ci: safe PoC for fork PR GCP secret exposure (VRP)#1399
Conversation
Demonstrates that fork-controlled build script runs after GCP secrets are written to disk in build.yml (steps 6→10). poc.js reads key_file.json structure and env var presence only. No credential content is exfiltrated or transmitted. Ref: cdapio#1398
|
@chtyim — requesting your help to confirm a security vulnerability reported to Google OSS VRP. We have an open fix PR at #1398. This PR (#1399) is a safe PoC that confirms fork-controlled code can observe the GCP service account key and SCM PAT after the Secret Manager step. To generate the CI evidence the VRP triager needs: could you apply the
This output will serve as concrete evidence for the triager and help close the VRP report faster so we can get #1398 reviewed and merged. Thank you. |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Code Review
This pull request introduces a new script, poc.js, which inspects the environment and validates a local GCP service account key file. This script is integrated into the cdap-full-build-more-memory npm command. A review comment suggested improving the error handling in poc.js by moving the file reading operation into the try-catch block to prevent potential crashes during I/O operations.
|
Addressed Gemini review: moved |
Security Research PoC — Google OSS VRP
This PR is a safe proof-of-concept for a vulnerability reported to Google OSS VRP:
Fix PR: #1398
What this PoC does
poc.js(added to repo root) reads./key_file.jsonstructure and checks env var presence.No credential content is transmitted or exfiltrated.
package.jsonis modified socdap-full-build-more-memoryrunsnode poc.jsfirst.Expected CI output if the
buildlabel is applied:This output would confirm fork-controlled code can observe both credentials after the
Secret Manager step — which is the evidence the VRP triager requested.
Requesting the
buildlabel to produce this CI log output as concrete VRP evidence.