Webmail: block remote CSS fetches when remote images are off

[ahmedhesham6]

Summary

With remote images off, processEmailContent rewrote only <img src>. The sanitizer allows <style> and style attributes, so CSS url(), @import, image-set() — and <img srcset> — all still fetched. Any one of them gave a sender a read receipt, timestamp, and IP from a reader the UI reported as protected.

This PR adds blockRemoteContent() in sanitize.ts as the single entry point for the preference and reduces the route to sanitize → block → return.

What it blocks

• <img src> — remote sources become the existing 1×1 placeholder pixel; data:/cid: sources are left alone so inline attachments keep rendering.
• <img srcset> — dropped whole when any candidate is remote, since srcset outranks src and would undo the rewrite. Candidates are parsed per the HTML rules (commas inside data: URLs are not separators).
• CSS url() — rewritten to none, keeping the rest of the declaration valid; data:/cid: exempt.
• CSS @import — dropped entirely, both url() and bare-string forms.
• CSS image-set() — remote string arguments replaced with an inert data:,, since they fetch with no url( token.

Covers both <style> bodies and style attributes (with the entity encoding sanitize-html applies to attribute values handled correctly).

Hardening details

• CSS comments are normalized to whitespace first, so url(/*x*/https://…) cannot split the token past the patterns.
• CSS escapes of ASCII alphanumerics are decoded first, so \75 rl(…) and @\69 mport cannot dodge the patterns. Other escapes are untouched.
• The comment and @import passes are hand-written linear scanners: the natural regexes backtrack quadratically on crafted input (/*a/*a…, repeated unclosed url(), which server-side is a denial-of-service lever.
• One shared inline-scheme definition (data:/cid:) backs every exemption so the passes cannot drift.
• Fast paths: mail with no style content, and CSS with no (, @, or \, skip the work and pass through byte-identical.

Blocking any of it sets the existing hasBlockedImages flag, so the current "remote content blocked" banner covers CSS too with no client change.

Notes

• Regex-over-HTML is best-effort by design; a follow-up worth considering is rendering the read pane in a CSP-restricted iframe so the browser enforces no-fetch and this pass becomes defense-in-depth.
• No new dependencies.

Closes #220

[Hydralerne]

thank you for your support
how ever, i found some issues in the pr

• Bypasses (remote fetch survives, no banner)

1. image-set() bare string containing ; { or } - HIGH

<style>a{background:image-set("http://evil.com/a;b" 1x)}</style> → unchanged, blocked=false

CSS_IMAGE_SET = /…image-set([^;{}]*/ truncates its span at the first ;/{/} - but those are ordinary characters inside a CSS string token, so the browser parses the whole URL and fetches. Worst part: the realistic data: fallback + remote sibling hits this every time (the ; in ;base64 truncates the span before the remote candidate):
image-set("" 1x, "http://evil.com/a" 2x) → remote 2x leaks

2. image-set() via escaped hyphen - HIGH

<style>a{background:image\2dset("http://evil.com/x" 1x)}</style> → unchanged, blocked=false

CSS_IMAGE_SET keys on the literal substring image-set(; image\2dset( doesn't match, but the browser resolves \2d→- while building the ident and forms a real image-set( function. (The url() form is safe here - CSS_REMOTE_URL is ident-independent - so only the bare-string form leaks.)

3. Decoy src= inside alt/title shields the real remote src - HIGH
   → unchanged, blocked=false
   The src rewrite /(\bsrc\s*=\s*)("[^"]"|'[^']')/i is non-global, and \b matches the src= inside the alt value (the space before it is a word boundary). It rewrites that first (inline, so it's left as-is) and stops - the genuine src="https://evil.com/track" is never inspected. This is the nastiest one: it breaks the plain case, which is the whole original feature. (data-src is safe only because the allowlist strips it - this is the same class of bug the allowlist happened to cover, but alt/title are preserved verbatim.)

also Correctness (false positives / broken render)

• D1 (med): inline image-set("data:a" 1x, "data:b" 2x) → mangled to image-set("data:a"data:,"data:b" 2x) and falsely blocked=true. CSS_REMOTE_STRING re-anchors on the closing quote of an exempt string. Destroys a legit zero-fetch retina background - violates the PR's own "inline data: survives" invariant.
• D2 (low): content:"@import" (the literal substring in a string) → stripImports deletes to EOF, unbalancing the block; blocked=true false positive. stripImports doesn't skip string/url() contents.
• D3 (low): fill:url(#grad) (same-document fragment ref, never fetches) → rewritten to none + blocked=true false banner.

suggested fix :

• image-set: replace the [^;{}]* span regex with a quote-aware, balanced-paren scanner (like the existing importEnd) to find the function's true extent; and normalize the ident (decode escaped -, or match image-set allowing escapes) before comparing.
• : stop regexing src out of the raw tag string - parse the tag's attributes (or at minimum require a real attribute boundary and make it global) so a src= inside alt/title can't shadow the real one.
• false positives: exempt bare url(#fragment); make CSS_REMOTE_STRING not span across an exempt string's boundary; make stripImports skip string/url() contents.

[ahmedhesham6]

Thanks for the feedback, will update the gaps

[ahmedhesham6]

Thanks for the sharp review — all six reproduce on the previous revision, and all six are fixed in faa955d.

Bypasses:

1. image-set() span truncation at ;/{/} — the span is now found by a quote-aware scan to the balancing paren (same approach as importEnd), so string contents can't end it early. Your data:…;base64 fallback + remote 2x case now blocks the remote candidate and keeps the data: one.
2. image\2dset( — escape decoding now includes \2d (-) alongside alphanumerics, so the ident normalizes to image-set( before matching. Same reasoning as the alnum escapes: - means the same thing in an ident and in a string, so decoding is safe there too.
3. Decoy src= in alt/title — blockImgTag no longer regexes src= out of the raw tag text. It walks the tag's attributes sequentially (name = value pairs), so only a real src/srcset attribute is inspected and a lookalike inside another attribute's value can't shadow it.

False positives:

• D1 — image-set strings are rewritten by a sequential token scan instead of a regex, so it can't re-anchor on the closing quote of an exempt string; image-set("data:a" 1x, "data:b" 2x) now passes through byte-identical and unflagged.
• D2 — stripImports skips string contents, so content:"@import" is left alone.
• D3 — url(#fragment) is exempt in the lookahead; a same-document reference never fetches.

All previous behavior holds (34 checks including your five cases, the original issue repro, adversarial-input timing on the new scanners, and an end-to-end pass through the sanitizer).

[Hydralerne]

perfect, gonna check last time then merge, ty

[Hydralerne]

also are you on x ? would love to know your handle :"