fix(core): reject loopback hosts in network allowlists by senamakel · Pull Request #127 · tinyhumansai/tinybox

senamakel · 2026-10-23T13:24:37Z

Refs #27
Part of tinyhumansai/openhuman#7328

This stacked TinyBox #27 branch adds explicit loopback and metadata protection to allowlist validation and the opt-in native Linux Docker egress backend. Validation rejects loopback IP literals (including IPv4-mapped and scoped IPv6), localhost aliases, terminal DNS root dots as equivalent names, legacy numeric IPv4 spellings of loopback/metadata addresses, and loopback or cloud-metadata answers from the injected resolver. DNS resolution is performed once when planning an allowlist; the resulting IPs are retained in the plan.

The optional NativeLinuxDockerEgressController enforces pinned TCP destinations on a verified local, rootful Linux Docker Engine. It installs default-drop IPv4/IPv6 bridge firewall rules before workload start, checks that destinations do not overlap Docker-assigned bridge subnets, adds pinned /etc/hosts mappings, and disables upstream DNS forwarding for allowlist boxes. The input chain permits both IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation and Advertisement, plus established traffic needed for published-port replies. Its hosted live proof marks the sandbox's IPv6 neighbor entry stale on its managed bridge and repeats the allowlisted connection, exercising a fresh neighbor discovery exchange. On an explicitly local host, the controller pins Docker to unix:///var/run/docker.sock; the rewrite is idempotent and only recognizes global Docker options, so workload arguments cannot spoof the pin. The host CLI does not inherit DOCKER_TLS_VERIFY or DOCKER_CERT_PATH: when requested by a workload, those values are passed to docker run / docker exec through a mode-0600 temporary env file, kept alive until the Docker command finishes and removed on return or cancellation. Newline values are refused. Remote and Unknown hosts keep ordinary Docker argv and environment unchanged; the native allowlist controller refuses allowlist creation there, as well as on Docker Desktop, rootless, and unverifiable hosts. The default Docker sandbox still refuses allowlists unless this controller is explicitly installed. The real firewall proof runs only in disposable hosted Ubuntu Docker CI.

Firewall resources are scoped to a Docker network owner/scope/attempt label. Chain names include a 48-bit SHA-256-derived box identity plus a 48-bit attempt suffix within iptables' 28-character limit. If the network is already absent, the orphan scan uses the longer box-specific prefix so another box's chain cannot block cleanup. When the matching network still exists, cleanup can reclaim only an empty, unhooked chain from the matching attempt; nonempty or unverified chains remain untouched.

The regression test uses default/box-0 and default/box-1, which collide on the previous four-hex prefix. It failed before the fix because cleanup refused while the other box's chain remained, and passes with the longer cryptographic identity. Existing restart recovery for an empty chain with its network present also passes. A deterministic TCP fixture confirms the published-port probe retries when the first connection closes cleanly before returning its response.

Docker network-create responses with an explicit already-exists conflict remain untouched; other nonzero results are reconciled because the daemon may have created the network before the response was lost. Cleanup removes only the network carrying this exact attempt token, preserving stale same-owner and foreign networks. Rollback failures now use the typed Error::EgressRollbackFailed variant, so the sandbox retains its box record without depending on a string-valued operation name. Public controller methods document their error conditions. The module README documents non-interactive, passwordless sudo without requiretty for Docker, iptables, and ip6tables; it no longer lists unused restore tools as a prerequisite. The test timestamp uses UNIX_EPOCH, Tokio's AsyncFd::register replacement is named in the unsafe API note, and the tracked compiler ICE dump was removed with future dumps ignored. The existing legacy numeric loopback test covers 127.1.

Local validation on the updated branch: fmt, strict all-target/all-feature Clippy, all-target/all-feature build, all-feature tests, and rustdoc with warnings denied pass. The workspace coverage script currently fails before producing a report because its --cfg coverage compile of the unchanged tinybox-module test target reports unresolved imports in resources_stdio.rs, resources_stream.rs, and mod_tests.rs; the exact-head hosted coverage lane passed on the preceding head and will be rerun. Focused tests cover nonzero network-create reconciliation and conflict preservation, rollback retry, workload env-file contents/mode/cleanup, nonlocal pass-through, daemon-pinning idempotence and spoof resistance, cleanup collision, neighbor rules, and response retry. The installed Docker CLI was verified to honor explicit --host ahead of conflicting DOCKER_CONTEXT and DOCKER_HOST; no real firewall-mutating test was run on the shared development host.

Summary by CodeRabbit

New Features
- Added opt-in outbound network allowlisting for containers on supported local, rootful Linux Docker hosts. Approved destinations are resolved and pinned before the workload starts; other outbound traffic is blocked.
Security
- Allowlist validation now rejects metadata-service and loopback destinations, including alternate hostname and IP address representations.
- Allowlist enforcement is unavailable on unsupported hosts and Docker configurations, including remote, rootless, and Docker Desktop environments.
Documentation
- Updated network policy documentation with allowlist behavior and platform requirements.

tinysweeper · 2026-10-23T13:24:43Z

Tiny Sweeper review

Reviewed head: 8e9043e626564dd66e28ec8e39ac4f22beb89019

Findings

No active actionable findings.

Resolved this pass

Accept neighbor discovery after the input-chain default drop
Accept neighbor discovery after the input-chain default drop

Verdict: Ready for maintainer review · Priority: none
Coverage: Reviewed 27 of 28 files; not reviewed: Cargo.lock.

Diagnostics and supporting details

Full summary

Pull request purpose (title): fix(core): reject loopback hosts in network allowlists. The description broadens this into loopback and metadata hardening in allowlist validation plus an opt-in native Linux Docker egress controller with attempt-scoped firewall ownership. The whole pull request adds loopback and hardened metadata rejection in EgressAllowlist validation, a resolver-backed pinned egress planner, an opt-in NativeLinuxDockerEgressController with per-attempt chain ownership, IPAM overlap checks and rollback-aware cleanup, DockerSandbox wiring including refusals for allowlist boxes without a controller, a defaulted HostExecutionLocation capability on the Host trait implemented by local, limited, jailed and SSH hosts, workload Docker credential handling through a mode-0600 temporary env file, a typed Error::EgressRollbackFailed, and matching spec, module README and live-suite updates. No trusted base-to-head push delta was available, so the whole pull request is described.

Unreviewed paths

Cargo.lock

Review snapshot

Change surface	Files	Review signal	Count
Production	13	Active findings	0
Tests	10	Noted findings	0
Documentation	3	Resolved findings	2
Configuration	1	Pending checks/questions	0

Completeness: Complete
Test assessment: Test coverage is assessed from changed tests and lane evidence; execution is not claimed without trusted check data.

What changed

No trusted push delta is available (reason: the review state has the prior reviewed head 90a9e3d and rendered evidence, but no trusted base-to-head diff comparison; cached prompt differences are not a proven push delta; current head 8e9043e). The whole pull request changes 28 files (5457 additions, 95 deletions), adding: loopback and legacy-numeric metadata rejection in EgressAllowlist validation with unit tests; crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs with plan_egress_allowlist and the egress resolver/target types; the opt-in NativeLinuxDockerEgressController in egress_enforcement.rs with per-attempt chain ownership, IPAM overlap checks and rollback-aware cleanup; DockerSandbox egress wiring plus the ControllerHost rewrite and a mode-0600 workload Docker env file; Error::EgressRollbackFailed; HostExecutionLocation on the Host trait with local, jailed, limited and SSH implementations and tests; and updates to docs/specs/contract-1-19.md, docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md and the live Docker suite. This section is not presented as a push delta.

Features

Added — Loopback host refusal in allowlist validation: Allowlist entries naming loopback addresses or aliases now fail validation with InvalidNetworkPolicy: IPv4/IPv6 loopback literals, IPv4-mapped loopback, scoped IPv6 such as ::1%1, localhost and .localhost names, and legacy numeric spellings like 127.1, 2130706433, 0x7f000001 and 0177.0.0.1. The documentation scopes this to entries as written rather than DNS-rebinding protection. (crates/tinybox-core/src/spec/types.rs impl EgressAllowlist {)
Modified — Metadata host matching hardened: Matching ignores DNS case and terminal root dots and recognizes legacy numeric IPv4 spellings of metadata addresses, so more equivalent spellings are refused at validation; resolved metadata answers remain the enforcing backend's responsibility. (crates/tinybox-core/src/spec/types.rs impl EgressAllowlist {, crates/tinybox-core/src/spec/mod_tests.rs fn allowlist_validation_rejects_malformed_and_metadata_hosts() {)
Added — Execution location capability per host: A defaulted Host::execution_location returns Unknown for custom hosts; LocalHost, LimitedLocalHost and JailLocalHost report Local and SshHost reports Remote, giving the Docker controller an explicit basis for accepting or refusing enforcement instead of guessing from a registration name. (crates/tinybox-core/src/runtime/mod.rs pub trait Host: std::fmt::Debug + Send + Sync + 'static {, crates/tinybox-host/src/local/mod.rs impl Host for LocalHost {, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/mod.rs impl Host for LimitedLocalHost {, crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs impl Host for JailLocalHost {, crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/mod.rs impl Host for SshHost {)
Added — Resolver-backed pinned egress planning: plan_egress_allowlist validates the allowlist, resolves each distinct hostname once (keeping absolute trailing-root-dot names distinct), normalizes IPv4-mapped answers, and rejects plans whose answers are metadata, loopback, empty, or IPv6 link-local needing an interface scope, producing pinned host/port/address targets for enforcement. Planning alone does not enforce traffic. (crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs pub use oneshot::{)
Added — Opt-in native Linux Docker egress controller: NativeLinuxDockerEgressController verifies a local rootful Linux Engine and firewall hooks, creates a labeled bridge network, verifies IPAM subnets do not contain pinned targets, installs default-drop forwarding and input chains before the workload starts, and performs ownership-checked, rollback-aware cleanup; unsupported, remote, Desktop and rootless environments are refused. (crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs pub use oneshot::{)
Modified — DockerSandbox egress wiring: DockerSandbox can be built with an egress controller; allowlist boxes are validated against the controller, the filtered network is prepared before container creation, run arguments pin /etc/hosts and loopback DNS, and destroy refuses an allowlist box when no controller is installed. (crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs impl DockerSandbox {, crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/args.rs pub(super) fn run()
Added — Workload Docker credential handling: When the controller rewrites Docker commands, DOCKER_TLS_VERIFY and DOCKER_CERT_PATH are stripped from the host CLI environment and passed to run/exec through a mode-0600 temporary env file kept alive until the command completes, with newline values refused and workload argv preserved. (crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs impl ExecutionObserver for DockerExecutionObserver {)
Added — Typed egress rollback failure: A new Error::EgressRollbackFailed variant carries the sandbox and combined setup/cleanup message so the sandbox retains the box record for cleanup retry without depending on a string-valued operation name. (crates/tinybox-core/src/error/mod.rs pub enum Error {, crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs impl DockerSandbox {)

Tests

unit — allowlist_validation_rejects_loopback_targets asserts validate() errors for 127.0.0.1, [::1], [::ffff:127.0.0.1], localhost, LOCALHOST., and service.localhost; separate loopback tests cover legacy-numeric spellings 127.1, 2130706433, 0x7f000001, 0177.0.0.1 and scoped ::1%1 and [::1%1]; the metadata test adds legacy numeric and root-dot spellings.: The Answered tests lane described these as written; execution is not confirmed by trusted check evidence. (crates/tinybox-core/src/spec/mod_tests.rs fn allowlist_validation_rejects_malformed_and_metadata_hosts() {, crates/tinybox-core/src/spec/types.rs impl EgressAllowlist {)
unit — Egress planning tests assert each distinct hostname is resolved once, absolute trailing-root-dot names stay distinct from unqualified names, loopback/metadata answers reject the whole plan, mixed safe/forbidden answers reject rather than drop one, IPv4-mapped answers normalize to IPv4 targets, private addresses are allowed, and empty answers reject.: The Answered tests lane described these as written; execution is not confirmed. (crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs)
unit — Controller tests cover missing bridge link refusal, pinned destination accepts, default-drop ordering, IPv6 neighbor-solicitation and neighbor-advertisement ordering via assert_input_return_rules, IPAM overlap rejection with rollback, ownership/scope/attempt label mismatch refusal before firewall mutation, ambiguous-create reconciliation, and cleanup collision regressions.: The Answered tests lane described these ordering and rollback paths as pinned; execution is not confirmed. (crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs, crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs impl Sandbox for DockerSandbox {)

Before merge

None.

Agent review details

critique

Conclusion: Success
Scope reviewed: all assigned evidence
Positive: The Answered critique lane reported 0 new findings on the files it reviewed.
Lane summary: This is a documentation-only addition (a new README.md for the egress enforcement module), so there is no code to break. The prior finding about neighbor discovery was disputed by the maintainer; re-checking the current head, the README's claim that "The input chain permits IPv6 Neighbor Solicitation and Advertisement for neighbor discovery" is backed by egress_enforcement.rs:617, which installs rules for `neighbor-solicitation` and `neighbor-advertisement`, and the surrounding design is documented as a deliberate exception in docs/specs/tinybox-runtime.md. Nothing in current-head code or the lookups independently supports the earlier concern, so it is dropped. I checked the README's factual claims against the implementation it documents (host requirements, rollback semantics, chain-owner verification, the pinned-plan and `/etc/hosts` mapping behaviour, and the stated limitations) and found them consistent with the code I was shown; no reportable defect.

security

Conclusion: Success
Scope reviewed: all assigned evidence
Positive: The Answered security lane reported 0 findings on the files it reviewed.
Lane summary: Reviewed 0 files; 0 findings. 1 file was not security-reviewed: crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md (prose or tabular data). (1 earlier finding(s) still open)

tests

Conclusion: Success
Scope reviewed: all assigned evidence
Lane summary: The prior disputed finding (neighbor-discovery ACCEPT in the input chain) is present in current-head code exactly as before: `install_family` accepts neighbor-solicitation/advertisement in the input chain and the test helper only pins ordering relative to the established/drop rules, so the concern is not established as actionable and is dropped rather than repeated. One concrete test-adequacy gap remains that I can verify from the diff: `cleanup_refuses_a_network_scope_hash_collision_before_firewall_mutation` and `cleanup_refuses_firewall_chains_with_another_owner_marker` assert only `is_err()` plus absence of `-D/-F/-X`, which would pass even if the refusal came from an unrelated failure path; that is weak but not a defect I can anchor to a reachable misbehaviour, so I report nothing. No new reportable defect found in this revision.

commits

Conclusion: Success
Scope reviewed: all assigned evidence
Positive: The Answered commits lane reports no sensitive content in committed files.
Lane summary: No sensitive content in committed files. (1 earlier finding(s) still open)

description

Conclusion: Success
Scope reviewed: all assigned evidence
Positive: The Answered description lane reports the new commits wire the egress controller into DockerSandbox, move the failed-create reconciliation into a helper, and add the env-file rewrite for DOCKER_TLS_VERIFY/DOCKER_CERT_PATH. It records the disputed neighbor-discovery finding as not holding at this head, reasoning that in a container the bridge-side reply to a Neighbor Solicitation is host-originated and passes through OUTPUT.
Lane summary: The added file is a README documenting the opt-in Docker egress controller; it matches the implementation in the diff (local rootful Linux, pinned resolutions, owner markers, refusal matrix) and introduces no code. I could not independently verify the disputed prior finding about neighbor-discovery acceptance from this revision's evidence: the underlying install order in egress_enforcement.rs is unchanged from the earlier head and no current-head code or lookup rules out the claimed behaviour, but the maintainer's dispute plus the live test that marks the neighbor entry stale and re-probes suggests the ordering is intentional and exercised; I am not re-raising it without new evidence. (1 earlier finding(s) still open)

Evidence and run details

Models: ladder/vectors-oai3, deepseek-v4.1-flash
Spend: $0.012802
Tokens: 384751 input · 3616 output · 90368 cached · 804 embedding
Updated: 2026-10-23T20:23:01Z
Continuity: summary cache chain restarted at the storage ceiling.

Head	State	Pass summary
`e2327ff49b48`	ready for maintainer review	0 active finding(s), 9 resolved finding(s) (at 2026-10-23T20:03:52Z)
`dc79eeebdb31`	ready for maintainer review	0 active finding(s), 5 resolved finding(s) (at 2026-10-23T20:09:29Z)
`fa3bdd456b5a`	ready for maintainer review	0 active finding(s), 4 resolved finding(s) (at 2026-10-23T20:15:21Z)
`90a9e3d14c3a`	ready for maintainer review	0 active finding(s), 0 resolved finding(s) (at 2026-10-23T20:18:44Z)
`8e9043e62656`	ready for maintainer review	0 active finding(s), 2 resolved finding(s) (at 2026-10-23T20:23:01Z)

chatgpt-codex-connector · 2026-10-23T13:24:49Z

Codex Review Summary

This comment shows the latest Codex review activity on this pull request.

Review	Status	Commit	Review trigger
📝 Code Review	✅ Completed 2026-10-23T20:24:38.611677Z	`8e9043e`	New commits

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coderabbitai · 2026-10-23T13:24:53Z

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crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md
crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs
crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs

📝 Walkthrough

This change adds opt-in egress allowlist enforcement for native local rootful Linux Docker. It resolves and pins destinations, configures bridge and firewall rules, and integrates setup and cleanup with the sandbox lifecycle. Host execution-location reporting and allowlist validation are also extended.

Changes: Docker Egress Allowlist

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Host location and allowlist validation `crates/tinybox-core/src/runtime/`, `crates/tinybox-core/src/spec/`, `crates/tinybox-host/src/`, `crates/tinybox-ssh/src/host/`	The `Host` API reports local, remote, or unknown execution locations. Allowlist validation rejects explicit loopback entries and additional metadata-host spellings.
Resolve and pin destinations `crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress.rs`, `crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_tests.rs`, `crates/tinybox-docker/src/lib.rs`	The planner resolves normalized hostnames and creates pinned address-and-port targets. Tests cover resolver behavior and rejected addresses.
Native Docker enforcement `crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs`, `crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/*`, `crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs`, `crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml`, `crates/tinybox-core/src/error/mod.rs`	The opt-in controller validates the host and daemon, prepares an owned bridge and firewall rules, and supports ownership-aware rollback and cleanup.
Sandbox lifecycle integration `crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/*`	The sandbox prepares the egress network before container startup, passes pinned mappings to Docker, and cleans up during rollback or destruction. Local Docker commands use the controller wrapper for command rewriting and TLS environment handling.
Specifications and live Docker coverage `docs/specs/*`, `crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs`, `.gitignore`	The specifications describe controller-gated allowlist behavior. The live test checks allowed and blocked traffic over IPv4 and IPv6, published-port responses, and cleanup.

Priority: ⚪ Pending latest changes

Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes

Change: Feature

Sequence Diagram(s)

sequenceDiagram
  participant Client
  participant DockerSandbox
  participant NativeLinuxDockerEgressController
  participant EgressResolver
  participant DockerEngine
  participant Firewall
  Client->>DockerSandbox: create allowlist box
  DockerSandbox->>NativeLinuxDockerEgressController: prepare egress network
  NativeLinuxDockerEgressController->>EgressResolver: resolve hostnames
  EgressResolver-->>NativeLinuxDockerEgressController: return addresses
  NativeLinuxDockerEgressController->>DockerEngine: create and inspect bridge
  NativeLinuxDockerEgressController->>Firewall: install IPv4 and IPv6 rules
  NativeLinuxDockerEgressController-->>DockerSandbox: return prepared network and mappings
  DockerSandbox->>DockerEngine: start container

Suggested reviewers: m3ga-mind

Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to fa3bd

Operators following the README may grant the wrong privilege and still be unable to set up allowlists. Correct the prerequisite; the remaining issue is bounded and does not block merging.

Pre-merge checks: 4 · 1

Failed checks: 1 warning

Check name	Status	Explanation	Resolution
Docstring Coverage		Docstring coverage is 44.72% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 246 functions across 22 files. (3 skipped…	Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.

Passed checks: 4 passed

Check name	Status	Explanation
Description Check		Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check		The title clearly and concisely describes the primary change: rejecting loopback hosts in network allowlists. It is directly related to the pull request objectives.
Linked Issues check		Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check		Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.

Full details: Docstring Coverage

Explanation

Docstring coverage is 44.72% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 246 functions across 22 files. (3 skipped: 3 unsupported.)

Resolution

Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.

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Inline comments:
Review comments at @crates/tinybox-core/src/spec/types.rs:
- Line 314: Extend loopback detection used by EgressAllowlist::validate to
recognize numeric IPv4 shorthand such as 127.1 in the syntax accepted by the
enforcing backend, and add 127.1 to the loopback regression cases. Preserve
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Extend the malformed-host cases to include trailing-dot forms of the metadata hostnames, ensuring the allowlist validator rejects them as well. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Metadata host matching now strips terminal root dots before comparing, so names like `Metadata.Google.Internal.` are refused instead of slipping through the allowlist check. The contract spec was updated to document the case-insensitive, root-dot-tolerant matching. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Expose an egress module that resolves and pins allowlist targets so sandbox network access can be planned against stable addresses. The new types and plan_egress_allowlist are re-exported from the crate root for callers. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Hostname normalization no longer strips the trailing root dot, so absolute names such as "service." stay distinct from their relative counterparts instead of collapsing into the same allowlist entry. Tests were extended to cover the absolute-name case and to disambiguate Result from the crate's Error type. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Adds tests asserting that IP literal allowlist entries are pinned without resolution and that forbidden literals are rejected, plus a test that resolver failures surface as backend errors. The existing hostname test now also checks that both configured ports are retained. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Add assertions for the execution_location accessor on the local and SSH hosts, and on the SSH host's inner host, so the new reporting behaviour is exercised for local, remote, and unknown cases. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Introduce a HostExecutionLocation enum and an execution_location method on the Host trait so security-sensitive controllers can determine whether a host runs commands locally or remotely instead of inferring it from the host's registration name. Custom hosts default to Unknown until they explicitly attest to their locality. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Implement execution_location on LocalHost so callers can tell that commands run on the local machine rather than a remote host. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

SshHost now implements execution_location and returns Remote, so callers can tell that commands run on the far machine rather than locally. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Add tests that verify the egress controller prepares the allowlist before the container starts and cleans up after destroy, and that a controller failure rolls back the box record before it is dropped. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Register the new egress_enforcement module and re-export DockerEgressController and NativeLinuxDockerEgressController so callers can enforce egress policy through the native Linux backend. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

The Docker sandbox now accepts an optional egress controller that can rewrite docker argv before execution, letting callers install per-box allowlist filtering. Without a controller the sandbox keeps refusing NetworkPolicy::Allowlist as before. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

The remove_container helper now passes its argv straight to run_docker instead of wrapping it with docker_argv, since the caller already supplies the full command. This removes a redundant layer of argument construction with no change in behaviour. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Add a validate_host method to the DockerEgressController trait with a default no-op implementation, and have the native Linux controller check that the host is supported, the target is Linux, and the engine and firewall are available. Also skip forcing the local rootful docker env prefix when the command already starts with env. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Wrap the host in a ControllerHost that rewrites docker argv through the egress controller before execution, so observed hosts and sandboxes with a controller attached get the same egress handling as the primary host. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

The docker sandbox now installs an egress filter through the egress controller when a box requests an allowlist network policy, instead of refusing the policy outright. The controller validates the host and prepares the default-drop filter before the container starts, and any failure during create tears the egress state back down so no filter is left behind. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Docker client credentials for the workload were previously forwarded as `--env` flags, exposing them in the host CLI environment and process argv. They are now written to a mode-0600 temporary file passed with `--env-file`, which is removed once the host operation finishes. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

The PreparedDockerRequest field holding the workload env file is now named _env_file, marking it as intentionally retained rather than read. This keeps the file alive for the lifetime of the request without triggering unused field warnings. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

The workload environment file is now written only when the request actually invokes docker, and the environment keys are cleared unconditionally so they never leak into the container. Requests that carry workload env vars but are not run or exec now fail with a clear error instead of silently dropping them. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Replaced the negated is_some_and check with is_none_or for clarity, and swapped the splice call for two inserts when adding the env-file flag. Behaviour is unchanged. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Add a clippy allow attribute to the docker variable preservation test so the credential redaction and env-file lifetime assertions can stay together in one case. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Add a requires_local_docker_host capability to the egress controller trait, defaulting to false and enabled for the native Linux controller. Docker argv rewriting and the workload env file are now only applied when the controller demands a local host and the command actually runs locally, so remote execution no longer gets rewritten as if it were local. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Add a local() helper to ScriptedHost that builds a host pinned to HostExecutionLocation::Local, so tests can exercise the local execution path without repeating the struct setup. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

… rejection Add tests asserting that the native controller leaves nonlocal docker commands and environment untouched, and that workload env file writing rejects values containing newlines. The existing docker variable test now uses a local scripted host so it exercises the local path. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

The native controller test no longer asserts that the prepared request has no env file, since that field is gone. The remaining assertions already cover the behaviour under test. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

The forced docker command no longer passes --tls=false and --tlsverify=false, since the local unix socket host already implies no TLS and the extra flags were unnecessary. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Move the local daemon TLS pinning test out of the egress enforcement suite and add a Unix-only check that the generated workload environment file is written with 0600 permissions, so the test covers the file's access mode alongside its contents. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

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Add a regression test asserting that rewriting the workload docker env file leaves the trailing exec arguments untouched, so flags like --env are not mistaken for env file entries. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Docker run now rejects environment file injection unless the image and workload arguments are separated by --, and the env-file flag is inserted directly after the subcommand instead of after scanning the whole argv. This keeps option parsing from mistaking workload arguments for docker options. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

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Add a fake host behaviour that fails the network create command after the network has already been created, and a test asserting that the controller reconciles the current attempt's side effect by inspecting and removing the network rather than leaving it behind. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

When docker network create exits non-zero for a reason other than the network already existing, the controller now runs the same reconciliation path used for spawn failures instead of returning the raw error, so side effects from a partially created network are cleaned up. The "already exists" case still returns the original error unchanged. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

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Add a test asserting that a remote controller host preserves the caller's DOCKER_TLS_VERIFY environment and argv when no local env file is present, plus a ScriptedHost::remote helper to build that host. This guards against the remote path dropping TLS settings that the local env file rewrite would otherwise carry. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

Only write the workload docker env file when the execution location is local, so remote hosts no longer get a local env file they cannot use. The remote TLS test was reformatted to match. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

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Add a test asserting that a custom local docker controller leaves the daemon TLS environment untouched when preparing a request, guarding the behaviour against regressions. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

The env file is now written whenever the controller requires a local docker host and execution is local, rather than only when the argv was rewritten. This decouples the env file from argv rewriting so controllers that need a local host still get the file even when no rewrite occurs. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

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Review comments at @crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md:
- Around line 10-12: Update the README requirement text to distinguish direct
access to the rootful Docker socket by the calling user from passwordless,
non-interactive sudo access for iptables and ip6tables; do not imply Docker
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crates/tinybox-core/src/error/mod.rs
crates/tinybox-docker/Cargo.toml
crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement.rs
crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement/README.md
crates/tinybox-docker/src/egress_enforcement_tests.rs
crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs
crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod_tests.rs
crates/tinybox-docker/tests/live_docker.rs
crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs

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crates/tinybox-host/src/limited/jailed.rs
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The setup notes now state that the rootful Docker Engine socket must be accessible directly to the calling user, and that passwordless sudo is only needed for iptables and ip6tables rather than for Docker itself. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

This CodeRabbit review examined an older branch head (fa3bdd4), before the README correction at 8e9043e. The current README explicitly states that the caller accesses the rootful Docker socket directly and passwordless non-TTY sudo is required only for iptables/ip6tables. Exact-head CI run 40018698054 passed all 14 jobs, and pr-comments reports no unresolved threads. I re-requested review after the fix; dismissing only this stale verdict, not valid feedback.

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tinysweeper Bot added the priority: p3 Whenever. Cosmetic, a nicety, or a cleanup with no user visible effect. label Oct 23, 2026

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Comment thread crates/tinybox-core/src/spec/types.rs Outdated

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senamakel mentioned this pull request Oct 23, 2026

Tracker: consolidate security, policy, approvals and sandboxing into the tinysecurity bus module (+ tinybox audit) tinyhumansai/openhuman#7328

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senamakel and others added 4 commits October 23, 2026 13:48

merge: stack metadata IPv4 aliases on TinyBox #127

b56273a

merge: stack metadata DNS and IPv4 alias fixes

de10751

Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

senamakel mentioned this pull request Oct 23, 2026

fix(spec): reject metadata IPv4 aliases #130

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senamakel and others added 16 commits October 23, 2026 14:15

merge: stack pinned egress planning on TinyBox #130

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docs(egress): document resolve error condition

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Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

feat(local): report local execution location

d86fa6d

Implement execution_location on LocalHost so callers can tell that commands run on the local machine rather than a remote host. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

feat(ssh): report remote execution location for ssh hosts

6ef019d

SshHost now implements execution_location and returns Remote, so callers can tell that commands run on the far machine rather than locally. Auto-committed-on: cuttlefish Co-authored-by: Medulla <medulla@tinyhumans.ai>

senamakel and others added 11 commits October 23, 2026 19:49

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Comment thread crates/tinybox-docker/src/sandbox/mod.rs Outdated

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senamakel merged commit b784259 into main Oct 23, 2026
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senamakel mentioned this pull request Oct 24, 2026

[sec-bus] release: finish sandbox acceptance and publish a module release compatible with contract 2.5 senamakel/tinybox#59

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