[codex] Harden workflow shell and auth security gates

[elodiejmirza]

Summary

• Require explicit trust before workflow shell steps execute noninteractively, with interactive approval as the local fallback.
• Validate outbound authentication URLs and Azure tenant path segments before network requests.
• Close Bandit low-severity findings by narrowing broad exception handling, replacing assert-based runtime guards, and adding targeted suppressions for deliberate subprocess/best-effort patterns.

Security review

• Bandit: 0 High, 0 Medium, 0 Low findings after remediation.
• Gitleaks: no leaks found.
• pip-audit: no known vulnerabilities found.
• Ruff and compile checks passed.
• Full pytest was attempted; shell/git fixture tests were blocked by the local global Git identity hook rejecting test repos that set Test User test@example.com. Targeted regression suites for the touched auth, workflow, integration, and self-upgrade code passed.

Validation

• PYTHONPATH=src uv run --extra test pytest tests/test_utils.py tests/test_authentication.py tests/test_self_upgrade_detection.py tests/test_self_upgrade_verification.py tests/test_self_upgrade_execution.py -q --tb=short
• PYTHONPATH=src uv run --extra test pytest tests/integrations/test_integration_subcommand.py tests/test_workflows.py -q --tb=short
• PYTHONPATH=src uv run ruff check
• python3 -m compileall -q src
• uv tool run bandit -q -r src -f json
• gitleaks detect --no-git --redact --source .
• pip-audit --desc off --progress-spinner off
• git diff --check

[elodiejmirza]

Closing this upstream PR because the change was intended for the SoloSentryOrg fork and has already been merged in SoloSentryOrg#1.