Switch bibliography to use references.bib

build_support/catalog/catalog.am

@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ CATALOG_FILES = \
 	catalog/selten1975/fig1.efg \
 	catalog/selten1975/fig2.efg \
 	catalog/selten1975/fig3.efg \
+	catalog/shapley1974/fig2.nfg \
+	catalog/shapley1974/fig3.nfg \
 	catalog/vonstengel2022/fig10.1.efg \
 	catalog/vonstengel2022/fig10.12.efg \
 	catalog/vonstengel2022/fig10.5.efg \

catalog/bagwell1995.efg

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 EFG 2 R "Bagwell (GEB 1995) commitment and (un)observability" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
 "This is a Stackelberg-type game with imperfectly observed commitment, following the
-analysis of `Bag1995 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Bag1995>`_.  The outcomes and payoffs are the same as in Bagwell's
+analysis of :cite:p:`Bag1995`.  The outcomes and payoffs are the same as in Bagwell's
 model.  This example sets the probability that the follower 'correctly' observes the
 leader's action as .99 (99/100).  The key result is that the only pure-strategy
 equilibrium that survives if observability is imperfect is the one in which players

catalog/gilboa1997/fig1.efg

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 EFG 2 R "Absent-Minded Driver (Gilboa 1997, GEB, Figure 2)" { "Player 1" }
 "The original absent-minded driver problem from
-`Gil97 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Gil97>`_"
+:cite:p:`Gil97`"
 
 p "" 1 1 "" { "B" "E" } 0
 p "" 1 1 "" { "B" "E" } 0

catalog/gilboa1997/fig2.efg

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 EFG 2 R "Two-Selves Absent-Minded Driver (Gilboa 1997, GEB, Figure 2)" { "Player 1" }
 "A reformulation of the absent-minded driver problem from
-`Gil97 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Gil97>`_
+:cite:p:`Gil97`
 using a multi-self approach.  A chance move determines the order in which two selves act,
 each facing a binary choice.  Neither self knows the order of play, capturing absent-mindedness
 through information sets that cross the chance branches rather than through imperfect recall.

catalog/jakobsen2016/fig1a.efg

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 EFG 2 R "Jakobsen, Sorensen, Conitzer (2016) Figure 1(a)" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
-"An example from `JakSorCon16 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#JakSorCon16>`_ illustrating a game
+"An example from :cite:p:`JakSorCon16` illustrating a game
 that is not exactly timeable.  A coin toss determines which player moves first.
 Each player guesses whether she went first, without distinguishing going first from going second.
 Each player receives a payoff of 1 for a correct guess and 0 otherwise.

catalog/jakobsen2016/fig1b.efg

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 EFG 2 R "Jakobsen, Sorensen, Conitzer (2016) Figure 1(b)" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
-"An example from `JakSorCon16 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#JakSorCon16>`_ illustrating a game
+"An example from :cite:p:`JakSorCon16` illustrating a game
 that has an exact deterministic timing.  A coin toss determines the flow of the game;
 player 1 only plays if the coin comes up Heads, and if so plays first.
 Player 2 always plays, but cannot distinguish whether the coin came up Heads or Tails.

catalog/jakobsen2016/fig1c.efg

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 EFG 2 R "Jakobsen, Sorensen, Conitzer (2016) Figure 1(c)" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
-"An example from `JakSorCon16 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#JakSorCon16>`_ illustrating a game
+"An example from :cite:p:`JakSorCon16` illustrating a game
 that is not exactly timeable. A coin toss determines the order of players.
 The player moving second is only offered a bet if the player moving first guessed correctly.
 Each player receives a payoff of 1 for a correct guess and 0 otherwise.

catalog/jakobsen2016/fig3.efg

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 EFG 2 R "Jakobsen, Sorensen, Conitzer (2016) Figure 3" { "Player 1" "Player 2" "Player 3" "Player 4" }
-"An example from `JakSorCon16 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#JakSorCon16>`_ illustrating
+"An example from :cite:p:`JakSorCon16` illustrating
 the extensive form of an onion routing game that is not exactly timeable.
 Chance chooses a sender by drawing a signal from {0, 1, 2, 3} with equal probability.
 The sender does not make a strategic choice; only the two intermediary players act.

catalog/myerson1991/fig2_1.efg

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 EFG 2 R "A simple Poker game" { "Fred" "Alice" }
-"This is a simple game of one-card poker from `Mye91 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Mye91>`_, used as the
+"This is a simple game of one-card poker from :cite:p:`Mye91`, used as the
 introductory example for game models.
 
 Note that as specified in the text, the game has the slightly unusual feature
 that folding with the high (red) card results in the player winning rather than
 losing.
 
-See also `Rei2008 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Rei2008>`_
+See also :cite:p:`Rei2008`
    Another one-card poker game where folding with the high card is a loss rather
    than a win.
 "

catalog/myerson1991/fig4_2.efg

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 EFG 2 R "Myerson (1991) Figure 4.2" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
-"An example from `Mye91 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Mye91>`_ which illustrates the distinction between
+"An example from :cite:p:`Mye91` which illustrates the distinction between
 an equilibrium of an extensive form game and an equilibrium of its
 (multi)agent representation.  The actions B1, Z1, and W2 form a
 behavior profile which is an equilibrium in the (multi)agent

catalog/nau2004/sec3.nfg

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ NFG 1 R "Battle of the Sexes" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
 { { "Top" "Bottom" }
 { "Left" "Right" }
 }
-"The coordination game known as Battle of the Sexes (section 3 of `Nau2004 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Nau2004>`_). Has three Nash equilibria: two pure-strategy (TL and BR) and one completely mixed."
+"The coordination game known as Battle of the Sexes (section 3 of :cite:p:`Nau2004`). Has three Nash equilibria: two pure-strategy (TL and BR) and one completely mixed."
 
 {
 { "" 3, 2 }

catalog/nau2004/sec4.nfg

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NFG 1 R "Three-player game with a unique Nash solution in irrational strategies"
 { "Left" "Right" }
 { "1" "2" }
 }
-"A three-player game with a unique Nash equilibrium in irrational mixed strategies (section 4 of `Nau2004 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Nau2004>`_). The correlated equilibrium polytope is seven-dimensional with 33 vertices."
+"A three-player game with a unique Nash equilibrium in irrational mixed strategies (section 4 of :cite:p:`Nau2004`). The correlated equilibrium polytope is seven-dimensional with 33 vertices."
 
 {
 { "" 3, 0, 2 }

catalog/nau2004/sec5.nfg

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NFG 1 R "Game with a continuum of completely mixed-strategy Nash equilibria" { "
 { "Left" "Right" }
 { "1" "2" }
 }
-"A three-player 2x2x2 game with 3 pure, 2 incompletely mixed, and a continuum of completely mixed Nash equilibria (section 5 of `Nau2004 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Nau2004>`_). The correlated equilibrium polytope is seven-dimensional with 8 vertices."
+"A three-player 2x2x2 game with 3 pure, 2 incompletely mixed, and a continuum of completely mixed Nash equilibria (section 5 of :cite:p:`Nau2004`). The correlated equilibrium polytope is seven-dimensional with 8 vertices."
 
 {
 { "" 0, 0, 2 }

catalog/nau2004/sec6.nfg

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NFG 1 R "2x2x4 game with Nash equilibria in the relative interior of the correla
 { "Left" "Right" }
 { "1" "2" "3" "4" }
 }
-"A three-player 2x2x4 game (section 6 of `Nau2004 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Nau2004>`_). The correlated equilibrium polytope is four-dimensional with six vertices. The set of Nash equilibria is a line segment in the relative interior of the polytope."
+"A three-player 2x2x4 game (section 6 of :cite:p:`Nau2004`). The correlated equilibrium polytope is four-dimensional with six vertices. The set of Nash equilibria is a line segment in the relative interior of the polytope."
 
 {
 { "" 2, 0, 0 }

catalog/reiley2008/fig1.efg

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 EFG 2 R "Stripped-down poker (Reiley et al 2008)" { "Professor" "Student" }
-"This is a one-card poker game used in `Rei2008 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Rei2008>`_ as a teaching exercise.
+"This is a one-card poker game used in :cite:p:`Rei2008` as a teaching exercise.
 
-See also `Mye91 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Mye91>`_
+See also :cite:p:`Mye91`
     Another one-card poker game with slightly different rules.
 "
 

catalog/selten1975/fig1.efg

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 EFG 2 R "Selten's horse (Selten IJGT 1975, Figure 1)" { "Player 1" "Player 2" "Player 3" }
-"This is a three-player game presented in `Sel75 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Sel75>`_, commonly referred
+"This is a three-player game presented in :cite:p:`Sel75`, commonly referred
 to as \"Selten's horse\" owing to the layout in which it can be drawn.
 It is the motivating example for his definition of (trembling-hand)
 perfect equilibrium, by showing a game that has an equilibrium which

catalog/selten1975/fig2.efg

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 EFG 2 R "Selten (IJGT 1975) Figure 2" { "Player 1" "Player 2" }
-"This is a counterexample presented in `Sel75 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Sel75>`_, to show that extensive and
+"This is a counterexample presented in :cite:p:`Sel75`, to show that extensive and
 normal form concepts of perfectness do not coincide.  This game has one
 perfect equilibrium in the extensive from, but a distinct (pure) strategy
 equilibrium is also perfect in the normal form.

catalog/selten1975/fig3.efg

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 EFG 2 R "Selten (IJGT 1975) Figure 3" { "Player 1" "Player 2" "Player 3" }
-"This is a counterexample presented in `Sel75 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Sel75>`_, to show that extensive and
+"This is a counterexample presented in :cite:p:`Sel75`, to show that extensive and
 normal form concepts of perfectness do not coincide.   Specifically, there
 are two equilibria which are perfect in the normal form but not perfect
 in the extensive form.

catalog/shapley1974/fig2.nfg

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+NFG 1 R "Fig 2 from 'A Note on the Lemke-Howson Algorithm' (Shapley 1974)" { "1" "2" }
+
+{ { "1" "2" "3" }
+{ "1" "2" "3" }
+}
+"Fig 2 from :cite:p:`Shap74`. This bimatrix game is used to demonstrate the Lemke-Howson algorithm."
+
+{
+{ "" 2, 3 }
+{ "" 0, 0 }
+{ "" 3, 0 }
+{ "" 2, 0 }
+{ "" 3, 3 }
+{ "" 0, 0 }
+{ "" 0, 2 }
+{ "" 0, 2 }
+{ "" 1, 1 }
+}
+1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

catalog/shapley1974/fig3.nfg

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+NFG 1 R "Fig 3 from 'A Note on the Lemke-Howson Algorithm' (Shapley 1974)" { "1" "2" }
+
+{ { "1" "2" "3" }
+{ "1" "2" "3" }
+}
+"Fig 3 from :cite:p:`Shap74`. This bimatrix game has a pair of mixed-strategy equilibria
+that are inaccessible to the Lemke-Howson algorithm. That is, the two equilibria in this
+pair are connected to each other for all dropped labels, and can thus not be reached by
+any concatenation of paths from the artifical equilibrium, where the Lemke-Howson algorithm
+starts."
+
+{
+{ "" 0, 0 }
+{ "" 2, 3 }
+{ "" 3, 0 }
+{ "" 3, 2 }
+{ "" 2, 2 }
+{ "" 0, 0 }
+{ "" 0, 3 }
+{ "" 0, 0 }
+{ "" 1, 1 }
+}
+1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

catalog/vonstengel2022/fig10.1.efg

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 EFG 2 R "Figure 10.1 from von Stengel (2022)" { "I" "II" }
 "
-Figure 10.1 from `vS22 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#vS22>`_.
+Figure 10.1 from :cite:p:`vS22`.
 It is essentially a type of poker game.
 Its description as a competition between software firms is due to
-`TvS02 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#TvS02>`_.
+:cite:p:`TvS02`.
 "
 
 c "" 1 "" { "1/2" 1/2 "1/2" 1/2 } 0

catalog/vonstengel2022/fig10.12.efg

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 EFG 2 R "Figure 10.12 from von Stengel (2022)" { "I" "II" }
 "
-Figure 10.12 from `vS22 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#vS22>`_.
+Figure 10.12 from :cite:p:`vS22`.
 It refers to a non-standard version of the Monty Hall problem where the television show host Monty
 Hall has the option of opening another door without a prize to the contestant (player I), rather
 than opening such a door all the time. Its purpose is to demonstrate a whole convex set of optimal

catalog/vonstengel2022/fig10.5.efg

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 EFG 2 R "Figure 10.5 from von Stengel (2022)" { "I" "II" }
 "
-Figure 10.5 from `vS22 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#vS22>`_.
+Figure 10.5 from :cite:p:`vS22`.
 Player II has four reduced strategies in this game, compared to eight unreduced strategies.
 "
 

catalog/vonstengel2022/fig10.7.efg

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 EFG 2 R "Figure 10.7 from von Stengel (2022)" { "I" "II" }
 "
-Figure 10.7 from `vS22 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#vS22>`_.
+Figure 10.7 from :cite:p:`vS22`.
 It is a game with imperfect recall, but it has the same strategic form as the game in Figure 10.5
 from the same book.
 One equilibrium strategy of player II as computed from the strategic form is not realization

catalog/vonstengelforges2008/fig1.efg

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 EFG 2 R "Figure 1 from von Stengel and Forges (2008)" { "1" "2" }
 "
-Figure 1 from `vSF08 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#vSF08>`_.
+Figure 1 from :cite:p:`vSF08`.
 It is a kind of a kind of signaling game.
 "
 

catalog/vonstengelforges2008/fig6.efg

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 EFG 2 R "Figure 6 from von Stengel and Forges (2008)" { "1" "2" }
 "
-Figure 6 from `vSF08 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#vSF08>`_.
+Figure 6 from :cite:p:`vSF08`.
 This game has perfect recall and no chance moves, yet it has a circular precedence structure among
 the information sets of the two players. The payoffs are not important.
 "

catalog/vonstengelforges2008/fig9.efg

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 EFG 2 R "Figure 9 from von Stengel and Forges (2008)" { "1" "2" }
 "
-Figure 9 from `vSF08 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#vSF08>`_.
+Figure 9 from :cite:p:`vSF08`.
 It encodes the SAT formula :math:`x\wedge (\neg x \vee y) \wedge (\neg x \vee \neg y)`
 (writing $-x$ for :math:`\neg x`).
 The formula is satisfiable (which here it is not) if and only

catalog/watson2013/exercise29_6.efg

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 EFG 2 R "Princess Bride signaling game (from Watson)" { "Wesley" "Prince" }
-"This game is Exercise 29.6 from Watson `Wat13 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Wat13>`_, based on a scene from
+"This game is Exercise 29.6 from Watson :cite:p:`Wat13`, based on a scene from
 the Rob Reiner film, The Princess Bride:
 
 Wesley (the protagonist) confronts the evil prince Humperdinck.  Wesley

catalog/watson2013/fig29_1.efg

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 EFG 2 R "Job-market signaling game (version from Watson)" { "You" "Firm" }
 "This is a version of Spence's classic model of education being a job-market
-signal, as presented in Figure 29.1 of Watson `Wat13 <https://gambitproject.readthedocs.io/en/latest/biblio.html#Wat13>`_.
+signal, as presented in Figure 29.1 of Watson :cite:p:`Wat13`.
 "
 
 c "" 1 "" { "High" 1/3 "Low" 2/3 } 0

doc/algorithms.rst

@@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ enummixed
 Computes Nash equilibria using extreme point enumeration.
 
 In a two-player strategic game, the set of Nash equilibria can be expressed as the union of convex sets.
-This program generates all the extreme points of those convex sets. (Mangasarian [Man64]_)
+This program generates all the extreme points of those convex sets. (Mangasarian :cite:p:`Man64`)
 This is a superset of the points generated by the path-following procedure of Lemke and Howson (see :ref:`lcp`).
-It was shown by Shapley [Sha74]_ that there are equilibria not accessible via the method in :ref:`lcp`, whereas the output of
+It was shown by Shapley :cite:p:`Shap74` that there are equilibria not accessible via the method in :ref:`lcp`, whereas the output of
 :program:`enummixed` is guaranteed to return all the extreme points.
 
 .. _enumpoly:
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ polynomials, the subdivision constructed is such that each cell
 contains either no equilibria or exactly one equilibrium.
 
 For strategic games, the program searches supports in the order proposed
-by Porter, Nudelman, and Shoham [PNS04]_.  For two-player games, this
+by Porter, Nudelman, and Shoham :cite:p:`PNS04`.  For two-player games, this
 prioritises supports for which both players have the same number of
 strategies.  For games with three or more players, this prioritises
 supports which have the fewest strategies in total.  For many classes
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ lp
 Computes a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game by solving a linear program.
 For extensive games, the
 program uses the sequence form formulation of Koller, Megiddo, and von
-Stengel [KolMegSte94]_.
+Stengel :cite:p:`KolMegSte94`.
 
 While the set of equilibria in a two-player constant-sum strategic
 game is convex, this method will only identify one of the extreme
@@ -103,15 +103,15 @@ lcp
 Computes Nash equilibria of a two-player game by finding solutions to a linear
 complementarity problem. For extensive games, the program uses the
 sequence form representation of the extensive game, as defined by
-Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel [KolMegSte94]_, and applies the
+Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel :cite:p:`KolMegSte94`, and applies the
 algorithm developed by Lemke.
 
 For strategic games, the program uses the method of Lemke and Howson
-[LemHow64]_. In this case, the method will find all "accessible"
+:cite:p:`LemHow64`. In this case, the method will find all "accessible"
 equilibria, i.e., those that can be found as concatenations of Lemke-Howson
 paths that start at the artificial equilibrium.
 There exist strategic-form games for which some equilibria cannot be found
-by this method, i.e., some equilibria are inaccessible; see Shapley [Sha74]_.
+by this method, i.e., some equilibria are inaccessible; see Shapley :cite:p:`Shap74`.
 
 In a two-player strategic game, the set of Nash equilibria can be expressed
 as the union of convex sets. This program will find extreme points
@@ -142,8 +142,8 @@ logit
 Computes the
 principal branch of the (logit) quantal response correspondence.
 
-The method is based on the procedure described in Turocy [Tur05]_ for
-strategic games and Turocy [Tur10]_ for extensive games.
+The method is based on the procedure described in Turocy :cite:p:`Tur05` for
+strategic games and Turocy :cite:p:`Tur10` for extensive games.
 It uses standard path-following methods (as
 described in Allgower and Georg's "Numerical Continuation Methods") to
 adaptively trace the principal branch of the correspondence
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ convergence of Newton's method in the corrector step. If the
 convergence is fast, the step size is adjusted upward (accelerated);
 if it is slow, the step size is decreased (decelerated). The
 maximum acceleration (or deceleration) can be set as an argument.  As described in
-Turocy [Tur05]_, this acceleration helps to
+Turocy :cite:p:`Tur05`, this acceleration helps to
 efficiently trace the correspondence when it reaches its asymptotic
 phase for large values of the precision parameter lambda.
 
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ Computes approximations to Nash equilibria using a simplicial subdivision
 approach.
 
 This program implements the algorithm of van der Laan, Talman, and van
-Der Heyden [VTH87]_. The algorithm proceeds by constructing a triangulated grid
+Der Heyden :cite:p:`VTH87`. The algorithm proceeds by constructing a triangulated grid
 over the space of mixed strategy profiles, and uses a path-following
 method to compute an approximate fixed point. This approximate fixed
 point can then be used as a starting point on a refinement of the
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ ipa
 
 Computes Nash
 equilibria using an iterated polymatrix approximation approach
-developed by Govindan and Wilson [GovWil04]_.
+developed by Govindan and Wilson :cite:p:`GovWil04`.
 This program is based on the
 `Gametracer 0.2 <http://dags.stanford.edu/Games/gametracer.html>`_
 implementation by Ben Blum and Christian Shelton.
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ gnm
 
 Computes Nash
 equilibria using a global Newton method approach developed by Govindan
-and Wilson [GovWil03]_. This program is based on the
+and Wilson :cite:p:`GovWil03`. This program is based on the
 `Gametracer 0.2 <http://dags.stanford.edu/Games/gametracer.html>`_
 implementation by Ben Blum and Christian Shelton.