fix(security): command injection in registry.testRegistry / testRegistryById#4875
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…yById remote path
The remote (execAsyncRemote) path built `echo ${password} | docker ${args.join(" ")}`
with the password, registryUrl and username interpolated unescaped, so a password
like `pw; whoami` ran arbitrary commands as root on the target server. Reuse
safeDockerLoginCommand (already used by create/update), which shell-escapes each
field and feeds the password via --password-stdin. The local argv+stdin path was
already safe.
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Fixes GHSA-w6r4-f26v-8g36.
Problem
The remote (
execAsyncRemote) path of bothregistry.testRegistryandregistry.testRegistryByIdbuilt the docker login command by interpolating the password directly into a shell string:`echo ${input.password} | docker ${args.join(" ")}`password(andregistryUrl/username, which flow intoargs) were onlyz.string().min(1), so a password likepw; whoami; #executed arbitrary commands as root on the target server via SSH. Any user withregistry:readcould trigger it.Fix
Reuse
safeDockerLoginCommand(already used bycreateRegistry/updateRegistry), which shell-escapes registry/user/password and feeds the password through--password-stdin. The local path already usedexecFileAsyncwith an argv array + stdin and was safe.Verification
safeDockerLoginCommandoutput: every payload (; whoami,$(), backtick,' && rm) collapses to a single literalprintf %sargument; legit login command unchanged.testRegistrywith an injected password did not execute the payload (no marker file created).Closes GHSA-w6r4-f26v-8g36.