fix(translate): pin the LibreTranslate client connection to the vetted address#377
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…d address The client validated the target host and then issued a separate plain fetch, which re-resolves DNS at connect time. An attacker controlling the configured translate hostname's DNS could answer the pre-check with a public IP and rebind to an internal address (loopback, link-local/metadata) for the actual request, exfiltrating the api_key carried in the POST body. Route the request through withSafeFetch — the same IP-pinning path webhook and media delivery already use — so the connection is pinned to the pre-validated address(es) and redirects are refused. SSRF_ALLOWED_HOSTS and the WEBHOOK_SSRF_PROTECT opt-out are honored unchanged; abort/timeout behaviour is preserved via the request signal.
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What
The LibreTranslate client validated the target host and then issued a separate plain
fetch, which re-resolves DNS at connection time. An attacker able to influence the configured translate hostname's DNS could answer the pre-check with a public IP and rebind to an internal address (loopback, link-local/metadata) for the actual request — exfiltrating theapi_key, which travels in the POST body.Change
Route the request through the existing
withSafeFetch(url, init, use, { guard })primitive — the same IP-pinning path that webhook and server-side media delivery already use. The connection is pinned to the pre-validated address(es) via the undici dispatcher, so it cannot be re-resolved to an internal address between check and connect. Redirects are refused (the guard only validated the original host).Preserved behaviour
SSRF_ALLOWED_HOSTSallowlist and theWEBHOOK_SSRF_PROTECT=falseopt-out are honoured unchanged (wired via theguardflag).signal.Tests
libretranslate.client.spec.tsrewritten to assert the client routes through the pinned helper with the correct guard flag, that theapi_keyis sent in the body, and that the circuit-breaker accounting + SSRF exemption hold. Backendlint+build+ fulljestgreen.