feat: add post - PHP supply chain attack hiding postinstall in package.json (May 22 2026)#1296
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Post on the Socket disclosure from yesterday: 700+ GitHub repos and 8 Packagist packages compromised by hiding an npm
postinstallhook inpackage.jsonon PHP/Composer projects. The PHP review never saw it because the team only auditscomposer.json.Angle: ecosystem-boundary blindness as the recurring pattern across the last six weeks of supply chain campaigns. Concrete defenses: cross-manifest scanning in CI, CODEOWNERS on install-script changes, pinning Composer deps to tags rather than dev-branches. Also covers the "Dependency Cache Sync" GitHub Actions step that survives the package cleanup as a re-infection vector.
OG image generated.