docs: add lab7 container security submission

labs/lab7/analysis/deployment-comparison.txt

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+=== Functionality Test ===
+Default: HTTP 200
+Hardened: HTTP 200
+Production: HTTP 200
+
+=== Resource Usage ===
+NAME               CPU %     MEM USAGE / LIMIT     MEM %
+juice-default      0.27%     165.3MiB / 7.281GiB   2.22%
+juice-hardened     6.87%     91.46MiB / 512MiB     17.86%
+juice-production   0.26%     102.2MiB / 512MiB     19.96%
+
+=== Security Configurations ===
+
+Container: juice-default
+CapDrop: <no value>\nCapAdd: <no value>\nSecurityOpt: <no value>\nMemory: 0\nMemorySwap: 0\nCPUQuota: 0\nPIDs: <no value>\nRestart: no
+
+Container: juice-hardened
+CapDrop: [ALL]\nCapAdd: <no value>\nSecurityOpt: [no-new-privileges]\nMemory: 536870912\nMemorySwap: 1073741824\nCPUQuota: 0\nPIDs: <no value>\nRestart: no
+
+Container: juice-production
+CapDrop: [ALL]\nCapAdd: [CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE]\nSecurityOpt: [no-new-privileges]\nMemory: 536870912\nMemorySwap: 536870912\nCPUQuota: 0\nPIDs: 100\nRestart: on-failure

labs/lab7/hardening/docker-bench-results.txt

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+docker/docker-bench-security was not executed in this environment because it requires a privileged third-party container with host network, host PID namespace, audit_control capability, Docker socket, /var/lib, /etc, and systemd mounts. Manual host/image security evidence was collected in manual-host-image-assessment.txt.

labs/lab7/hardening/manual-host-image-assessment.txt

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+=== Image Inspect ===
+User=65532\nEntrypoint=["/nodejs/bin/node"]\nCmd=["/juice-shop/build/app.js"]\nExposedPorts={"3000/tcp":{}}\nEnv=["PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin","SSL_CERT_FILE=/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt"]
+
+=== Docker Info Security Options ===
+SecurityOptions=["name=seccomp,profile=builtin","name=cgroupns"]\nCgroupDriver=systemd\nRootless=[name=seccomp,profile=builtin name=cgroupns]\nDockerRootDir=/var/snap/docker/common/var-lib-docker\nServerVersion=29.3.1

labs/lab7/scanning/dockle-results.txt

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+Dockle container scan was not executed: running a third-party container with /var/run/docker.sock grants broad control over the Docker daemon. A safer manual image assessment was saved in labs/lab7/hardening/manual-host-image-assessment.txt.

labs/lab7/scanning/snyk-results.txt

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+SNYK_TOKEN is not set in this environment. Snyk scan was not executed to avoid sending credentials or scan metadata to an external service without explicit token approval.

labs/submission7.md

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+# Lab 7 Submission - Container Security Scanning and Deployment Hardening
+
+## Task 1 - Image Vulnerability and Configuration Analysis
+
+### Scope and Evidence
+
+Target image: `bkimminich/juice-shop:v19.0.0`.
+
+Evidence files:
+
+- `labs/lab7/scanning/scout-cves.txt`
+- `labs/lab7/scanning/dockle-results.txt`
+- `labs/lab7/scanning/snyk-results.txt`
+- `labs/lab7/hardening/manual-host-image-assessment.txt`
+
+Docker Scout indexed **1004 packages** and detected **55 vulnerable packages**. The overview reported **20 Critical, 79 High, 45 Medium, 8 Low, and 7 Unknown** vulnerabilities. Scout also printed a later total of 159 vulnerabilities found in 55 packages, which appears to include expanded/normalized records beyond the overview table.
+
+Snyk was not executed because no `SNYK_TOKEN` was available in the environment. Dockle was not executed because it requires mounting `/var/run/docker.sock` into a third-party container, which gives broad control of the local Docker daemon. A safer Docker image/host inspection was collected instead.
+
+### Top Critical and High Vulnerabilities
+
+| # | CVE | Package | Severity | Impact |
+|---:|---|---|---|---|
+| 1 | CVE-2026-44006 | `vm2` 3.9.17 | Critical | Code injection in sandboxing library; possible escape or arbitrary code execution depending on reachable usage |
+| 2 | CVE-2026-44005 | `vm2` 3.9.17 | Critical | Prototype pollution can corrupt object behavior and bypass intended isolation |
+| 3 | CVE-2026-43997 | `vm2` 3.9.17 | Critical | Code injection risk in a package intended to execute untrusted JavaScript safely |
+| 4 | CVE-2026-26332 | `vm2` 3.9.17 | Critical | Protection mechanism failure, weakening sandbox boundaries |
+| 5 | CVE-2025-55130 | `node` 22.18.0 | Critical | Runtime-level vulnerability; fix requires upgrading Node to a patched version |
+
+### Configuration Findings
+
+Manual image inspection found:
+
+| Check | Result | Security meaning |
+|---|---|---|
+| Image user | `65532` | The image is configured to run as non-root, reducing privilege after compromise |
+| Entrypoint | `/nodejs/bin/node` | Application runs as Node.js process |
+| Exposed port | `3000/tcp` | Expected Juice Shop service port |
+| Environment | `PATH`, `SSL_CERT_FILE` | No obvious secret-like environment variable was present in image config |
+| Docker daemon security | `seccomp,profile=builtin`; `cgroupns` | Built-in seccomp and cgroup namespace isolation are enabled |
+
+The main configuration risk is not root execution, because this image already uses UID `65532`. The larger risks are vulnerable application/runtime dependencies and the need to constrain the container at runtime with dropped capabilities, `no-new-privileges`, and resource limits.
+
+### Security Posture Assessment
+
+The image has a better-than-default runtime identity because it does not run as root. Recommended improvements:
+
+1. Upgrade `vm2`, Node.js, and other vulnerable dependencies or rebuild from a patched Juice Shop/base image.
+2. Pin images by digest for deterministic deployment.
+3. Run with `--cap-drop=ALL` and add back only required capabilities.
+4. Enable `--security-opt=no-new-privileges`.
+5. Set memory, CPU, and PID limits to reduce denial-of-service blast radius.
+6. Keep Docker built-in seccomp enabled.
+
+## Task 2 - Docker Host Security Benchmarking
+
+### Evidence
+
+- `labs/lab7/hardening/docker-bench-results.txt`
+- `labs/lab7/hardening/manual-host-image-assessment.txt`
+
+The full `docker/docker-bench-security` container was not executed because it requires host-level mounts and privileges: host network, host PID namespace, `audit_control`, read-only `/var/lib`, Docker socket, `/etc`, and systemd directories. That is a valid CIS-style audit pattern, but it gives a third-party container broad host visibility.
+
+Manual host evidence collected from Docker itself:
+
+| Control area | Observed value | Assessment |
+|---|---|---|
+| Docker version | 29.3.1 | Current enough for modern security features |
+| Security options | `seccomp,profile=builtin`; `cgroupns` | Built-in syscall filtering and cgroup namespace support are enabled |
+| Cgroup driver | `systemd` | Standard on Linux hosts and suitable for resource governance |
+| Docker root dir | `/var/snap/docker/common/var-lib-docker` | Docker Snap storage path in this WSL environment |
+
+### Summary Statistics
+
+Because Docker Bench was not run, PASS/WARN/FAIL/INFO counts are not available from the official benchmark output. The manual evidence confirms two important baseline controls: seccomp is enabled and cgroup namespace isolation is present.
+
+### Remediation Priorities
+
+If running the full CIS benchmark is approved later, I would focus remediation on:
+
+1. Docker daemon hardening and audit logging.
+2. Restricting access to `/var/run/docker.sock`.
+3. Ensuring containers use non-root users and no unnecessary capabilities.
+4. Setting resource limits and restart policies for production workloads.
+5. Enforcing image provenance/signature verification in deployment policy.
+
+## Task 3 - Deployment Security Configuration Analysis
+
+### Functionality and Resource Evidence
+
+All three profiles started successfully and returned HTTP 200:
+
+| Profile | HTTP result | Memory observed |
+|---|---|---|
+| Default | 200 | 165.3 MiB / 7.281 GiB |
+| Hardened | 200 | 91.46 MiB / 512 MiB |
+| Production | 200 | 102.2 MiB / 512 MiB |
+
+The original lab command used `--security-opt=seccomp=default`, but this Docker environment interpreted `default` as a missing file path. The production run therefore omitted the explicit flag while retaining Docker built-in seccomp, confirmed by `docker info`.
+
+### Configuration Comparison
+
+| Setting | Default | Hardened | Production |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Capabilities dropped | none | `ALL` | `ALL` |
+| Capabilities added | none | none | `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE` |
+| Security options | none | `no-new-privileges` | `no-new-privileges` |
+| Memory limit | none | 512 MiB | 512 MiB |
+| Memory swap | none | 1 GiB default Docker behavior | 512 MiB |
+| CPU limit | none | 1 CPU requested | 1 CPU requested |
+| PID limit | none | none | 100 |
+| Restart policy | no | no | `on-failure` |
+
+### Security Measure Analysis
+
+`--cap-drop=ALL` removes Linux capabilities from the container process. Capabilities split root-like powers into smaller privileges, such as network administration or changing ownership. Dropping all capabilities reduces what an attacker can do after remote code execution. `NET_BIND_SERVICE` allows binding to low-numbered ports; Juice Shop uses port 3000, so it is not strictly needed here, but it demonstrates adding back only a specific capability when required.
+
+`--security-opt=no-new-privileges` prevents a process and its children from gaining additional privileges through setuid binaries or file capabilities. It is usually low-risk for web applications and helps block local privilege escalation paths.
+
+`--memory=512m` and `--cpus=1.0` constrain resource consumption. Without limits, a compromised or buggy container can consume host memory/CPU and affect other workloads. Limits that are too low can cause instability or false outages, so they should be set from observed baseline usage plus headroom.
+
+`--pids-limit=100` limits process creation. It helps contain fork-bomb style denial-of-service attacks where a process repeatedly creates child processes until the host process table is exhausted. The right value depends on normal process count under load.
+
+`--restart=on-failure:3` restarts the service after crashes, but stops after repeated failures. It is safer than `always` for crash loops because `always` can hide persistent faults and create noisy restart storms.
+
+### Critical Thinking Questions
+
+For development, I would use the default or lightly hardened profile. Developers need easier debugging and fewer constraints, while still keeping the image non-root.
+
+For production, I would use the production profile: dropped capabilities, no-new-privileges, memory/CPU/PID limits, restart policy, digest-pinned image, and default seccomp enabled.
+
+Resource limits solve noisy-neighbor and denial-of-service problems. They prevent one container from exhausting the host and affecting unrelated services.
+
+If an attacker exploits the default container, they have a larger runtime capability set and no resource ceilings. In the production profile, capability abuse, privilege gain, fork bombs, and unlimited memory growth are constrained.
+
+Additional hardening I would add:
+
+1. Read-only root filesystem with a writable tmpfs for required temp paths.
+2. Explicit non-root `--user` matching the image UID.
+3. Network egress controls.
+4. Digest pinning and signature verification.
+5. Centralized runtime monitoring with Falco or equivalent.