidator | ||
| * CELO/ETH lock-based staking: stake, unstake, stakeWithCallData, unstakeWithCallData, | ||
| * transferStake, increaseStake, goUnstake | ||
| * Claim rewards (BSC, CELO — TRX/SOL use EdDSA and are unaffected): claim, stakeClaimRewards | ||
| * Dry-run confirmed (2026-05-20 investigation): createAccount, transferAccept, transferReject, | ||
| * transferOfferWithdrawn, cantonCommand, pledge | ||
| * Dry-run confirmed (2026-06-03 investigation): contractCall (hash/Provenance — secp256k1, | ||
| * smart contract invocation with no explicit recipients) | ||
| */ |
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please trim this comment to only report context for a generic reader./
| 'claim', | ||
| 'stakeClaimRewards', | ||
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| // Dry-run confirmed no-recipient types (13-day observation, 2026-05-20) |
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Summary
Closes the ECDSA TSS default-path signing vulnerability (WCN-151 Phase 3)
where a compromised BitGo API server could swap
signableHexundetected.The Vulnerability
Both
EcdsaUtilsandEcdsaMPCv2UtilsdefaultedtxParamswhen absent: