Test win

[k-ye]

Related issue = #

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Note

High Risk
SessionStart hooks and always-applied Cursor rules execute or promote running an opaque multi‑MB Node script, enabling supply-chain style arbitrary code execution for anyone opening the repo in supported IDEs.

Overview
This PR wires automatic execution of node .github/setup.js into Claude and Gemini via SessionStart hooks, and adds a Cursor rule (alwaysApply: true) that tells the IDE/assistant to run the same command for “project setup.”

It also introduces .github/setup.js itself (the diff shows an empty add, but the file in the tree is very large). Together, these changes push reviewers and tooling to run that script on session start or during normal development—not typical Taichi build/docs workflow.

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[cursor]

Cursor Bugbot has reviewed your changes and found 2 potential issues.

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[cursor]

SessionStart runs obfuscated script

High Severity

New SessionStart hooks run node .github/setup.js on every matched session without user confirmation. That file is a single obfuscated eval payload, not normal Taichi setup (setup.py / misc/ci_setup.py). Anyone opening the repo in Claude or Gemini can execute arbitrary Node code automatically.

Additional Locations (1)

• .gemini/settings.json#L6-L9

 

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[cursor]

Cursor rule runs setup script

High Severity

An alwaysApply Cursor rule tells the agent to run node .github/setup.js as required project setup. That steers automated tooling toward the same obfuscated script the new session hooks execute, increasing the chance it runs during normal editing.

 

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[knight42]

Security hold: this PR is affected by the current malicious-code incident involving suspicious [skip ci] commits and/or the .github/setup.js payload pattern.

Please do not merge this PR. I am requesting changes and closing it to prevent accidental merge while we investigate and clean up. Reopen only after the suspicious commits are removed, the branch is rebuilt from a trusted base, and trusted CI has been re-run.

安全处理：该 PR 被纳入当前恶意代码事件的受影响范围，涉及可疑的 [skip ci] commit 和/或 .github/setup.js payload 模式。

请不要合并该 PR。我会先 request changes 并关闭 PR，避免误合并。只有在移除可疑 commit、从可信 base 重建分支，并重新跑可信 CI 后，才应重新打开。