Please report cryptographic or implementation vulnerabilities privately to security@lux.network — encrypted with the team key listed at https://lux.network/security/key.asc. Public disclosure happens after a fix lands and downstream consumers have had a 14-day private window.

Corona is production-hardened reference implementation for Ring-LWE threshold signing in Quasar consensus, and a NIST MPTC submission package. The following are in-scope for responsible disclosure:

• Specification ambiguity that leads to an exploitable verifier behaviour.
• Threshold-protocol soundness gaps (forgery, key-recovery, share extraction, rogue-key, adaptive-corruption breaks).
• Constant-time violations in code paths that touch a secret share, a Gaussian sample, or a Lagrange-aggregation intermediate.
• KAT mismatches between the Go reference and the C++ port at ~/work/luxcpp/crypto/corona/ (cross-runtime byte-equality is a load-bearing invariant).
• Pedersen DKG (dkg2/) hiding-blind leakage or commitment binding failures.
• Reshare-protocol (reshare/) failures to preserve (A, bTilde) across committee rotation.
• Activation-cert (reshare/activation.go) bypass or accept-on- failure paths.
• Information leaks via logging, panics on secret-correlated paths, or variable-time equality.
• Cryptanalysis of the underlying Boschini et al. ePrint 2024/1113 construction or of Corona's specific parameter set (N = 256, q = 0x1000000004A01).

• Performance or implementation efficiency complaints (file an issue).
• DoS attacks against the reference implementation that don't affect the threshold-correctness invariants.
• Issues exclusively in the M-LWE sibling at luxfi/pulsar — file there. Corona and Pulsar are independent libraries with no shared types.
• Issues in lens-specific code (lens/) — Corona's threshold path does not depend on lens.
• Issues in the legacy dkg/ (Feldman VSS without blinding) — documented as broken for public broadcast; replaced by dkg2/ (Pedersen DKG with hiding blinds). Production deployments use dkg2/.

Corona maintainers will request CVEs for any in-scope vulnerability prior to public disclosure. CVE numbers will be embedded in the ePrint changelog and the release tag's commit message.

Findings discovered after the 2026-Nov-16 MPTC package submission deadline will be added to the submission's "known limitations" appendix and disclosed publicly per NIST's MPTC public-analysis process (no embargo window for findings against actively-submitted MPTC packages).

Corona and Pulsar are independent submissions but share Lux as a common author and overlap in some operational mitigations (e.g., aggregator-host hardening, mlock pinning). A vulnerability that affects both packages will be disclosed to both security@lux.network mailing lists simultaneously to enable coordinated patching.

• T+0: Private report received at security@lux.network.
• T+5 days: Acknowledgement + initial triage; CVE requested if in-scope.
• T+30 days: Fix landed in main; tagged patch release; private disclosure to downstream consumers (Quasar consensus, etc.).
• T+44 days: Public disclosure (advisory + CVE published).

Faster disclosure timelines apply for critical findings (immediate exploitability with no mitigation). Slower timelines apply for research-level findings requiring spec consultation with NIST MPTC reviewers.