π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix path traversal vulnerabilities#244
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix path traversal vulnerabilities#244thirdeyenation wants to merge 1 commit into
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Co-authored-by: thirdeyenation <133812267+thirdeyenation@users.noreply.github.com>
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π¨ Severity: HIGH
π‘ Vulnerability: Used
str.startswith()for path containment checks (if not str(target_file).startswith(str(self.base_dir)):) andPath.relative_toin try-except block, which are flawed for path traversal prevention.str.startswithallows accessing files like/base_dir_suffixwhenbase_diris/base_dir.π― Impact: An attacker could bypass path restrictions to access sensitive files on the filesystem by exploiting prefix matching.
π§ Fix: Updated code to use
Path.is_relative_to(base_dir)to correctly ensure paths are safely constrained to the allowed base directory.β Verification: Verified using python script that tests path resolution out of bounds and in bounds.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 1725061449511023628 started by @thirdeyenation